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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND . 
. Record No. 2686 
MER.CER STILLi\1:AN AND BERLO VENDING COM-
P .A.NY, A DELA Vf ARE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiffs in Error, 
versus 
0. vV. ·wrLLIA:MiS, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Honorable the Chief Justice a1id Justices of the Su-
preine Court of .Appeals of Virginia: 
The petitioners, Mercer S~illman and Berlo Yending Com-
pany, a Delaware Corporation, respectfully show that they 
are aggrieved by a final judgment entered by Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, _on August 31st, 
1942, in a certain action at law by notice of moti911 for judg·-
ment wherein 0. ,N. Willi~ms is plaintiff and the petitioners 
are defendants. The said judgment, of which petitioners 
complain, was rendered in favor of the said 0. W. Williams 
and against the petitioners in the sum of Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3,000.00) with interest from May 14, 1942, and 
costs. 
The petitioners are advised that errors to their 
2>K= *prejudice were committed by the trial court such as 
warrant and call for a review and reversal of said judg-
ment and a writ of error and supersedeas by this Court are, 
therefore, prayed for. 
With this petition is submitted a. transcript of the record 
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in the court below, together with all original exhibits sub-
mittecl at said trial. 
THE CASE IN BRIEF OUTLINE. 
This matter arises oi1t of a collision on February 14th, 
1941, between the Buick automobile of C. W. Williams, driven 
by himself, and the Ford automobile of· Mercer Stillman, 
driven by him on the business of his co-defendant, Berlo 
Vending· Company. The collision occurred on U. S. Route 
460, about seven miles east of Blackstone at the intersection 
of U. S. Route 460 with State Route 153. 
Route 460 at that point runs approximately east and west. 
Route 153 intersects 'but does not cross Route 460 and runs 
from it at an angle in a northeasterly direction. While 
Route 153 does not cross Route 460 as such, a county road 
continues in a southwesterly direction producing an inter-
section of highways in the nature of 'the letter ''X". 
"Williams, the plaintiff below, and hereinafter referred to 
as such, was traveling eastwardly on Route 460 from Black-
stone, intending to turn left or northeastwardly into 
3* •state Route 153 and across the line of travel of traffic 
westbound on Route 460. Stillman, one of the defend-
ants belo,v and hereinafter referred to as such, was traveling 
westward on Route 460 from Petersburg· toward Blackstone. 
The collision occurred at the intersection, the two vehicles 
striking directly head on in the center of the highway as the 
Williams car was in the act of commencing its left turn 
across the path of the oncoming automobile operated by 
Stillman. 
The view was unobstructed from the intersection where 
the collision occurred eastwardly along U. S. Route 460 in 
the direction from which ,Stillman approached around a slight 
curve for a distance of several hundred yards. The colli-
sion occurred between 8 :00 and 8 :30 o'clock in the morning 
of a day that was slightly misty without materially impair-
ing visibility. -
The plaintiff was unable to say, and no other witness said, 
that he had given any signal for a left turn. The plaintiff 
admitted that he did not see the oncoming car of the de-
fendant until after he had alreadv commenced or was in 
the act of commencing to make the wleft turn across its path. 
After the plaintiff had turned his car to the left approxi-
mately 2 to 4 feet across the center white line, he then saw 
the defendant's car approaching so close that it was bound 
to strike him. The plaintiff then again undertook to change 
his course by turning his car back toward the· rig·ht, where 
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it was struck head-on in the center of the highway astride 
the center white line. 
4~ *THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The trial court refused to strike· the plaintiff"s evidence, 
both at the end of his evidence in chief and at the conclusion 
of all the evidence. The motions to strike the evidence were 
based on the plaintiff's failure to establish primary negli-
gence of the defendants and more particularlv on .his own 
contributory negligence in any event as a matter of law. 
The trial court likewise refused the motions to set a.side the 
jury's verdict and to enter judgment for the defendants, 
preclica ted on the ~ame g-rounds. These several actions of 
the trial court constitute the sam(} assignment of error that 
the verdict and judgment are contrary to the law and to the 
evidence. · 
2. The trial court refused all instructions requested by 
both the plaintiff and the defendants and undertook to charge 
the jury in a single instruction prepared by the court. The 
court's instruction omitted material phases of the plaintiff's 
duties which were relied on as a defense bv the defendants. 
The court's refusal to grant any Qf the instructions requested 
bv the defendants and its further refusal to correct the omis-
sions and errors pointed out in the trial court's charge, con-
stitute a further assignment of .error, that the jury was im-
properly instructed. 
5• *3. The trial court permitted it to be shown to the 
jury, over defendants' objection, that the defendants' 
automobile was covered by public liability insurance at the 
time of the collision, and subsequently refused defendants' 
motion for a mistrial by reason thereof, wllich action of the 
court is likewise assigned as error in the admission of evi-
dence and in the refusal to declare a mistrial on that ac-
count. 
4. The trial court, notwithstanding formal exception to its 
action in respect thereto, limited the a.rg11ment of counsel 
to the jury to thirty minutes and denied the request that 
the time for argument be extended to 45 minutes. '1,his ac-
tion of the court is assigned as a further prejudicial error 
entitling defendants to a new trial at least. 
5. The trial court permitted plaintiff's counsel to indulge 
in highly improper and prejudicial argument to the jury 
over the strenuous objection of defendants, which action of 
the trial court is similarly assigned as error entitling de-
fendants to a new trial. 
6. Tl1e trial court committed various other errors to the 
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prejudice of the clef endants as shown by the record tendered 
herewith and now assigned as error but later spedfically 
6* set forth under an *appropriate head in this petition. 
The several assignments of error will be discussed in the 
order hereinabove mentioned . 
.ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I. 
THE DEFENDAi~TS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT IN . 
THEIR FAVOR ON THE· EVIDENCE . 
. The E,vidence in, Detail. 
The plaintiff was drivi~g eastwardly on Route 460. He 
intended to turn left or northeastwarclly into Route 153 upon 
, arrival at the intersection of the two highways (Transcript 
of Record, page 35). Such a movement necessarily required 
the plaintiff to turn across the line of travel of any traffic 
approaching the intersection from the east on Route 460. 
The plaintiff claimed that he was warned by an occupant of 
the car that he was approaching '' a very dangerous cross-
ing, the worst he knew'' and that, therefore, be slowed down 
until he "was possibly running twenty miles an hour". 
While the plaintiff is contradicted in this by the very person 
to whom he attributed such warning· (Tr., p. 90), his subse-
quent conduct should be viewed in the light ·of bis own, self-
revealed state of mind of extreme caution due to a realiza-
tion of unusual danger. Moreover, such caution was due to 
have been exercised by him in the knowledge that he was in 
the country and that ·any oncoming traffic .._had the right to 
travel and could be expected to be traveling at the rate of 
55 miles per hour. 
7* $tThe plaintiff claimed that he '' looked in every di-
rection as I entered the intersection'', in fact, he claimed 
to have looked twice in every direction (Tr., p. 36). The 
further narrative account of the accident by the plaintiff is 
as follows: 
'~I made the turn, and just as I made the turn to go in, 
I looked down the road and saw something coming at a 
rate of speed which was very unusual. I lmew I could not 
get throug·h if he came on that way, and, believing he would 
stop or slow clown for the intersection, I turned my car to 
the rig·ht until I bad it nearly exactly, a.s far as I could tell, 
straight in the road, and the car was still coming, and ap-
proad1ed the intersection, which has later proved to be about 
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eig·hty feet, and wlien I sa.w he would not stop I applied my 
brake and stopped my car, and almost in the same instant, 
I can hardly tell what, in a split second, his car crashed into 
mine" (Tr., pp. 36-7). . ' 
Plaintiff's counsel then took the plaintiff back over the 
same ground by detailed question and answer as follows : 
'' Q. When you approached the intersection, before you 
started to turn, knowing·, however, that you were going to 
turn, and before you got over the white line at all, how fast 
were you traveling? 
"A. Approximately twenty miles. 
'' Q. ·when you finally decided to begin to turn across the 
white line to the left, did you look down the road to see if 
anything· was coming from towards Petersburg? 
'' A. I looked down the road next to the last thing I did 
and the last thing I did was to turn my car and look a11ead. 
*" Q. How far had you gotten across with your front 
8* wheels, preparing to go into Route 153, before this man 
hit vou? 
'· A. r" was only slightlv in, one or two feet. It would be 
out of the question to tell definitely, but I was over the line 
anywhere from two to four feet, to the be'st of my knff\,vl-
edge. 
''Q. When you saw him coming and, as you say, realizing 
he was c.oming so fast and that you could not make it, what 
did you do? 
"A. J moved mv car a little. 
'' Q. "Which way'? · 
'' A. To the right. 
'' Q. Did you get your car straight? 
'' A. Almost exactlv. 
'' Q. Do you know ,Yhether or not you came to a dead stop 
before you were hiU 
'' A. To the lJest of my knowledge and belief I came to a 
dead stop at the time that he entered the intersection. 
'' Q. At. the time you first saw him, when you bad gotten 
over two to fol'tr feet across the white line, preparing to 
go into Route 153, had he gotten to the intersection Y 
'' A. No, l1e was beyond the intersection when I first saw 
him. 
'' Q. Can you give us an idea of bow far he was from the 
faterse~tion when vou first saw him Y 
'' A. It would be· hard to give an estimate. It was just a 
flash. · · 
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'' Q. Can you give us an estimate of tlie rate of speed he 
was traveling when you first saw himY 
'' A. My impre-ssion when I first saw him was anywhere 
from 60 to 90 miles an hour. 
"Q. You don't think it was less than 60? 
'' A. Certainly not less than 60, and possibly more than 
that. It was just a flash; a thing you *could not just 
9"" easily tell, because it was just a dart'' (Tr., pp. 37-38). 
It is abundantly clear from both of the foregoing_ accounts 
by the plaintiff on direct examination, one, his general state-
ment without benefit of counsel and the other directed by the 
leading strings of most adroit counsel, that the plaintiff did 
twt see the approaching car of the def end ant until after he 
had commenced to make his left i'urn and bad gotten his 
front wheels some two to four feet across the white line in 
the center of the highway. 
The foregoing is alone sufficient, we submit, to convict 
the plaintiff of contributory negligence as a matter of law .. 
But further scrutiny of the plaintiff's own testimony and of 
the undisputed evidence as to his · opportunity for seeing 
renders the ma.tte1: of the plaintiff's own negligenc.e incon-
testable. 
Leaving aside' for the moment the · plaintiff's testimony 
that he didn't know whether or not he gave any hand signal 
as required by law, before undertaking to make the left 
turn, and the plaintiff's written statement, filed in evidence, 
that he did not give any such signal (which is positive evi-
dence that it was not given, uncontradicted by any other evi-
dence) (Tr., pp. 42, 71, 87, Dfdfs. ]}x. No. 1), many other and 
even more significant facts appear from the cross examina-
tion of the plaintiff. 
10* e,' Q. You had not seen him when you undertook to 
turn? 
"A. No. 
'' Q. And, after you started to turn and got well into the 
turn you saw him coming? 
'' A. I saw him coming. 
"Q. Then you went back! 
''A. Yes. 
'·'Q. You had started to make a left turn? 
'' A. Yes. 
'' Q. And then changed it and went back in the other di-
rection? 
''.A. Turned it a foot or two and then saw him. 
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'' Q. Had you turned enough to get your left-hand rear 
wheel across the white line Y 
'' A. To the best of my knowledge it had not crosse~, my 
left-hand wheel had; but my right hand had not. 
"Q. ·which is which? 
'' A. I beg your pardon. I will correet it. l\ily left-hand 
wheel was, as I have said, at the time, I think, 2 to 4 feet 
across. 
''Q. That was your left front wheel, was it not? 
'' A. My left front wheel. I said wrong. I could not see 
my rear wheel. · 
* * * 
'' A. M v left-hand front wheel and mv left rear wheel were 
right up °iiear the middle of the road as I approached. 
"Q. And you were turning into the intersection practi-
callv on the white line anvhow t 
"A. Yes, rig·ht up to it,.., (Tr., pp. 61-62). 
It also developed from the plaintiff, himself, that 
11 * ~the oncoming car of the defendant was withiri 50 to 
75 feet of him before he saw it, and, what is even more 
important, that it had also traveled a considerable distance 
within the plaintiff's view before it was observed by him. 
''Q. Is it not true you did not see this car until you turned 
, to the left 1 
'' !,... I had made my final pass and realized all roads were 
clear and I turned to the left ( no sense in looking- to the 
right on 460) and I caught something corning·, maybe 50 or 
mavbe 75 feet awav. 
'' Q. That thing· ;as as far as you. could see? 
'' A. No: it hnd come part of the distance without my see-
ing- it and it came the rest of it; so I could not tell how fast 
it WflS coming, because it is like seeing and hearing· a train 
comin_g· on the railroad at 90 miles an hour; like a bumming 
bird when I was a boy. 
'' Q. How much had that cRr come when you did not see 
it? 
"A. Impossible to tell'' (Tr., p. 58). 
·w'ith the foregoing- statements by the plaintiff in mind, 
it is of prime importance to ascertain from the evidence how 
far away the defendants' ca.r could have been seen when it 
first came .into the view of a driver approaching the inter-
....-:--
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section slowly from the west on Route 460 and intending to 
turn left into Route l 53 as was the plaintiff. 
The photographs and plats in evidence show that Route 
460, in the vicinity of the collision, formed a slight curve-
to the right from the plaintiff's viewpoint as he proceeded 
eastwardlv from Blackstone and to the left from the point 
of. view of the def enclant, Stillman, as he proceeded 
12:l!c *in the opposite direction west toward Blackstone from 
· Petersburg·. (See Plats, Defts. Exhibits 8 and 9; Pho-
tographs, Pl. Ex. 2, 3 and 4, Dfdts. Ex. 2·,. 5, 12, 13 and 14.) 
By laying a ruler across Dfdts. Ex. 8 ( the plat drawn to 
the scale 1"=40'), it is easily demonstrated that a straight 
line from a point on the left side of the westbound lane of 
travel 100 feet west of the intersection, where. the plaintiff 
was as he approached the intersection going· east, can be 
drawn. without leavin,_q the paved highway, to a point on 
the right side of the hi~hway g·oing· west, as the defendant: 
was. some 400 feet east of the intersection. As the plaintiff 
approached the intersection, the ref ore, he had a clear view 
on the hi.qhway itself for 500 feet to see approaching- traffic .. 
There was no dispute as to the accuracy of the plat. If the 
defendants' automobile was 50 to 75 feet of the plaintiff 
when it was :first seen, it had traveled a minimum of about 
425 feet in full view of the plaintiff on the highway without 
being· seen by him and before he gave any intimation that 
he was going· to turn left. 
If the visibility across the shoulder to the edge of the 
rig·ht of way is taken into consideration, the consequent arc, 
representing· tl1e distance a westbound ve11icle would be 
plainly visible from 100 feet west of the intersection then 
becomes approximately 800 feet; and the defendants' auto-
mobile traveled slig·htly more than 700 feet in plain view 
of the plaintiff iv·ithout being seen bv him and before he 
gaye by signal or otherwise any indication that he was 
13* «igoimr to turn left.. 
Dfdts. Ex. 12 was taken, looking' west on Route 460 
from a point 250 steps east of the intersection. It shows 
the fast 750 feet .traveled bv. the defendants' ca.r before the 
collision. It is a view in the direction of travel of the de-
fendanfa' car. The intersection and the posts in the inter-
section where the plaintiff · says he undertook to start his 
furn nre clearlv and plainly visible. That picture is indis-
putable proof tl1at the plaintiff either in or auproaching tha.t 
fotersection and undertaking- to make a left turn therein, 
had a: clear view of the defendants' car for the distance 
shown therein, or more than 750 feet. Dfdts. Ex. 14 shows 
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the same distanc.e. looking- in the opposite direction. lt shows 
exactly what the plaintiff c.ould have seen as he approached 
the intersection intending- to turn left into Route 153. It 
shows that an automobile approaching from the east, as 
was the defendant, could have been seen at least twice as 
far away as the intersection sign appearing· in the near dis-
tance of that photogTaph. That sign was shown by the plat · 
and bv measurement to be 457 feet east of the intersection. 
(Dfdts. Ex. 8, Tr., p. 118.) 
Tke important fact in connection therewith is, of course, 
that the plaintiff did not give any indication whatever, by 
signal or otherwise, of his intention to turn as he approached 
the turning- point and as the defendant was approaching 
him. "When the plaintiff had only made 2. to 4 feet of his 
turn the defendant ·was alreadv within 50 to 75 feet of 
14 * him. Considering- the '"'relative speeds testified to, that 
is 20 compared to 60 or 90, the defendant could not have 
been but a few feet more than 50 or 75 feet away when the 
plaintiff first commenced t9 make his turn without prior 
warning. 
The plaintiff's witness, _t.\.ttorney Beecher E. Stallard, said 
that two vehicles, one l1eaded east on Route 460 and getting 
readv to turn left into Route 153 at the intersection and ·the 
other east of the- intersection and headed west on Route 460, 
could see one another when the second was a distance of 350 
to 400 ya.rds east of the intersection (Tr., pp. 102, 101). 
The plaintiff, himself, said that the visibility was perfect 
and that one could see ea.siJy 300 feet around the curve (Tr., 
pp. 51, 40, 34). While it is plain from the plat, from the 
pictures and from all the other testimony that the plaintiff's 
view of the oncoming car was not by any means so limited to 
300 feet, the plaintiff's negligence· is just as clearly demon-
strated by his own :figures. From them it appears that tl1e 
defendants' car traveled 225 to 250 feet in plain view with-
out being· seen by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was only 2 to 
4 feet over the white line when the defendants' car wa's first 
seen only 50 to 75 feet away (Tr., pp. 58,. 61-2, 37-8). It is, 
as above stated, clear from his testimony that the plaintiff 
]md only just turned his car the 2 to 4 feet across the white 
line when he first saw the defendants' car onlv 50 to 75 feet 
away. ·while the plaintiff was looking and getting ready to 
tum Hnd actually turning the 2 to 4 feet that first announced 
l1is intention to turn left, the *defendants' car was 
15* traveling 225 to 250 feet towards the plaintiff in the 
plain view of the plaintiff but not seen by him. And 
notwithstanding, the plaintiff made his turn, without any 
signal whatever in the face of that approach. 
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The plaintiff claimed the defendants' car was moving at 
60 to 90 mil~s per hour. This was approximately_ 90 to 135 
feet per second. It could have been seen according to the 
plaintiff 300 feet away. The defendants' car was then in 
full view for some 2 to 21h seconds before it was seen, on 
the plaintiff's own evidence.' The plaintiff was traveling 
about 20 miles an hour, or 30 f~et per second. The plaintiff 
was then, on his ovn1 evidence, within 60 to 75 feet of the 
point of impact when the defendants' car came into view 
about 300 feet away. Yet the plaintiff did not undertake to 
cross the white line or ~ive any other indication of his inten-
tion to turn left across the path of'l the oncoming defendants, 
by signal or otherwise, until the last f~w feet of the 60 to 
75 feet and when the defendants' car was almost within 50 · 
to 75 feet of him. 
The evidence that no signal of any kind was given by the 
plaintiff is clear. His signed written statement was filed in 
evidence. (Dfdts. Ex. 1, Tr., p. 75.) It states in part-
'' I did not give any arm or hand or any signals for a left 
turn.'' 
16* ~The plaintiff was asked on direct examination 
before the statement was introduced in evidence whether 
·he gave any sig·nal before making the turn. His answer was 
that he usually did, but whether he did on this occasion or 
not, he did not rem,eniber or know (Tr., p. 42). After the 
statement was introduced, he de~ied that he told the person 
takin~; the statement that he gave no signal, and repeated 
tha.t he didn't even remember whether his window was up 
or down (T:r., p. 71). 
The written statement is undeniably positive evidence that 
no signal was given. Moreover, there is no contradiction 
by the plaintiff, himself, of the positive fact so asserted by 
the statement. The plaintiff merely asserts tl}.at he does not 
know. 
But, whether he gave the signal or not, the plaintiff's neg-
ligence in turning left in full view of the defendants' car, 
so nearly approaching as claimed in such neg·ligent manner, 
is clearly sufficient to bar any rec.overy by hin;i in any event. 
On the foregoing, w:e submit, the plaintiff is clearly not 
entitled to recover as a matter of law. The plaintiff under-
took to turn left from a direct line and across the line of 
travel of oncoming traffic. whose op~ration would clearly be 
affected thereby, without having first seen that such move-
ment could be made in safety and without first giving the 
signal for such turn required by law. Va. Code, 1940, §_2154 
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(122). This was done, moreover, in the faee of the near ap-
proach of an oncoming vehicle, traveling as claimed, at 
17* a very reckless rate '"'of speed. The plaintiff, himself, 
by ·his own act of attempting to turn back to the right 
after turning only 2 to 4 feet, gave the clearest acknowledg·-
ment of his prior negligence in undertaking to make the· turn 
under those circumstances in the first place. At all events 
his second change of course further added to the cause of 
the collision. 
Mr. Bruce, passeµger in the plaintiff's car, saw the de-
fendants' car when it was 200 to 250 feet a way. He then 
hollered to the plaintiff to ''Look". He said that the de-
fendants' car turned to its left during its last 50 to 60 feet 
of travel before the collision (Tr., p. 83). This was evi-
dently when the plaintiff made his left turn and Stillman 
thereupon undertook to try to go behind him. But the plain-
tiff even then turned back to his right and the vehicles met 
in the center of the highway (Tr., pp. 83, 85, 46, 106). Mr. 
Bruce also said that he did not see whether the plaintiff 
gave any sig'llal for a left turn before undertaking to make 
it ( Tr., p. 87). 
We have not commented on the evidence offered by the de-
fendants. Stillman received a severe blow on the head which 
knocked him unconscious. The lack of re<mllection on his 
part of the events immediately before the accident is neither 
unreasonable nor uncommon in such cases (Tr., pp. 153-4). 
Had he testified contrary to the plaintiff his evidence would 
not be relevant on .this motion. · ·what he might· or might· 
not have said, the_refore, is immaterial here. Other 
18* *witnesses placed the vehicles after the collision on the 
plaintiff's left side of the highway so close to the high-
way markers on that side that they interfered with getting 
the injured out of the defendants' car on that side (Tr., pp. 
128, 140). 
All of the witnesses agreed tha.t the Buick and the Ford 
were locked head-on, west of the stobs in the center of Route 
153 and around which the plaintiff was due to turn. That is 
to say that the plaintiff, going east and intending to turn 
left, never reached the center of the hig·hway around which 
the law required him to turn (Tr., pp. 126, 131, 134, 140). 
This would indicate that the plaintiff was "cutting" the cor-
ner. The plaintiff, himself, soug·ht to offset the effect of this 
by contending that he was knocked back by the impact (Tr., 
p. 46), but no pbvsical evidence corroborated him in that 
claim (Tr., pp. l 42-3). 
We shall not undertake to discuss the plaintiff's conten-
tions reg·arding the ei·rors in his written statement with 
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which he was confronted and which clearly convicted him of 
negligence (Dfts. Ex. 1; Tr., p. 75). A careful comparison 
of it with the plaintiff's testimony at the trial will disclose 
no material variation between the two. 
We most respectfully submit that the jnevitable conclusion 
from all the evidence is that the plaintiff did not exercise 
the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would 
have exercised under those circumstances, which is to 
19* *say that he was guilty of negligence that bars any re-
covery by him. The authorities, now briefly reviewed, 
are in full accord with that conclusion. 
The Decisions in Point. 
The case is controlled, we submit, by prior decisions of this 
Court. The sole question is whether the operator of one ve-
hicle approaching an intersection, where the view is unob-
structed for a reasonable distance, and intending to turn left 
therein, can do so, without any signal whatever for such turn 
and notwithstanding the near approach of another oncoming 
and clearly visible vehicle, with which he collides in making 
such turn and which he does not see until it is 50 to 75 feet 
from him and only after he has· already turned just 2 to 4 
feet across the center white line, and still recover ag·ainst t 
such other vehicle. 
The principle involved is that of neg·ligence evidenced by 
the movement from a place of safety to one of obvious 
·danger. The Court has said in countless cases that one so 
acting cannot recover. Particularly.has the court so decided 
in cases of automobile collisions at intersections where the 
view of each motorist by the other is unobstructed for a rea-
sonable distance. And this Court has so held irrespective 
of the right of way in either party. 
The principle plainly applicable here was applied against 
the plaintiff in Johnson. v. I-I arrison, 161 Va. 804, 172 
20~ *S. E. 259, which involved an automobile collision at an 
intersection where the unobstructed view of each driver 
by the other was approximately 528 feet. The plaintiff in 
that case was denied the benefit of a jury's verdict in his 
favor, and notwithstanding his clear rig·ht of way over the 
defendant, on the · sole ground that one cannot blindly and. 
without seeing across the path of another automobile ap-
proaching in plain view at a dang·erous speed. 
The same principle was earlier applied in Nicholson, v. 
Garland, 156 Va. 745, 158 S. E. 901, where the unobstructed 
view was only 200 feet and the plaintiff bad the right of way. 
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That plaintiff was deprived of a judgment in his favor by 
the trial court on the same ground. 
In Ellett v. Carpenter, 173 Va. 191, 3 S. E. (2d) 370, the 
plaintiff was again deprived of a favorable verdict on the 
same g·round even after the plaintiff's right of way over the 
defendant was conceded. In that case the view was partly 
obstructed at a street intersection in the town of Culpeper. 
Notwithstanding all this, the fact that a collision occurred 
was found to be inconsistent with the exercise of a reasonable 
lookout by the plaintiff. Many cases were cited in that opin-
ion (173 Va. at p. 199). 
The principle was again applied against the plaintiff in 
Yellow Cab Co. v. Gitlley, 169 Va. 611, 194 S. E. 683. In that 
case there was an '' extended open view'' available to both 
parties. The taxicab proceeding east on Monument Avenue 
in the City of Richmond collided with the plaintiff's car 
21* *proceeding· southwardly on Lombardy Street at Stuart 
Circle. The plaintiff continued across the path of the 
oncoming taxi notwithstanding its approach. 
In Capps v. Whitson, 157 Va. 46, 160 S. E. 71, the def end-
ants automobile was proceeding South on Hampton Boule-
vard in the City of :Norfolk at a rapid rate. The motor bus 
of the plaintiff, proceeding west on 28th Street, stopped on 
the east side of Hampton Boulevard to discharge passengers 
and then started across the intersection in front of the de-
fendant's automobile when it was some 150 feet away. It was 
clear that plaintiff's ·bus was hi the intersection and crossing 
it before the defendant's car entered the intersection. Such 
action was said to constitute neglig·ence on the part of the 
plaintiff's ddver, sufficient to bar any right of recovery by 
her. 
In Brown v. Lee, 167 Va. 284, 189 S. E. 339, the plaintiff, 
Lee, was proceeding east on a paved highway. The defend-
ant, Brown, was traveling south on a dirt highway. The 
plaintiff could have seen the defendant when the latter was 
75 feet from the intersection, beyond which the view was ob-
structed by woods. The defendant could have seen the plain-
tiff for 300 feet before he reached the intersection. The plain-
tiff had the right of way as was clearly recognized in the 
opinion. As in the case at bar the plaintiff did not see the 
defendant until too late to do anything. This Court re-
versed a plaintiff's judgment and entered judgment for the 
defendant with this brief, but pertinent comment-
22* *'' The negligen~e of Lee is too plain for argument. 
As a proximate cause it contributed to his injury and 
he cannot recover.'' (167 Va. 285.) 
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In Ca,mp v .. Bryant, 1.71 Va. 390, 199 S. E. 469, the plain-
tiff, following another car on a dusty road, did not real~e, 
that it had stopped and, in turning out at the last moment 
to pass the stop?ed car, collided with another vehicle pro-
ceeding in the opposite direction on its proper side of the 
highway. The plaintiff's judgment was reversed and judg-
ment entered for the defendant because the plaintiff was neg-
lig·ent as a matter of law. The Court ~lso said in the opiµ-
ion, that, if the view was obstructed by dust as was claimed, 
the plaintiff's care shquld have been commensurate with the 
increased hazard. 
In Penoso v. D. Pender Grocery Co., 177 Va. 245, 13 S. E. 
(2d) 310, the plaintiff was proceeding north and the. defend-
ant west at a street intersection in Portsmouth. The plain-
tiff was struck broadside as she reached the far side of the 
intersection. The plaintiff saw the defendant '' a half a block'' 
away as she pr~eeded into the intersection, which distance, 
on cross examiffit tion, she conceded might have been sixty 
to seventy feet. A plaintiff's verdict was set aside and judg-
ment entered for the defendant. In affirming that action by 
the trial court, this Court, speaking through J\fr. Justice 
Gregory, said, at page 248 of the opinion: 
23* *"It· is true that one entering an intersection may ( 
presume that cars on the intersecting street are being 
operated lawfully, and that the duty to maintain a proper 
lookout does not extend beyond a reasonable distance in each 
direction. However, one may not w:antonly project himself 
into a dangerous situati~n, no matter how serious the dere-
lictions of the other party. ,Vhere a person realizes or should 
reasonably realize that the actions of another have created a 
dangerous situation, there is a duty to avoid the consequences 
of that situation.'' . 
In Yellow Cab Co. v. Eden, 178, Va. 325, 16 S. E. 625 the 
testimony of defendant's driver showed that he '' drove out 
from a place of safety in front of a car fast approaching" 
some two hundred yards from the intersection. The def end-
ant was on the right an~ clearly had the right of way over 
the other car. Such action was characterized by this Court 
as "an invitation to disaster, and the collision that occurred 
was a natural and probable consequence''. The opinion then 
cites most of the decisions hereinabove mentioned and there-
upon makes the following most pei·tinent observation at pao·e 
341: 0 
''The driver of a car who keeps a lookout and fails to take 
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advantage of what it discloses is as guilty of negligence as 
one who fails to keep a lookout. The result is usually the 
same. Yellow Cab Co. v. Gulley, s,upra." 
Garrison v. Burns, 178 Va. 1, 16 S. E. (2d) 306, is quite in 
point. The plaintiff was a passenger in the front seat of an 
automobile operated by Clements southwardly on ·a dirt road 
interesting U. S. Route 460 in the general vicinity of Suf-
folk. It collided with a car traveling west on Route 460 
and operated by Garrison. Clements was confronted with a 
stop sign which he observed. ·while Clements was 
24* *stopped another automobile passed and then he saw 
the Garrison car some 350 yards away a.nd approaching 
from the left at about 55 miles, that is within the speed limit. 
Clements pulled out into lioute 460 and undertook to turn 
left thereon tllinking he had ample time to make the movement 
in safety. He was struck by the Garrison car as he was mak-
ing the left turn. The plaintiff, Burns, secured a verdict 
against both ·Clemen_ts and Garrison on which the trial court 
entered judgment. A. writ of error by this Court was re-
fused to Clements. Garrison appealed on the ground that 
Clements' neglig·ence was the sole cause of the collision, in 
which contention this court agTeed, reversing the judgment 
against Garrison and entering· :final judgment in his favor. 
Chief Justice Campbell made the following observations 
at pages 7-8 of the opinion, which, we submit, are equally 
pertinent to the issue in the case at bar: 
"When we. apply the legal tape to the facts of this case, 
these measurements plainly ·appear: (1) Garrison was trav-
eling the hig·hway on his proper side, at a speed not in excess 
of the leg·al limit, to-wit, fifty-five miles per hour; (2) he saw 
Clements approaching the highway and assumed that he would 
not enter the highway until the way was clear; (3) before 
attempting to turn left, Clements failed to give the proper 
signal. 
'' It may be conceded, as contended, that Garrison's head-
lights were not on. In view of the admission of Clements 
that he saw the Garrison car approaching three hundred 
yards away, it is inconceivable that the absence of lights led 
him to attempt to enter the highway. It may also be conceded 
that when Garrison veered to t.he left he was guilty of 
25* an error in judgment. This *act of itself does not make 
him guilty of negligence, if he acted as a person of or-
dinary prudence would have acted under the same circum-
stances. Lavenstein v. llf aile. 146 Va. 789, 132 S. E. 844. 
"While we are not unmindful of the weight which attaches 
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to the verdict of a jury when the verdict has been approved 
by the trial court, it is the imperative function of this court 
to set aside the verdict of a jury, even though approved by 
the trial court, when the evidence does not warrant the :find-
ing of the jury. . 
'' A careful analysis of the evidence leads to the-inescapable 
conclusion that the verdict in question is not supported by 
the evidence. In our opinion, the sole .proximate cause of the 
accident was the neg·ligence of Clements in entering the high-
way at the time and in the manner shown by the evidence 
adduced.'' 
Re1nine and Meade v. Whited, 180 Va. 1, 21 S. E. 
1 (2d) 
7 43, is, we believe, _the latest confirmation of the principles 
here applicable. Remine was traveling east at moderate 
speed on Valley Street in Abingdon. Meade was going· south 
on Court .Street at moderate speed. The collision occurred 
at the intersection of the two streets. Remine was on the 
right. Against Meade there was a "stop" sign before he 
entered the intersection which he observed. He had nearly 
crossed Valley Street before he W€lS hit by Remine. The un-
obstructed view of each by the other was apparently about 
250 feet. Both motorists had looked but neither saw the other 
a sufficient time before the collision to avoid it. 
The plaintiff was· riding as a guest in Meade's car. She 
recovered a joint judgment against both Meade and Remine 
which this Court affirmed. 
Remine had the right of way and collided with a 
26* *car which was apparently violating· his right of way. 
· In reliance upon the line of authorities hereinabove 
cited this Court found that "it is, as we have seen, plain that 
Remine approached the intersection without looking, and he 
was negligent upon his own statement of what he did.'' (180 
Va. 8, 6-7.) 
As to Meade, the conclusion was that, if Meade had looked 
he was bound to have seen the Remine car coming, and, by 
reason of his undertaking' to cross under those circumstances, 
''his negligence was gross". · 
We most respectfully submit that. in t11e case at bar, the 
plaintiff's own testimony convicts him of turnin!?." left at an 
intersection acroRs the path of an oncomin!?," vehicle. the sneed 
of which he fixed at 60 to 90 miles per hour, and which. if 
he looked. he could and should have seen as far away as 800 
feet. or, at least, on his own admission, 300 feet. He did not 
see the oncoming car until it was 50 to 75 feet from him and 
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had then already crossed 2 to 4 feet onto the defendants' 
side of the road, where he was struck. 
Whether the plaintiff had a technical right of way under 
these circumstances, o~ the claim that he was already in the 
intersection and turning to the left therein, is of no avail to 
him on these facts. Under the .authorities cited, •he 
27* ,vas, in either event, guilty of negligence barring a re-
covery. 
The trial court appears to have taken the position (1) that 
the plaintiff was entitled to a presumption that he gave the 
proper hand signal, and (2) that the failure to give it was not 
negligence in any event because it could not have been seen, 
had it been given (Tr., pp. 19-20). · 
It is clear that plaintiff undertook to claim the benefit of a 
technical right of way under Va. Code 1940, Section 2154 
(123). That section grants a technical rig·ht of way to a 
vehicle already in the intersection and turning left therein, 
only on the condition that the driver of such vehicle has 
given the hand sig11al for such left turn as required by Va. 
Code, 1940, Section 2154 (122) that is, by holding his left 
hand out straight for fifty feet before commencing the move-
ment. But the plaintiff could not and did not say that he 
gave such signal. The record was not merely silent on the 
subject, as was the case in Scott v. Gimningharn, 161 Va. 367, 
171 S. E. 104. On the contrary, the plaintiff in the case at 
bar was asked, on direct examination, whether he gave the 
signal for a left turn constituting· the condition precedent to 
his claim to such right of way. He replied that he did not 
know (Tr., p. 42). On cross examination he volunteered the 
same (Tr., p. 71). His passenger, Mr. Bruce, testified that 
he saw no signal (Tr., p. 87). But the plaintiff's signed state-
ment made shortly after the. accident. and filed in evidence 
contains, as shown above, the following· positive asser-
28* tion by him *on the point-"I did not give any arm 
or hand or any signals for a left turn". (Dfdts. Ex. 
No. 1, Tr., p. 75.) This is not, therefore, a situation where 
the lack of any evidence whatever entitles the plaintiff to the 
benefit of a presumption. 
As to whether the signal would have peen seen by the de-
fendants, it is clear from the most cursory examination of 
the maps and the pictures, that 'the plaintiff could have seen 
the defendant .and the defendant could have seen the plain-:-
tiff for an appreciable interval of time and distance before 
the plaintiff commenced to make the turn. It will be remem-
bered that the plaintiff never made but 2 to 4 feet of his turn. 
By the time the mere 2 to 4 feet had been accomplished the 
defendant was already within 50 to 75 feet and had bee,n 
-
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coming in full view, on the plaintiff's own admission, for at 
least 225 to 250 feet before the turn was commenced. But 
not until the plain.tiff had traveled his la.st 2 to 4 feet, which 
was the only distance traveled in the titni, did the defendant 
have any not-ice whatever that the pla,intiff 'UJas going to inake 
such a titrn. Had the plaintiff's hand been out as he ap-
proached and prepared to make the turn and while the de-
fendant was traveling· the 225 to 250 feet that brought him 
within 50 to 75 feet of the plaintiff, before the turn was be-
gun, the defendant would, at least, have been advised that 
the plaintiff was going to turn left and that he would be over 
the white line 2- to 4 feet by the time the defendant got within 
50 to 75 feet of the plaintiff. According· to the plaintiff's 
own evidence the hand signal, had it been properly given, 
could have been seen for, at least, 300 feet (Tr., pp. 40, 
29* 51). The *trial court's ref ere nee to Morris v. Da11ne 's 
Exor., 161 Va. 545, 171 S. E. 662, has, therefore, no rele-
vancy whatever (Tr., p. 20). Moreover, it certainly cannot 
be said that the defendant in the case at bar was not a per-
son to whom, in particular, the· plaintiff owed the duty of 
giving such signal. It was with specific reference to persons 
in the position of the defendant that Va. Code, Section 2154 
(123) (b) was enacted. 
vVe, likewise, submit that .Temp!.e v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134, 
12 S. E. ( 2d) 826, quoted extensively by the trial court in 
bis memorandum opinion, is not in point. In that case, 
Temple, the party undertaking· to enter a paved road from 
the side thereof and to turn left thereon across the path of 
Moses, proceeding on the paved road, was killed. There was 
no evidence that he failed to observe the provisions of the 
statute covering his conduct and, of course, he did not tes-
tify. In such absence of testimony this Court .was able to 
say-
''The presumption, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, is that Temple (the deceased) did stop and that he 
looked for oncoming traffic.'' (Parenthesis ours. 171 Va. 
145.) 
In such case this Court was unable to agree with the trial 
court that a jury's verdict in Temple's favor should be set 
aside as contrary to the law and evidence. In other words, 
in the absence of any proof as to what the deceased did the 
jury was warranted in :finding a verdict in favor of bi~ ad-
ministrator. On approximately the same facts, the ·Court 
approved the :finding· of another jury, on the same issue, but 
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between Temple and l\'Ioses, that Temple was solely at 
30* fault. Temple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, *8 S. E. (2d) 
262. 
In the case at bar, the situation is wholly different. The 
plaintiff was very much alive and very voluble in his account 
of the accident. It is from his own testimony that his negli-
gence appears. It was he, himself, who said that the last 
thing he did before turning left was to look in the direction 
from which the defendant was approaching and also that the 
defendant was within 50 to 75 feet by the time he had moved 
another 2 to 4 feet. (Tr., pp. 37, 58; sitpra, this petition, pp. 
7, 11.) 
Stratton v. Bergman, 169 Va. 249, 192 ,S. E. 813, is, like-
wise, not in point here. It falls within the. principles stated 
in Temple v. Ellington, supra, and not here applicable. One 
of the parties to the collision was killed. None of the wit-
nesses '' saw him until a fraction of a second before the im-
pact". The deceased was proceeding toward an intersec-
tion southeastwardly while the defendant approached it 
southwardly. The deceased reached the intersection first and 
was on the right. He clearly had the right of way. The de-
fendant did not see the deceased until he was about 12 to 15 
feet in front of him. This Court could not say, in the absence 
of any evidence as to what the plaintiff's · decedent did as 
he approached the intersection, that he was neg·ligent 
as a matter of law in undertaking to cross the path of a 
truck also approaching the intersection at a moderate rate of 
speed from a reasonable distance in a city. But again, we 
insist, the situation described by the plaintiff in the case at 
bar is wholly different. . 
31 * ''The trial court seems to have felt that the plaintiff 
was entitled to assume that no other car would be op-
erated on the highway except at a careful and prudent speed 
and that such assumption was sufficient to excuse the plain-
tiff's failure to see that which was obvious (Tr., p. 19). The 
plaintiff, himself, indicated a belief that he 'Yas entitled to 
even more and greater privileges on the hig·hway. 
'' ***and as he came nearly to that intersection, I thought 
in my mind, 'He is bound to stop at the intersection', and I 
had my car practically straight and I stopped my car prac-
tically dead-still where it was; but tl1e time intervening· be-
tween the time I stopped and his hitting me was instanta-
neous. When I saw him at the intersection to the time he hit 
me (wllich bas later proven to be about 70 feet) there was 
hardlr time to think" (Tr., p. 47). 
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'' My idea was before he got to the cross road he was bound 
according to the law to stop" (Tr., p. 64). 
The plaintiff seems to have gotten that erroneous idea from 
the fact that there were highway signs i~dicating the pres-
ence of an. intersection some 450 feet, both east and west of 
the intersection (Tr., pp. 63-4). There were no stop signs 
· against either driver (Tr., p. 115). This erroneous belief on 
his part might account for his remarkable statement, pre-
viously quoted, that it was useless to look in the direction 
from which the defendant approached- . 
'' I had made my final pass and realized all roads were clear 
and I turned to the left ( no sense in look11ng to the right on 
460) and I caught soniethi1ig coming, maybe 50 or maybe 75 
feet away." (Italics ours. Tr., p. 58.) 
32* • At all events, this Court has settled the point in 
Temple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, 331, 8 S. E. (2d) 262. 
"Temple could not excuse the violation of his statutory 
duty by relying upon a presumption that a car operated upon 
the hig·hway was being driven -at a careful and prudent speed. 
The law requires such stop, and common sense, reasonable 
caution and prudence dictate that the driver of the stopped 
vehicle, before entering the main artery of travel, shall look, 
and not enter into the public highway without seeing that 
such movement can be made with safety. He is under a duty 
to see what is in plain sight." 
The duty imposed by Va. Code, Section 2154 (122) upon 
a motorist intending to turn left in the face of oncoming 
traffic, which he claims is traveling 60 to 90 miles per hour, 
is equally positive. When he is struck by such vehicle instan-
taneously with the first 2 to 4 feet of the turn, he has neces-
sarily failed to see what was in plain sight on a road where 
the visibility, according· to him, was not less than 300 feet 
and, according to others, several hundred yards. 
ASSIGNME·1TT OF ERROR NO. II. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
The defendants requested eight instructions (Tr., pp. 239-
244}. They were all refused. The trial court gave its own 
charge, consisting of 20 paragraphs, in lieu of the instruc-
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tions offered by both plaintiff and defendant (Tr., pp. 245-
249). . 
Instruction A, offered by the defendants, set out clearly 
and plainly the positive duty of the plaintiff, on undertaking 
to make a left turn, to first see that such movement 
33* could be made in *safety, and, if the operation of any 
other vehicle might be affected ·thereby, to give the ap-
propriate signal therefor, as required by Va. Oode, 1940, 
Section 2154 (122) (Tr., p. 239). The instruction was not 
objected to by the plaintiff, except that the plaintiff denied 
the right of the defendants to a recovery on his cross-claim 
in any event. The plaintiff conceded that the instruction cor-
rectly stated a positive duty of the plaintiff, the failure to 
exercise which would bar his recovery (Tr., p. 256). Yet, 
the trial court's charge did not includ~ or cover the proposi-
tion therein set forth (Tr., pp. 2f5-249). This was made the 
express ground of an exception taken by the defendants (Tr., 
p. 262): . 
The trial court did say in its charge that the plaintiff was 
entitled to the right of way over the defendant if the plain-· 
tiff was turning left in the intersection before the defendant 
entered the intersection and provided, further, that the plain-
tiff had first used ordinary care to see that the left turn could 
be executed in safety anlhad given the signal for a left turn 
as required by Va. Code, Section 2154 ( 122). But the trial 
court did not tell the jury that it was part of the plaintiff's 
positive duty to first see that the left turn could be executed 
in safety, if any other car might thereby be affected, to give 
the signal therefor before undertaking to make the turn. 
In other words, the trial court told the jury that the plain-
tiff was entitled to a right of way if he did those things but 
did not instruct that the plaintiff had a positive *duty 
34* to do them. 
The fact is the trial court gave the plaintiff the benefit 
of Va. Code 1940, Section 2154 (123), paragTaph (b), but 
refused to the defendant the benefit of Va. Code 1940, Sec-
tion 2154 (122), paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (f). Tbese code. 
sections are-
' '·Section 2154 (122) Signals on starting, stopping, 0°r turn~ 
ing-(a) Every driver who intends to start, stop or. turn, or 
partly turn from a direct line, shall first see that such move-
ment can be made in safety and whenever the operation of 
any other vehicle may be affected by such movement shall 
give a sip;nal as required in this section, plainly visible to the 
driver of such other vehicle of his intention to make such 
movement. · 
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'' (b) The signal herein required shall be given by means 
of the hand and arm, or by some mechanical or electrical de-
vice approved by the director after this section takes effect, 
in the manner herein specified. Whenever the signal is given 
by means of the hand and arm, the driver shall indicate his 
intention to start, stop, or turn, or }Jartly turn, by extending 
the hand and arm from and beyond the left side of the ve-
hicle, in the manner following: 
'' ( c) For left turn, or to pull to the left, the arm shall be 
extended in a horizontal position straight from and level with 
the shoulder. 
* 
'' ( f) .Such signals shall be given continuously for a dis-
tance of at least :(ifty feet before slowing down, stopping·, 
turning, partly turning, or materially altering the course of 
the vehicle. '' 
''Section 2154 (123). Right of Way.-(b) The driYer of a 
vehicle approaching but not having· entered an intersection 
shall yield the right of way to a vehicle within such inter-
section and turning therein, to the left across the line of travel 
of such first mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the 
vehicle turning left has given a ·plainly visible sig1rnl of in-
tention to turn left as required in section seventy-five.'' 
35* *The omission of the trial court is clearly observed 
when the instruct.ion offered by the defendants and re-
fused by the court is compared with the court's charge on 
those points. 
Instruction A, asked for by the defendants and refused, 
was as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that it was the dutv of the 
plaintiff· Williams before undertaking to make a left turn 
from Route 460 to first see that such movement could be made 
in safety, and if the operation of any other vehicle might 
be affected by making· such left turn. to give a sig·nal by ex-
tending· fhe arm in a horizontal position straig·ht from and 
level with the shoulder to the left side continuously for a dis-
tance of nt least :fifty feet ( 50 ft.) before altering the course 
of his vehicle. · 
"The observance of the foregoing· duty was itself a con-
tinuing- duty on the part of the plaintiff. If you believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff failed to observe the foregoing 
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duty and that such failure on his part efficiently contributed 
in any substantial degree to cause the collision, then the plain-
tiff cannot recover and you must find your verdict for the 
defendants, Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Company. 
"If you also believe that the plaintiff's failure to observe 
this duty was the sole cause of the collision, then the de-
fendant Mercer Stillman is entitled to recover on his cross-
claim against the plaintiff Williams, and you must find your 
verdict in favor of the defendant Stillman, against the plain-
tiff Williams, on his cro·ss-clairri'' (Tr., pp. 239-40). 
Of this instruction plaintiff's counsel said: 
"By Mr. Allen: The first two paragraphs in Instruction A 
are apparently all right, from a cursory reading" (Tr., p. 
256). 
The trial. court's charge stated merely-
36• *" (7) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not 
having entered an intersection shall yield the right of 
way to a vehicle within such intersection and turning therein 
to the left across the line of travel of such first mentioned 
vehicle; provided that whenever the operation of any other 
vehicle may be affected by such movement, the driver of the 
vehicle already in the intersection and turning left shall first 
use ordinary care to see that such movement can be made in 
safety, and shall give a plainly visible signal of intention to 
turn left as required in Section 2154 (122) (Tr., pp. 246-7). 
'' (8) The sig-nal last above referred to shall be by extend-
ing the left arm in a horizontal position, straight from and 
level with the shoulder and shall be given continuously for 
a distance of at least fifty feet before turning or partly turn-
ing or materially altering the course of the vehicle" (Tr., p. 
247). . 
· It is thus seen that tl1e trial court failed to instruct on 
the positive duty put upon the plaintiff by Va. Code 1940, 
Section 2154 (122) when undertaking to make a left turn. 
The defendants were clearly entitled under the statute to 
have the jury told that a failure to observe that duty on his 
part in this case would prevent a recovery by the plaintiff. 
It would seem that the court originally intended to cover 
''all the points''' asked to be covered (Tr., p. 259). After a 
full discussion of all the instructions offered, the court said-
" By the C'ourt: All rig·ht, gentlemen. I will g·o over these 
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instructions and may work out one instruction in the form 
of a charge, including· all the points you have asked for. I 
will try to do th~t'~ (Tr., p. 259) . 
. 37* *There can be no doubt that the trial court's failure 
to accomplish that purpose was brought forcibly to its 
attention in the f~llowing objection-
' 'With respect, further, to that numbered paragraph coun-
sel urges upon the Court the.fact that the failure to give any 
signal ~nd the f aiJure to make the left turn in accordance 
with the provisions of the law is, in itself, a violation of the 
statute, and, in itself, a proximate cause of the collision, and 
may be a basis for the defendants' right to a verdict, and, 
likewise, if the sole cause, a basis for their right to a re-
covery. . 
'' The defendants' view as expressed in Ins,truction A is 
not presented to . the jury as a ground for the defendants' 
recovery; but is only presented to the jury as a proviso and 
condition on which the right of way improperly accorded the 
plaintiff can· be had"' (Tr., p. 262). 
The Court's attention is also invited to the entire objection 
made by the defendants to the trial court's charge (Tr., pp. 
260-264). From it will appear other exceptions taken. The 
most serious error has been shown above. Others, perhaps 
less important but equally erroneous, are here briefly men-
tioned. 
There was in fact no evidence to support any instruction 
granting the plaintiff a right of way, conditioned upqn the 
giving of the required hand signal, as set forth in paragraph 
7 of the charge (Tr., pp. 246-7). 
r,:t1he same is true of paragraph 10 in which the jury was 
told that a party, having given a proper signal for a left 
turn, placed, without his fault in a position of danger by an-
other party's negligence, may alter his course to extri-
38* cate himself *from danger without violating any law 
(Tr., p. 247). There was no evidence whatever that 
the plaintiff gave any signal for a left turn. The plaintiff, 
himself, testified that he clicln 't know whether he did or not 
(Tr., pp. 42, 71). The plaintiff's signed statement, filed in 
evidence (Dfdts. Ex. No. 1, Tr., p. 75) contains the categorical 
assertion that no hand or arm sig·nal was given by him for a 
left turn (Tr., p. 71). Mr. Bruce, an occupant of the car, tes-
tified that he could not say that any such signal was given 
(Tr., p. 87). ,No other persons testified on that subject. 
Considering that the plaintiff must establish his case by a 
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preponderance of evidence, it is obviously error for the trial 
court to predicate such an instruction in his favor upon the 
fact that a proper hand signal had been given when the evi-
dence does not show that it was given at all. The objections 
to the court's instruction on that and other grounds were 
\ 
clearly stated (Tr., pp. 261-2, 262-3). 
We most respectfully submit that the jury was not prop-
erly instructed and that, in the respects here pointed out, the 
defendants did not have a fair trial, for which reason they 
are in any event entitled to a new trial. 
General criticism by the trial CO\].rt of the defendants' of-
fered instructions as '' long and involved and, to a degree, 
argumentative" is neither accurate nor a sufficient excuse 
for the trial court's failure to instruct on a material point, 
we submit (Tr., p. 21). Nor does it supply evidence of 
39"" a proper *hand signal that the positive evidence shows 
was not given. A revi~w of plaintiff's objections to 
the defendants' offered instructions will disclose that they 
were apparently more acceptable to the plaintiff than to the 
trial court (Tr., pp. 256-9). · 
The error in this assignment of error is clearly shown, we 
submit. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR N!O. III. 
THE PREJUDICIAL EVIDEN·CE AS TO PUBLIC LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE CARRIED BY 
. THE DEFENDANTS. 
On the day after the accident the plaintiff made a written 
statement concerning the happening which was introduced 
in evidence to contradict his direct testimony. (Dfdts. Ex. 
1, Tr., p. 75). Before the statement was introduced, it was 
shown by the plaintiff, himself, that it was taken· by ].\fr. 
Charles 0. Dawson, a lawyer, of Richmond, who stated to the 
plaintiff that be represented· the defendant, Stillman, and 
who was understood by the nlaintiff to have been Stillman's 
attorney (Tr., pp. 52, 56). These facts were repeated by the 
plaintiff on his re-direct examination (Tr., p. 77). 
It was thus clearly established before the jury that the. 
taker of the statement was employed by the defendant, Still-
man, and that he was acting for Stillman as an attorney in 
a representative capacity in taking it. As such, Dawson was, 
therefore, subject to whatever inference of bias and inter-
est in favor of Stillman that the jury might believe *re-
40* sulted from that relationship. · 
It was a fact also that Dawson, as such lawyer, was 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
the resident adjuster for the casualty insurance company 
carrying public liability insurance on .Stillman's auto-
mobile. It is perhaps immaterial, but, nevertheless, a fact 
that Dawson did not know that his insurance company car-
ried a policy on the Stillman car when he went to the hos-
pital to investigate the accident at the request of a neighbor 
of Stillman, after verifying the fact of the accident by tele-
phone conversation with Stillma.n 's wife, from whom he 
learned that Stillman's condition was too serious for him to 
be seen (Tr., pp. 163-4). 
The plaintiff uildertoo~ to avoid the effect of his written 
statement and its contradiction of his direct· testimony, by 
claiming that Mr. Dawson had taken an unfair advantage 
of him, had not written down what he was told and had been 
generally inaccurate in the transcription of ,vhat the plaintiff 
told him (Tr., p. 52., et seq., p. 75). It appeared that the 
paper was read to the plaintiff by Dawson in the presence 
of the plaintiff's son and also of young Mr. Bruce, both law 
students, who rewrote certain portions to render it accurate 
and correct before the plaintiff signed it as a correct account 
of the matter (Tr., p. 54). Testimony concerning this state-
ment, mostly on questions by plaintiff's counsel, we believe, 
fills more than 75 pages of this record (Tr., pp. 52-57, 65-75, 
76-79, 176-193, 196-228). The complaints concerning its ac-
curacy reduce· themselves for the most part to the difference 
between "50 feet" and ''50 feet or more" (Tr., p. 57), 
41* "densely foggy'' and *"slightly fog·gy" (Tr., pp. 65-6), 
"could not swear'' and "would not swear'' (Tr., p. 66), 
and other such immaterial matters, most of which were cor-
rected before the paper was· signed by the plaintiff as a true 
and accurate statement. 
In the light of the aspersions made by the plaintiff con-
cerning the statement taker, Mr. Dawson, defendants' coun-
sel, desired the ben.efit of his appearance before the jury 
and his denial of any such unfair conduct. Realizing- Mr. 
Dawson's connection with the insurance carrier and the prob-
ability of inquiry into that connection by plaintiff's counsel 
if he were put on, defendants' counsel brought the matter 
to the attention of the trial court and asked for a ruling in 
. advance (Tr., pp. 147-151). 
The position of defendants' counsel was that Dawson's in-
terest and probable bias as a witness was sufficiently shown 
by the fact, already disclosed, that he was a lawyer repre-
sentin~· the defendants' interest in investigating the accident 
when he took the statement and that the insurance connection 
was therefore irrelevant and should not be inquired into (Tr., 
p. 147). The trial court strongly indicated that l1e would rule 
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against the defendants' ·contention in this regard, whereupon 
counsel asked to be permitted an exception thereto and to 
be allowed to put Dawson's testimony into the record, out of 
the presence of the jury, for the benefit of this Court in sup-
port of the exception (Tr., p. 148). The trial court refused 
this on the ground that he could not ''rule on a moot ques-
tion" (Tr., p. 149). 
42* *·Though the trial court definitely indicated that he 
would permit inquiry into the insurance question if 
Dawson were put on as a witness, yet he refused to permit 
Dawson's testimony to go into the record unless it was put 
on before the .jury. The trial court thus placed counsel in 
the dilemma of knowingly disclosing insurance to the jury 
in order to secure an exception to the court's ruling (Tr., pp. 
150-151). At that stage and under those circumstances, 
counsel chose not to introduce Mr. Dawson as a witness {Tr., 
p. 150). 
The defendant, Stillman, then took the stand and told what 
he knew of the accident. The first questions asked Stillman 
on cross examination by plaintiff's counsel were-(1) did 
he go with Dawson to take the statement; ·(2) did he see 
Dawson there; and ( 3) did he know Dawson was going to 
see the plaintiff at the time. To each of these questions the 
defendant answered in the negative (Tr., p. 158). Stillman 
was at the time confined to his home by reason of his in-
juries (Tr., p. 164). 
At that stage the defenda~ts' counsel felt that those• three 
adroit questions by plaintiff's counsel had actually gottei1 
across to the jury the fact of insurance and that there was 
probably no further damage in fact to be suffered by putting 
Dawson on as the lesser of two eYils in the face of the court's 
ruling·, considered erroneous and objected to by the defend-
ants. Dawson was, therefore, put on (Tr., p. 162). 
43* *It was then shown by Dawson that he was a prac-
ticing attorney and that, as such an_d representing Mr. 
Stillman, he took the statement (Tr., pp. 162-3). It was in-
tended to show thereby that Dawson was not disinterested 
and that he was subject to such imputation of bias by· reason 
of that interest as . the jury should determine. It was our 
contention that the matter of interest and probable bias was 
thereby fully and sufficiently covered without introducing 
in evidence the fact of the insurance coverage. 
On cross examination plaintiff's counsel first undertook 
to show that while Dawson was a member of the Virginia 
State Bar, he paid no State or City license ('l1r., pp. 171-2). · 
Thereupon, the following occurred-
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''Q. As a matter of fact, when you went there to get this 
statement, you were in the employ-
''By Mr. Bowles (interposing): I object. 
"By the Court: Let the attorney finish his question and 
the attorney can then make his objection. 
"By Mr. Bowles: It is the comment in the question that 
I object to. . 
"By the Court: I don't know whether the question is right 
or not until I hear the ,question. 
'~Q. (continued): of the insurance company carrying the 
public liability and property damage insurance on the car 
which Stillman was driving at the time of the wreck1 
"By Mr. Bowles: I object, if your Honor please, on sev-
eral grounds. I attempted to object before I heard the word 
'insurance', so the Court would be in the position that even 
if the Court were to rule in my favor the jury would not hear 
the word 'insurance'. 
44* *".Second, I object on the ground that there is no 
possible basis for the introduction by the plaintiff in 
the case of the word 'insurance', because any reasonable bias 
that the jury might believe has already been shown by J\fr. 
Dawson when he testified that he was interested in Mr. Still-
man's investigation of this accident, and I submit to- the 
Court that the injection of insurance on top of that cannot 
possibly aid the jury in finding any further bias and would 
be introduced solely for the purpose of influencing the jury 
to give an improper verdict. 
"By the Court: The objection is overruled. 
"By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception'' (Tr., pp. 172-173). 
Thereafter, the plaintiff was also permitted to show, over 
our objection, that Stillman, and not Berlo Vending Com-
pany, the co-defendant, was the insured party in the policy 
contract carried with the insurance company by whom Mr. 
Dawson was employed (Tr., p. 193). That such action was 
prejudicial error on many grounds is s~lf-evident, we sub-
mit. 
At the conclusion of all the testimony, the defendant, in 
addition to renewing the motion to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence which had been made and overruled at the conclusion 
of his evidence in chief (Tr., pp. 103-4), moved the court to 
declare a mistrial because of the improper admission of the 
testimony about the insurance coverage (Tr., p. 231). The 
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basis for the motion cannot now be more clearly staed than 
it was to the trial court. 
45* *"By Mr. Bowles: As to the motion for a mistrial, 
your Honor, this is the v.iew I wish to present to you. 
As I understand the authority for permitting a responsive 
answer to disclose the proposition of insurance in the back-
g-round is on the occasion of when it is necessary for the jury 
to have .a fair understanding of the testimony before it of 
any indication of bias, or a slant, so that the jury can prop-
erly evaluate the weight of the testimony. Now, in this case 
the introduction· of the testimony concerning the insurance 
and the length to which these questions have gone does not 
furnish the jury in any sense, I submit, with any additional 
help on that point, and the only basis on which it can come 
in is that it discloses the relation of Mr. Dawson when he went 
there. I can see no possible augmentation of the bias, whether 
Mr. Dawson went there representing Mr. stniman on a di-
rect contract between him and Mr. Stillman, or whether he 
went there. as a result of an agreement between Mr. Stillman 
and the insui·ance company; the bias is the same, if any, 
and that is the chief basis on ,,,hich it occurs to me that I 
am justified in objecting to the introduction of the insurance 
question. On top of testimony already presented, it can only 
be for the purpose of plaintiff's counsel to let the jury know 
that there is insurance. Furthermore, if your Honor please, 
if vour Honor can recall the manner in which Mr. Allen 
brought out the question of insurance it showed the jury 
that there was insurance before I had any opportunity to 
object to it. The question was: 'As a matter of fact, when 
you went there to get this statement you were in the employ 
of the insurance company carrying the public liability . and 
property damag·e insurance on the car which .Stillman was 
driving at the time of the wreck?' I tried to object to that 
and your Honor ruled that. I could not object until the ques-
tion was :finished. 
-~~y the Court: '\Ve have been over that and the jury was 
sent out and you were g·iven an opportunity to present the 
law in regard to it. I asked both you and Mr. Allen if you 
had said all you wanted and I indicated what my ruling would 
be. You told me you had said all you wanted to say. I did 
not send the jury out again, because you did not request 
it. 
46* *"By l\fr. Bowles: I don't think I was addressing 
myself to that pai"ticular question. The reasons I 
changed. the position which I previously stated to the court, 
when I determined not to put Mr. Dawson on the stand, in 
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the light of ,vhat your ruling w·ould be, were these: Mr~ 
Allen asked Stillman three questions: Mr. Allen asked Mr. 
Stillman on the witness stand did he go to the hospital with 
Mr. Dawson. He said no. He then asked him did he send 
Mr. Dawson there. Mr. Stillman said no. Mr. Allen then 
asked him did he know he was going and Mr. Stillman said 
no. 
"By the Court: Do you recall that that testimony was 
given in reply to a question as to whom ·he represented and 
he said he was Mr. Stillman's attorneyi 
"By Mr. Bowles: There was a statement yesterday that 
he was Mr. Stillman's attorney and it was then brought out 
that-he went there at Mr. Stillman's request. The difference 
lies in the employment, whether through Stillman's insur-
. ance company or direct. When those questions were asked 
Mr. Stillman I realized then that they were in effect telling 
the jury that this was an insurance case. I conceived then 
that the jury J{new the interest of au insurance company, and 
I considered what I thoug·ht was proper to do from then on, 
namely, that putting Mr. Dawson on and running the risk 
of that being confirmed was no more dangerous to . the de-
fendants' case than had already been suffered. Under those 
circumstances· I submit to the Court that they .questioned 
Mr. Dawson on the witness stand and showed the jury that 
he was there actually on Mr. Stillman's behalf as a lawyer 
for him; that he further stated that he was then acting with 
all that probable bias for him, and the jury knew that they 
were listening· to a witness who had a direct interest, and 
whether that request came from Mr. Stillman for him to go 
there, ,or whether Mr. ,Stillman's request came fron1 the in-
surance company to have a man go there and interview Mr. 
Williams does not point to nor is it rele,1ant to the question 
of bias, which had already been covered and established. 
47* *"That is the basis for my request for a mistrial 
and I wish to state that the question was asked before 
I 11ad a.n opportunity to object, because the Court stopped 
me, and that, moreover, is what I consider is very prejudicial 
error which these defendants have suffered. 
'' By the Court: The motion is overruled. 
"By Mr. Bowles: Exception is made for the reasons 
stated'' (Tr., pp. 232-235}. · 
vVe respectfully submit tl1at our position is both· reason-
able, loidcal and in full accord with the reasons heretofore 
assi~:ned by this Court for permitting an insurance connec-
tion to be shown in certain cases. 
We agTee with the trial court that ''the jury had a right 
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to know his interest in the outcome, his bias if any, in order 
to place credence where it belonged'' (Tr., p. 23)~ We in-
sist, however, that Dawson's interest. was sufficiently shown 
for that purpose when it became known that he aeted as at-
tornev for Stillman when he took the statement. Counsel 
do not entertain the apprehensions of perjury in such case 
apparently ascribed to them by the trial court (Tr., p. 24). 
We do know that jurors are human. It has been generally 
accepted that the Imowledge of insurance coverage is likely 
to influence them even unconsciously. When that principle 
conflicts with the jury's. right to know the interest of a wit-
ness, it has been decid~d. that the insurance phase becomes 
relevant on that gTound. But, in th_is case,. the fact of in-
terest and proba.ble bias was already covered by the fact 
that Dawson had been shown to have been acting as a 
48* representative *of the defendant and as such not a dis-
interested witness. Whether. he was employed directly 
or through an insurance contract then became immaterial, 
with the result that the insurance angle was highly prejudi-
cial to the defendant. · 
The foreg·oing view, we submit, is in accord with the de-
cisions of this Court in Rinehart, etc., Co. v. Brown. 137- Va. 
670, 120 S. E. 269; W or-rell v. Worrell, 17 4 Va.. 11, 27, 4 S. E. 
(2d) 343; Lanham v. Bond_, 157 Va. 167, 160 S. E. 89; Gaines 
v. Campbell, 159 Va. 504, 517, 166 S. E .. 704. 
We also submit that the position here taken is not in con-
flict with the doctrine of unintentional error announced in 
Jr1;-i.ne v. Carr, 163 Va. 662, 177 S. E. 208. 
The purpose and limitations on the rig.ht to show bias or 
interest are well illustrated by N. & W. R. Co. v. Birchfield, 
105 Va. 809, 811, 54 S. E .. 879, which seems to be in accord 
with the view here expressed. 
The trial court erre-d in ref using- the motion for mistrial 
on the facts here shown. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV. 
THE LIMITATION OF ARGUMENT. 
The trial of tl1is case occupied three full days, Mav 12, 
13 and 14, 1942 (Tr., pp. 10, 14, 15). Fourteen witnesses 
testified. Some 20 exhibits were presented, including- two 
scale maps and numerous pictures of the vehicles and· the 
highways.· There were two defendants ancl two counsel 
49• representine.- *them, each of whom desired to address 
the jury. The evidence was voluminous and complex. 
The issues were many-whether the plaintiff undertook -to 
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see that his left turn could be made in safety, whether he 
gave the proper signal therefor, how far he could have seen 
and whether and what he did see, whether he made the turn 
in accordance with law by going around the center of the 
intersection, whether the plaintiff was entitled to a right of 
way under the statute and the conditions therefor, the mat-
ters of primary and contributory ·neglig·ence, the burden of 
1>roof, the quantum of damag·e both as to claim and c.ross-
cla.im · and other minor issues. There was the conflict in-
volved in the contradictions betwee1i tl1e plaintiff's written 
statement and his direct testimony. This alone occupied 
more than 75 pages of the record, adduced, we believe, mostly 
by the plaintiff. There wa.s, moreover, the matter of insur-
ance injected into the case at the insistence of plaintiff's 
counsel. (See. Index; Tr., p. 265.) The instruction given by 
the trial court, ~nd apparently considered by him to be 
'' simple, impartial, clear and concise',., contained 20 num-
bered paragraphs covering· 5 full pages of the record (Tr., 
pp. 245-249, 22). 
· The trial court announced that coimsel would be limited 
to 30 minutes a side in presenting· their arguments. Defend-
ants' couns~l urged upon the court the impossibility of cov-
ering the matters here involved before the jury in such short 
time and requested at least 45 minutes as the minimum neces-
sary. The refusal to extend the time beyond 30 minutes 
was considered bv defendants' counsel an .arbitrary abuse 
of discretion· in this case. For such reason thev for-
50* mally *excepted (Tr., pp. 265-266). · " 
,v e sincerely represent to this Court t11at counsel were 
seriomdv ham1Jered by the strict limitation of time in prop-
erly renresenting their clients' interests in this case. It 
was impossible adequate to cover the questions of law and 
the evidence to which they applied. "'Whatever may have 
l)een the trial court':-; opinion concerning· the relevancy of 
the voluminous testimony, it was admitted by him and· was 
before tbe jury subject to comment in arg·nment. The is-
sues. considered by the trial court in his memorandum opin-
ion ~o simple as to warrant such strict limitation of arg·u-
ment, were not apparently capable of '' simple, impartial, 
clear and co1!cise'' statement by him in less than 20 para-
ATa.phs covernHr 5 full pages of record, a.s mentioned above 
(Tr .. pp. 22, 245-249). Havin?: so severely criticised counsel 
fo1· tl1e length, inaccuracv and argumentative character of 
the ei:2.·ht instructions requested by them (Tr., p. 21), it can 
hardly be presumed that tlle trial court, in preparin~ his 20 
pa.ra.gra11hs, undertook to instruct on any noint which he 
did not deem essential to a proper consideration of the case 
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by the jury. On this assumption, in discussing the instruc-· 
tions before the jury, counsel could have devoted no more 
than 1112 minutes to each of the issues of law involved by 
sacrificing all opportunity to touch on anything else. 
Moreover, as shown above, the trial court only accom-
plished such "concise" statement of 20 paragraphs by omit-
iing· all reference to the defendants' main defense, that is,. 
the plaintiff's failure to observe bis positive duty to 
51 * first see that *be could make his turn in safety and to 
give the proper signal therefor if any other vehicle 
might be affected, before undertaking· to make the left turn, 
as required by statute and as presented by Instruction No. A 
offered by: the defendants (Tr., p. 239). 
We most respectfully submit that counsel did all that they 
could under the circumstances to secu·re a sufficient time in 
which properly to present their clients' case (Tr., pp. 265-6). 
'' By the Court: I will limit counsel to thirty minutes a 
side. 
''By Mr. Bowles: If_ your Honor please, I hate to make 
a point of tl1e limitation of time for argument in a matter 
of this character; but your Honor is well aware of all the 
ramifications this case has gone into, in view of the ques-
tions of insurance and that statement and several other mat-
ters, together with the fact that the case bas been tried for 
two days, there are two counsel for the defendants and two 
defendants, and we earnestly and seriously believe that thirty 
minutes is too sho1·t a time for counsel to present our argu-
ment, and we earnestly ask you to give us forty-five minutes, 
and wish to except to your refusal to do so.'' 
The right of the defendants to a new trial, at least, on 
the g:round set forth in this assig'llment of error, rests upon 
sound authority. 
,] errell v. Norfolk, etc., Belt Line R. Co., 166 Va.· 70, 184 
S. E. 196. 
Pinn v. Comrnonwealth, 166 Va .. 727, 733, 186 S. E. 169·. 
52* *ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V. 
IMPROPER .ARGU:M.ENT OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL. 
During the closing· argument by pladntiff's coulnsel the 
· following occurred-
" The argument for the plaintiff wa.s opened by Mr. George 
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E. Allen, Jr., and thereµpo~ Mr. Anderson and Mr. Bowles 
successively addressed the jury, in accordance with the limi-
tation imposed of thirty minutes, and during the course of 
the argument of Mr. George E. Allen, Sr., the following oc-
curred: 
'' '~ * * What have we left. They bring here a statement 
signed in the hospital by Mr. Williams, under the ~rcum-
starices detailed "here, and I submit to you g·entlemen of the 
jury that the very firgt statements that Mr. Dawson made 
when he entered that hospital were misrepresentations. And 
they come here and tell you that Mr. Dawson was an attor-
ney at law, representing Mr. Stillman, and that Mr. Dawson 
went there as a representative and attorney for Mr. Still-
man. It turns out that he came from Pennsylvania about 
three years ago, and all he has done is to pay a fee for about 
three years to the Integrated Bar, and has not bought a li-
cense for the City of Richmond or the State of Virginia, 
and he claims, therefore, . he is entitled to represent Mr. 
Stillman as a lawyer. His name is not on any of these papers. 
According to his statement, his part as a lawyer is giving 
incorrect statements-
"By Mr. Bowles (interposing): l\:fy understanding of the 
evidence is that Mr. Dawson is qualified as a lawyer, and 
he does what it subsequently appears he does as a lawyer 
for an insurance carrier. ·we objected to the bringing out 
of t11e questioJ:! of insurance, and if there was bias, it was 
brought out that he was attorney for Mr. ,Stillman. The evi-
dence shows he gave Mr. Bruce a card showing he was a 
representative of the insurance company, but he states that 
he did not kriow at the time that bis insurance company was 
carrying the risk on the Stillman car. . 
"By tl1e Court: I overrule the objection. 
53* •''By Mr. Bowles: Exception is noted to the Court's 
ruling. 
"By Mr. Allen (continuing): I submit to you gentlemen 
of the jury that he testified to and represented to you that 
he was an attorney at la:w, representing Mr. Stillman, and 
you saw he did not l1ave any ~ight to practice law, and he 
admitted it on the witness stand, and when fi.rst questioned 
he said he did not know he was representing the insurance 
company, and when he went out there and wanted to go into 
Mr. Bruce's room, and young Mr. Bruce would not let him 
go in, he then handed :M:r. Bruce a card showing- he repre-
sented the insurance company. • * ,jf" (Tr., pp. 267-9). 
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The foregoing· will clearly illustrate to this Court how 
larg·e a part the question of insurance played in this· case. 
It was skillfully used to incense and inflame the jury into 
the belief that the plaintiff had not only been negligently in-
jured on the hig·hway by the defendants but also that he 
had been badly treated at the hospital by their insurance 
representative whose ''part as a lawyer is giving incorrect 
statements" (Tr., pp. 267-8). 
This passage is,_ likewise, clear evidence that 30 minutes 
was wholly insufficient time in which to combat such unwar-
ranted insinuation. Not onlv did the trial court limit un-
reasonably the time in which the defendants might argue 
their case, but he failed to protect the defendants against 
improper and prejudicial arguments directed against them. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VI. 
V .A.RIOUS OTHER ERRORS SPECIFIED. 
1. Tl1e witness, L. C. Bruce, passenger in the plain-
54 * tiff's *car and witnei,s introduced on behalf of the 
plaintiff, desc.ribed the p9sition of the plaintiff's auto-
mobile in the hig·hway in considerable detail and concluded 
with the following volunteered statement-. 
"I. have seen the highway patrolman's sketch of it a.nd 
it is very similar to the way I am describingP (Tr., p. 88). 
When the hig·hway patrolman was put on by the defend-
ants he referred to tlmt sketch and was permitted to illus-
trate his testimony with it, but the trial court refused to 
JJermit it to be filed in evidence as an exhibit, either as a con-
temporaneous diagram made by the investigating police of-
ficer or as a present free-hand representation of his testi-
mony (Tr., pp. 106-7, 108, 110). 
The jury, the ref ore, never saw the police officer's sketch 
of the position of the cars except at a distance when in his 
hands during his te~timony. To this the defendants ex-
cepted. 
2. When the plaintiff introduced his photographer Payne, 
to· prove C'ertain measurements of distances shown on the 
photographs taken by him, he was permitted to express llis 
opinion as to what constituted "the beginning of the inter-
section'' and to predicate ce1·tain distances on that opinion. 
Defendants objected and excepted on the ground that the 
intersection was defined bv statute as '' the area embraced 
within the prolongation or' the lateral curb lines, or if none, 
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then the lateral boundary lines of two or more highways, 
which join one another at an angle, whether or not one 
55* such hig:hway *crosses the other''. Va. Code 1940, 
2154 (49') (z) (Tr., pp. 118-120). It wa.s perfectly plain 
from Payne's testimony and from the maps that his idea of 
the intersection and the consequent measurements '' from the 
begi.nning of the intersection'' were not in conformity with 
the statute. This gave the jury an erroneous idea of the 
distances involved and of where the intersection began, which 
was important in connection with the so-called rig·ht of way 
accorded the plaintiff by the trial court. 
These matters here stated, while perhaps not in thems~lves 
sufficient to warrant a reversal, were material and, along 
with all the other matters herein shown, serve further to 
demonstrate that the defendants did not receive a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION. 
The petitioners most respectfully submit that the plain-
tiff, by his own testimony, is eonvicted of negligence barring 
any right of recovery by him. In any event, errors have 
been committed which, at least, warrant a new trial. 
In consideration whereof, the petitioners respectfully 
pray that a writ of error and snpersedeas to the judgment 
complained of may be awarded them, and that the action of 
the lower court in entering.· the same be reviewed and re-
versed. The petitioners further pray, inasmuch as the 
56* record herein *is in proper condition therefor, that 
final judgment be entered in their favor on the plain-
tiff's notice of motion for judgment, or failing so to do, that 
a new trial be granted them in. the alternative on all issues. 
The petitioners pray leave to state orally by counsel the 
reasons for reviewing the decision of the lower court com-
plained of and that they may be granted an opportunity for 
such oral presentation. 
The petitioners further pray that they may be allowed to 
adopt this petition as and for their opening brief on the 
hearing of this matter before this Court. . 
Tl1e petitioners aver that on this, the 28th day of Decem-
ber. 1942, prior to the filing of this petition with the Clerk 
of tMs Court, a true typewritten copy of the same was de-
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livered to Mr. George E. Allen, of Richmond, Virginia, coun-
sel of record for the plaintiff. 
MERCER STILLMAN, 
BERLO VENDING COMP ANY, 
BOWLE-S, ANDERSON & BOYD, 
ALFRED SCOTT ANDER.SON, JR., 
AUBREY R. Bo,vLES, JR., ' 
Of Counsel. 
By Counsel. 
We, Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., and A. Scott Anderson, Jr., 
attorneys practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, do certify that in our opinion there is sufficient 
error in the record accompanying this petition that the judg-
ment complained of should be reviewed and reversed. 
A. SCOTT ANDERSON, JR., 
AUBREY R. BOWLES, JR. 
R.ichmond, Va., December 28, 1942. 
Received Dec.ember 28, 1942. 
:M:. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
5T* * January 14, 1943. Vi!rit of error and supersedeas 
awarded by the court. Bond $4,000. 
M. B. W. 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Vjrginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2686 
MERCER STILLMAN AND BERLO VENDING COM-
P ANY, A DELA W AR,E CORPORATION, 
Plaintiffs in Error, 
vers'lts 
C. W. WILLIAMS, Defendant in Error. 
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT IN ERROR. 
Now ,comes C. ·w. "Williams, plaintiff in tbe court below, 
hereinafter referred to as ''plaintiff,'' and submits this, his 
answer, to the petition of the defendants, Mercer Stillman 
and Berlo Vending Company, for a writ of error from the 
judgment rendered against them in favor of the plaintiff on 
the 31st day of August, 1942, by the Law & Equity Court of 
the City of Richmond, Part Two. 
OPINION OF THE COUR.T BELOW, A COMPLETE 
ANSv\TER.. 
The able opinion of the learned trial court is a complete 
answer, in model judicial style, to the petition of the defend-
ants for a writ of error. We here set it out in full: 
''MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT. 
'' In this case there was a v~rdict by the jury in favor of 
the plaintiff for $3,000.00 ag;ainst both defendants, and the 
Court is now asked to set this verdic.t aside as contrary to 
the law and the evidence. 
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'' The defendants base their motion upon three· grounds: 
2~ *'" (1) That there is no evidence to support the ver-
dict, 
"(2) That the Court erred in refusing instructions re-
quested bv the defendants and in giving Instruction X in 
lieu thereof., . . 
'' ( 3) That the Court limited arg·ument of counsel before 
the jury to thirty minutes ·a side. 
"(4) Because the Court ·over the objection of the defend-
ants allowed Chas. 0. Dawson (a defendants' witness) to 
be examined as to his relationship to a liability insurance 
company carrying insurance on the def end ants' car. 
"1. 
''It is not necessarv to set out in detail the evidence. A 
general statement will be sufficient. The parties approached 
each other from opposite directions and met on a curve, which 
for a time obscured their vision of each other. They met at 
the intersection of two cross-roads which did not cross each 
other at right angles but on an angle somewhat as in this 
illustration : 
Before reaching the intersection, the plaintiff had slowed 
down to about twenty miles per hour, and as he approached, 
he looked in every direction and there was nothing on either 
road. He looked throug·h his mirror to be sure nothing 
3* was behind him. He says he looked to *the front twice 
and to his right twice and had started to make the turn 
when he again looked down the road and saw something com-
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ing at a very unusual rate of speed. He says he turned his 
car back to the rigl1t and straight in the road, applied his 
brakes and stopped his car, and almost in the same instant 
the defendant's car crashed into him. He estimates the de-
fendant's speed at from sixty to ninety miles per hour. The 
whole thing· happened in an instant. He was not certain 
that he gave the statutory signals before starting, and there 
is no positive evidence that he did not. 
"In Scott v. C,um1/iJJigham, 161 Ya., at page 371, it is said: 
'' 'In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we cannot 
assume that Scott before making the turn failed to give the 
required signal. ' . 
''From the evidence, it is apparent tha.t had he given the 
signals, they would not have bee:q seen by the defendant due. 
to the curve in the road and the distance. Under such cir-
cumstances, it was not negligence to· fail to give the signal. 
See Morris v. Danie's Exor., 161 Va. 545. 
'' The evidence is somewhat in conflict, but after review-
ing· it, the facts are so similar to those in the case of Temple 
v. Ellington, 177 Va. 145, that it is pertinent to quote exten-
sively from that case. There it was said: 
'' '"\Vhile it is true Mr. Moses had the right of way at this 
particular intersection if l1e were proceeding lawfully, it is 
also true that J\fr. Temple would not have to assume that 
he would encounter any vehicle operated at an ·excessive 
speed. If the Moses car was being operated a.t an illegal 
rate of speed, it would come from a point of obscurity to 
the point of impact in a few seconds. At 560 feet west of 
the intersection,. it could not liave been seen on account of 
the obstruction created hy the bill. For instance, if it were 
moving· at 45 miles per hour, it would liave covered the dis-
tance in about eight and one-half seconds. If travelling 55 
miles per hour, it would have covered the distance in about 
seven seconds. If traveling at 65 miles per hour, the dis-
tance would ha.ve been covered in about six seconds. The 
jury could have reasonably believed that ¥r. Temple 
4 * stopped his truck before g·oing on *the highway and 
looked but did not see t.l1e Moses car because it was ob-
scured by the hill, and before he c.ould get his truck straight-
ened out on the highway, he was struck. 
'' 'The presumption in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, is tha.t Temple did stop and that he looked for on-
coming traffic.' 
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'' 'The jury by their verdict evidently found Mr. Moses 
guilty of operating his car at an excessive speed. • • * Like-
wise, the jury found Mr. Temple free from any negligence 
which was the proximate cause of the collision.' 
'' 'If the jury discredited the testimony of Mr. Moses and 
believed that of Mrs. Brewer, this was within their province.' 
'' '.An inference of excessive speed on the part of Moses 
may be drawn from the force of the impact and the damage 
to the vehicles even tl1ough :Moses testified that he was clriv-
ine: at a lawful speed. 15)6 Huddy, Automobile Law, Sec. 
179.' . 
"vVithout ~:oing into a recital in full of the evidence in 
this case, the Court is of the opinion that the principles an-
nounced in the above case are applicable and-that the evi-
dence was sufficient on which to base a verdict. 
'' ') .... 
'' The parties requested nine instructions. Most of them 
were long~ and involved, some incorrec.t and some partly cor-
rect and partly incorrect, yet dealing- with a vital point in 
the case. The Court did not think the jury should go unin-
structed on a vital issue, and yet to patch these requests for 
instructions by deleting· or adding to and making them con-
form to the other instructions without repetition did not tend 
to clarity. In order to instruct the ju;ry clearly, the Court 
refused all requests from both parties and gave Instruction 
X in lieu thereof. The plaintiff is not here complaining of 
the refusal to give his instruction, so he need be considered 
no further. 
'' The defendants requested eig·ht instructions. Five were 
long and involved and, to. a degTee, argumentative. 
5• *Five were finding instructions. The same thought was 
repeated in some, thereby unduly emphasizing it. Some 
of the finding instrnc.tions were incomplete, and some with-
out supµorting evidence. To point out these inaccuracies 
in detail would prolong- this memorandum and serve no g·ood 
purpose. .All instructions are the Court's. In imparting tlie 
law to the jury, the court may use its own langu{lge. It is 
more apt to use lang·uag·e that is neutral than counsel who 
often unintentionally in their zeal will emphasize their owri 
theories. The model. instruction is simple, impartial, clear 
and concise. 
"In Gottlieb v. Com., 126 Va. 807, ~Tudge Prentiss deplores 
the fact that unfortunately many instructions which have 
received judicial sanction are eoucbed in technical lang-uage 
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of doubtful meaning and with their 'obscurities, refinements, 
distinctions, contradictions, hypotheses and tergiversations 
serve only to confuse.' When the law of the case has been 
once given to the jury, litigants can find no just cans~ for 
complaint. In reviewing the objections of the defendants 
to Instruction X, the answer to many is found in the instruc-
tion itself and in the foreg·oing principles. A closer inspec-
tion of Instruction X will reveal the fac.t that it already 
covers many of the matters which were urged as an objec-
tion because omitted. The Court thinks Instruction X sub-
stantially and simply covered every vital issue in tbe case. 
"3. 
''Thirty minutes was al1owed to each side to present their 
case to the jury. The testimony of any aid to the jury was 
brief and within a small compass. The bulk of the record 
is lar~elv acc.ountecl for because of the efforts of counsel in 
Cf08S -examination in a vain sea.rcb for additional facts and 
because of the arguments of counsel over objeetions to evi-
dence. "TJ1en these mutters are sifted from the record, 
there was little left to argue to the jury who had patiently 
lh,tened to the evidence. 
. "4. 
"'l111e witness Dawson was introduced bv the defendants 
with full knowledge of counsel of bis relationship and that 
he would on cross examination be asked about this relation-
ship. Dawson's testirnonv was in direct conflict with that of 
the -plaintiff on a vital issue. The jury had a rig·ht to know 
his interest in tl1e outcome, llis bias if any, in order to place 
credence where it belong·ed. 
6* *'' Counsel vainly try to sunport their objection by di-
recting attention to the fart that it had been shown that 
the witness ,,rent to tbe hospital to interview the plaintiff as 
the attorney of the defendant 1Stillman. They contend that 
this miQ·ht sl1ow bias and that the witness at the time of his 
visit did not know his company carried insurance on the 
defendant, and that it ·was unnecessary and improper to go 
farther. 
'' The answer fo this is that it is always competent to show 
the extent of tl1e bias. A party having two clients vitally in-
forested would be more prone to deviate than if 11e had only 
one. It is the amount of the influence tending to draw the 
witness from the path of truth that is important. 
"Another thought is that it is the bias existing at the 
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moment the witness is testifying and not his bias at some 
antecedent dav. 
"It is an ancient rule of evidence that a witness may be 
imp~ached by showing his interest in the outcome. Testi-
mony as to liability insurance is excluded on the theory that 
it is irrelevant and likely to produce prejudice. But when 
necessary to show the witness is biased or interested in 
the result, it is no longer irrelevant. 
''If counsel are fearful that seven jurors will perjure them-
selves and render an unjust verdict through prejudice . in 
a case in which they have no interest, then other couns~l 
may be equally ( even more so) fearful that a witness with 
two clients to serve, from whom he earns his living, might 
depart from the path of truth. In the opinion of the court, 
the situation presents an ideal case for a jury to consider 
all of the surrounding circumstances. 
'' The motion to set aside the verdict will be overruled and 
judgment entered in accordance with the verdict. 
"(Signed) FRANK T. SUTTON, JR. 
Aug. 25th, 1942.'' 
THE FALLACY OF DEFENDANT'S' ARGUMENT IS 
THAT IT IS BASED ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMP-
TIONS. 
The entire· argument of counsel for petitioners, though 
7* *ably presented, is based upon four erroneous assump-
tions: (1) that the plaintiff was bound to see the on-
coming· automobile of the defendants before attempting a 
left turn, or else stand convicted of negligence ; ( 2) that 
plaintiff, intending to make a left turn, was absolutely or 
unqualifiedly bound to first see that such movement eould 
be made in safety; (3) that the plaintiff was under the abso-
lute and unqualified duty to give the appropriate arm signal 
for a left .turn, or stancl convicted of negligence as a matter 
of law, and ( 4) that the uncontraclicted testimony in the 
record shows that the plaintiff did not g·ive such a. signal. 
We shall now undertake to point out the_ testimony which 
supports the verdict of the jury ·that the plaintiff, in view 
of all the circumstances of the case, was not g-uilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to see defendants' automo-
bile sooner; that he was not guilty of contributory negli-
~ence in failing· to see that a left turn could be made in 
safety; that he was not guilty of contributory neg·lig·ence, 
as a matter of law, in failing to give t11e signal, (if, in fa.ct, 
I ( 
. I 
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he so failed) and that there is no evidence from which the 
jury was bound to find that the signal was not in fact given. 
In this ~ourt plaintiff's position, fortified by a verdict ap-
proved by the trial judge, must be sustained if the record 
contains credible evidence to support the verdict. We are 
not concerned with conflicts in the testimonv. Thev have all 
been resolved in favor of the plaintiff. · "' 
8* *TESTIMONY WHICH SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. 
It will be observed, as stated by the court in its opinion, 
that "the parties approached each other from opposite di-
rections and met on a curve, which for a time obscured their 
vision of each other. They met at the intersection of two 
cross-roads which did not cross each other at right angles, 
but an angle somewhat as in this illustration: 
At this point the court is asked to look at the photographs 
identified as "Plaintiff's Ex~ No. 4," ''Plaintiff's Ex. No. 
3," and "Plaintiff's Ex. No. 2." Plaintiff approached the 
intersection on 460 from the direction of Blackstone, which 
is from the reader's left. The defendants approached on 
460 from the opposite direction. Plaintiff intended to make 
a left turn into 153. Photograph marked ''Plaintiff's 
9-11: Ex. No. 4,'' was taken *from the direction of Blackstone. 
"Plaintiff's Ex. No. 2" was also taken from the direc-
tion of Blackstone, but with the camera. closer to tl1e inter- • 
section. They show the range of plaintiff's vision as he ap-
proached the intersection. ''Plaintiff's Ex. No. 3" was 
taken from the direction of Petersburg. 
Plaintiff testified as follows on direct examination: 
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·' Q. Tell the jury just exactly how you approached the 
intersection; how you were turning and what you did f 
'' A. When I was 250 to 300 feet away, I was warned by Mr. 
Bruce that I was coming to a very dangerous crossing, the 
worst he knew, and he made the remark a.bout it as a matter 
of caution to me. I· slowed down until I was possibly run-
ning twenty miles an hour. I approacl1ed the intersection, 
which is about 200 feet across; I looked in every direction 
as I entered the.intersection, as I always do, and there was 
nothimr on either road. I could see as far as, the roads were 
open, which happens to be not very far, possibly 200 feet, or 
something like that, and there was nothing in slight any-
where. I looked through my mirror and made sure nothing 
be]1ind me. I was running- between double lines; there was 
nothing· in front or bebiricl and there was nothing to my 
rig·ht. I looked in front twice and to my right twice and 
made sure there was nothing behind, and as I was exactly 
by the post on the side, with ha.I£ of my car in front and the 
other half behind, I made the turn, and just as I made the 
turn to go in, I looked clo~ the road and saw something 
coming· at a rate of _speed which was very unusual. I knew 
I could not get throug·h if he came on that way, and believ-
ing he's would stop or slow down for the intersection; I turn eel 
my car to the ri.!rht until I.had it nearly exactly, as far as I 
could tell, straight in the road, and the car was still coming, 
and approached the intersection, whic]1 has later proved t"o 
be eighty feet, and when I Sfl:W he would not stop, I applied 
my brake and stopped my car, and almost in the same in-
stant, I can hardly tell what, in ai split second, his car era.shed 
into mine. W11en it happened, I remember it crashed; I 
l1eard some noige; I heard groans; but I did not know any-
thin!?.· for a little while. 
'' Q. When you approached the intersection, before you 
started to turn, knowing·, however, that you were goin~ 
10* to turn, ~and before you ~·ot over the white line at all, 
how fast were you travelling t 
'' A. Anproximatelr twenty miles. 
'' Q. "\Vhen you :(inally decided to begin to turn across the 
w11ite line to the left. did vou loQk down the road to see if 
anything was coming· towards Petersburg1 
'' .A. I looked down the road next to the last thing I did 
and the last thing I did was to turn my car and look ahead. 
Tr., pp. 35-37. * * * 
"Q. At the time you first saw him, when you had gotten 
over two to four feet across the white line, preparing to 
go into route 153, had he g·otten to the intersection Y 
I 
i 
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'' A. No, he was beyond the intersection when I first saw 
him. rrr., p. 38. * * * 
'' Q. Can you give us an estimate of the rate of speed he 
was travelling· when you first saw him? 
'' A. l\f y impression when I first saw him was anywhere 
from 60 to 90 miles an hour. 
"'Q. You do not think it was less than 60? 
'' A. Certainly not less than 60, and possibly more than 
that. It was just a flash ; a thing you could not just easily 
tell, because it was just a dart. Tr., p. 38. • • * 
'' Q. As you were intending to turn into Route 153, were 
you going to turn on the far side of those posts, or on the 
near side? 
'' A. I was turning· on the right side, which I should. I 
was where I had the post exactly to my left and then started 
to make the turn. Tr., p. 39. * * * . 
'' Q. Do. you know how wide 153 is on your left as you ap-
proach that post; in other words, a person coming out of . 
153, going· towards Blackstone 7 · 
"A. It is a two-lane roadway. The road is 22 feet wide, 
but the widest part, where 153 comes into 460, is possibly 
200 feet. I stepped it across there, but did not measure it. 
Both the pictures were taken a. little closer up on the Black-
stone side, looking east, and the one taken on the Pe-
ll* tersburg side a *little further, because as you look east 
it shows a. curve in tl1e road . 
. '' Q. Does the road, in fact, curve to the east? 
'' A. It is a rainbow curve and vou can see soine 250 feet 
or 300 feet in going around it. Tr·., pp. 39 & 40. * * *' 
'' Q. State to the jury, to the best of your knowledge and 
belief, whether you gave that sig11.al there for the left-hand 
turn or not! · 
"A . .1\.pproaching the intersection a.nd seeing· nobody com-
ing- and looking a~rain and seeing· nobody coming in either 
direction and looking· carefully before ~a king the turn, I 
don't remember wl13t I did; but I always make the signal; 
I have never been accused of not making· the signal; it is 
just a thing that I do automatically; but whether I made 
the sig·n or not, I don't definitely remember; but I always 
make the -sign. If anybody was coming in front of me, or 
behind, or anywhere, I would lmow I made the sig·n; but 
not seeing- anybody I don't. know whether I made the sign 
or not with my hand." Tr., p. 42. 
On c.ross ex~nation, plaintiff testified: 
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'' Q. Then, you could. see on this road as fa.r as could be 
seen1 
"A. Yes, probably 100 feet beyond the post. 
''·Q. You said you could see 250 to 300 feet. 
'' A. The 300 feet was from the middle of the road down 
towards Petersburg; it would not have been visible 250 feet. 
"Q. I believe you said, in your direct examination 250 to 
300 feeU 
'' A. I would say definitely, I think we measured it as be-
ing· 250 feet from the scene of this end of the road up to 
the post, and it wa.s possible to see more down the center 
of the road. 300 feet, I think, would be the .limit you could 
see from the middle of the intersection and f tom the inter-
section. Tr., p. 51. * * * 
' '' Q. You also told Mr. Dawson yon did not give any hand 
signal? 
-,, A. No, I did not. 
'' Q. But you have it here in the paper? 
12"" *" A. But he read it differently; that is not correc.t. 
'' Q. You say you did not tell Mr. Daw.son and this 
statement did not ha:ve in it at the time that you did not 
see the car until it was 50 feet from you Y 
"A. No. He said, 'When did you first see it,'· I said, 
'Wben I cut out of that intersection.' He said, 'How far¥' 
I said, I don't know.' He.said, 'Estimate it.'' I said, 'I 
don't know whether 50 feet or more.' It has been shown 
since the intersection is about 70 feet. 
'' Q. Did ·you measure . it? 
'' A. No, I stepped it off and it is approximately 75 or 80 
~~ ' 
"Q. Let us get this correctly. You looked twice? 
'' A. I looked facing me t-wi.ce and to my right twice. 
'' Q. How many . times to your rear? 
'' A. I said I looked through my mirror and saw nothing 
coming from the back. 
"Q. How many times did you do that? 
'' A. Well, once or twice. 
''Q. I think you said before you did it twice? 
"A. I did it twice; I will say I always look twice. 
'' Q. Your routine is when approaching an intersection you 
look forward twice, to your back twice and to your right 
twice? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. How many times did you look to the left Y 
'' A. I looked forward, then to the ·left one time and then 
looked to my left for the final look. 
. . 
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"Q. Was that when you got hit, when you looked to the 
left? 
'' A. I had turned to look to the left and got sig·ht of the 
thing coming. Mr. Bruce made some remark; I don't re-
member what he said now. 
"Q. Is it not true you did not see· the car until you turned 
to the left? 
13* *''A. I had made my :final pass and realized all roads 
were clear and I turned to the left ( no sense in look-
ing to the rig·ht on 460) and I caught something coming, may-
be 50 or maybe 75 feet away. 
'' Q. That thing was as far as you could see? 
'' A. No; it had come pa.rt of the distance without my see-
ing it and it came the rest of it; so I could not tell how fast . 
ft was coming, because it is like seeing and hearing a 'train 
coming on the railroad at 90 miles an hour ; like a humming 
bird when I was a hoy. Tr., pp. 56 & 57. '* * * · 
'' A. The whole thing, for the last 100 or 150 feet, lmp-
pened in one second and it is .hard to get those things. I 
would say if a wagon had been going across ther~ it would 
have been hound to have been hit; or if an old man or an 
old woman had been ~wing· over there thev would have been 
bound to have been hit. Tr.~ p. 59. * * * · 
'' A. Yes, and to the best of my knowledge and belief he 
was making- 75 miles an hour, possibly more than that; but 
to be safe I woulcl say he was going· 75 miles an hour. T.r., 
p. 60. * • • 
'' Bv the Witness: The statement here in t]1e copy which 
says I said I did not give any arm or hand signal for a. left 
turn ; I did not say it. I told him frankly and plainly that I 
looked everywhere and did not see · anything and that I did 
not remember wl1ether I had my window down or whether I 
. had it up. I told him if I haci my window down my hand 
would go out automaticallv, as it always did, but I could 
not swear under the conditions that I had the window down. 
He asked me point blank and I said, 'I do not remember 
.definitely, but I do remember definitely looking in every di-
rection.' He put .it on this paper wrong. He says on this 
statement here: '* * * I was traveling before starting· my 
turn, came into view. This car was about 30 to 50 feet from 
me.' I told him verv franklv I could not tell how far it was 
from me, but it was" well outside the intersection and that I 
did not have much idea how wjde the intersection was, but 
that the car was outside the inter'section. I could not be 
definite as to how far, but I know it was outside the inter-
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section, and I now know it was 75 feet from the intersection, 
and he put the car was 30 to 50 feet from me._ That is wrong. 
T 71 * * * r., p. . 
'' Q. Did you use the figures 30 to 50 feet, and, if so, what 
did you have reference to when vou used them Y 
14• "'' A. I told him that the cai was well outside the 
intersection, but I could not say how far it was. 
"Q. Did you use the fig1.1res '30 to 50 feet away' at all? 
'' A. I said it was well outside of the intersection. He 
said, 'do you lmow ho.w far Y' I said, 'I don't know; it might 
have been 30 to 50 feet.' 
'' Q. The 30 to 50 feet had reference to outside the inter-
section? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. And he put it 30 to 50 feet away from you? 
· "A. Yes. " Tr., p. 77. • * * 
Re-Direct Examination. 
"Q. Mr~ Bowles examined you at length as to what ha.p-
pened immediately before you turned and what happened 
when you did. I ask you this question: Immediately before 
the front wheels of vour car turned over the white line to 
the, left, did you look ~down the: road to Petersburg? 
'' A. I did immediately before I did and it was the last 
thing. I turned my eyes before I did. 
'' Q. You did not see anything coming¥ 
'' A. No, I did not. 
'' Q. Then you turned your eyes to Route 153, the side you 
were turning to, and saw nothing coming? 
'' A. That is right. · 
"Q. You were then turning your left wheel from 460 g·o-
ing into route 153? · 
'' A. Yes, I have a recollection of four things done then; 
one thing that it was coming outside the intersection : then 
to the intersection; then that it was1 coming into the car, and 
then the crash, and I do not remember anv more until I come 
to." Tr., pp. 78-7R * * * ., 
Mr. L. C. Bruce, a passenger in the plaintiff's car, testi-
fied on direct examination : 
15~ *" A. 'When I first seen Mr. Stillman's car, Mr. Wil-
liams had not gotten quite over the line, or, if so, not 
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much. He was just starting to make his turn. He had just 
c.hanged like he was making his turn ·and evidently, from 
the way he acted, he saw him about the time I did. 
''Q. When you first saw Mr. 1Stillman's car had Mr. Wil-
liams gotten opposite that stoh on the wesU 
'' A. He was going by at the rig·ht of the stob; he was just· 
about to turn. 
'' Q. He had not turned; had just prepared to turn¥ 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. How far was the Stillman car away at that time? 
"A. Well, at first I seen of the car it was about 250 feet. 
I just mean something approximately like that. 
'' Q. Had it g-otten to the intersection? 
,, A. No, it had not gotten to the intersection then. It came 
on to the intersection, Mr. Williams had barely turned his 
car straight, say about 4 feet, and I saw :Mr. Stillman's car 
turn to us. That is when I began to cover up and duck my 
head. 
"Q. Could you g·ive µs any idea how fast the Stillman car 
was running? · 
'' A. I would say sixty-five to seventy miles an hour. Tr., 
pp. 84-85. • • * 
"Q. Can you t(lll whether Mr. Williams gave any arm 
signal for the turn? 
'' A. To the best of my opinion he did. 
''B;v J\fr. Anderson: If your Honor please, we object to 
the witness' opinion. If he knows, he can state it. 
''By the Court: The objection is sustained. State what 
you know. 
' 
"Q. According to your best recollection, state whether he 
gave the sig·nal or not? 
"A. I believe he did." Tr., p. 86. * * * 
16»> *W. H. Read, State Trooper, caliecl by the defend-
ants, testified on cross examination:. 
''Q. You spoke of the sign. Was tlmt the center of the 
square indicated by 'stop,' a.t tl1e mouth of 460 Y 
'' A. There was one there. 
'' Q. How far can that stop sign be seen by the drive1~ of 
a car approaching· the intersection from towards Peters-
burg? 
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'' A. I would say 200 feet anyway. 
· '' Q. Is the top of that sign about as high as an automo-
bile? 
'' A . .Approximately so, yes. 
'' Q. If a person approaching the intersection from towards 
Petersburg could see that stop sign about 200 feet and the 
stop sign was about the heig·ht of an automobile, then a per: 
son sitting in a.n automobile could see a person approaching 
from Blackstone about the same distance Y 
'' A. I do not g·et that question? · 
'' Q. I understand you to say a person · approaching that 
intersection from Petersburg, as Stilhnan was, could see 
that ·stop sign in the center of the mouth of 460 for 200 feet¥ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. Now, I ask you if a person approaching that int~r-
section from towards Blackstone and got to a place about 
where that stop sig11 is at the mouth of 153 he could see the 
approaching car from the same distance, could he not? 
'' A. Yes, he could. · 
'' Q. Then, a person approaching this intersection · from 
Blackstone how far could he gee a uerson approaching· from 
the other side, from towards Petersburg, when the person 
approaching from Blackstone gets to the double white line 
(I hand you 'Plaintiff's Ex. No. 2, wh~ch shows the white 
line)-a car approaching the intersection from Blackstone 
and reaching· that white line, how far can he see a car ap-
proaching from Petersburg? 
'' A. Just a short distance. 
*'' Q. So, a person approaching this intersection from 
17* Blackstone could not see far along the road until he 
got up near there t 
'' A. He would have to be close to 153 to see a car approach-
ing 153 coming from Petersburg·.'' Tr., pp. 113-114. * * * 
The defendan't, Stillman, testified that he did not know how 
fast he was driving as he approached the intersection, since 
he was not watching his speed. He could give no account 
of the accident whatsoever, claiming that he was knocked un-
. conscious (Tr., p. 153). But he made statements to Mr. 
Beecher Stallard, to the effect that ·he did n.ot see Mr. Wil-
liams, and that while he would not estimat.e bow fast he was 
going, he left Richmond about seven o'clock that morning 
and had driven about fifty-five miles, when the accident hap-
pened (Tr., pp. 96, 98). The testimony of the various wit-
nesseR shows that the collision took place shortly after eight 
o'clock. It is a matter of common knowledge that to aver-
M. Stillman and Berlo Vending Co. v. C. vV. Williams 55 
age fifty-five miles an hour one has to drive a good part of 
the time much faster than fifty-five miles an hour. In this 
instance, Stillman had to drive throug·h the City of R.ich-
mond and the ·City of Petersburg, and several small towns 
before reaching the point of the collision. He could not have 
made the trip in anything like an hour without running a 
good part of the time at a speed of 75 or 80 mile's an hour. 
He struck the plaintiff's car with such force that the entire 
front of the plaintiff's car from the radiator to the wind-
shield was demolished, and. the back of the plaintiff's car 
was driven in about two feet just as if it had been struck from 
the rear. The defendants' car was similarly damaged. 
18* -No doubt Mr. Stillman was operating or ...:•intently listen-
ing to the radio on his car, an~ that accounts for his 
failure to6 give any account of the accident. J. vV. Martin, a 
witness for the defendants, stated 011,;pCross examination that 
the radio on Mr. Stillman's car was on when the witness ar-
rived at the scene of the accident. Mr .. Kay, an occupant 
of the defendants' car, ,vas likewise unable to g·ive any ac-
count of the accident. He said he did not see the accident or 
know what side of .the road they were on when it happened. 
Perhaps he, too, was intently listep.ing at the radio. 
The learned trial judge, in a few well chosen words, thus 
summarized the evidence which we have ':luoted: 
'' The parties approached each other from oppo~ite direc-
tions and met on a curve, which for a time obscured their 
vision of each other. They met at the intersection of two 
cross-roads which did not cross each other at right angles 
but on an angle somewhat as in this illustration: (illustration 
omitted.) * * * 
·'Before reaching· the intersection, the plaintiff had slowed 
down to about _twenty miles per hour, and as he approached, 
he looked in every direction and there was nothing on either 
road. He looked throuirh his. mirror to be sure nothing was 
behind him. He savs he looked to the front twice and to 
his rig:ht twice and ·had started to make the turn when he 
again looked down the road and saw some.thing coming at 
a very unusual rate of speed. He says he turned his car 
back to the right and straig·ht in the road, applied. Ms brakes 
and stopned his car, and almost in the same instant the de-
fendants' car crashed into him. He estimates the def end-
ants' speed at from sixty to ninety miles per hour. The whole 
thing l1appened in an instant. He was not certain that he 
gave the statutorv sigt1als before starting, anfl there is no 
positive evidence that he did not.'' 
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19* *THE PLAINTIFF, IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY .NEGLIGENCE, 
WAS NOT BOUND TO SEE THE O!N1.COMING AU-
TOMOBILE, OF THE DEFE;NDANTS. B.E·FORE AT-
TEMPTING TO TURN TO THE LEFT. 
The plaintiff approached the intersection slowly. He 
~ooked in every direction twice. Lastly, and properly so, his 
eyes were turned in the direction of 153 into which he in-
tended to turn. After he began to turn into 153, and when 
he had moved in that direction, only a few feet, he caught a 
glimpse of the defendants' car, well outside of the intersec-
tion, coming at a terrific rate of speed. Realizing that he 
would be struck broadside if he continued, he straightened 
his car on 460, by slightly turning it back to the right, and 
stopped, hoping· and praying that the defendants would pass 
him to their right, but they continued at their reckless rate 
of speed, without changing their course, or applying· their 
brakes, until they were stopped by a head-on collision with 
plaintiff's car. · What more could any plaintiff have done! 
He looked twice in the direction from which defendants' au-
tomobile came, and it had not come into view. Of course, 
this lookout was made a ·short interval before plaintiff un-
dertook to turn left, but the interval was no longer than 
was necessary to- enable him to turn his eyes from the east 
and look north, before entering 153. At the time he looked 
twice in the direction from which the defendants' -0ar came, 
he could not see very far. He says he could see about 200 
feet. He is corroborated in this by the State Trooper. The 
State Trooper further testified that shortly before Mr. Wil-
liams reached the point where he could possibly see 200 
20* feet in the *direction of Petersburg, he could see only 
a short distance. It is submitted that the plaintiff ex-
ercised not only ordinary, but extraordinary care in the prem-
ises and that the accident wa~ due wholly to the excessive 
speed at which defendants were travelling. · 
In Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 145, 12 S. E. 2d, 826, 
Temple was entering· an arterial highway, intending to make 
a left turn therein and ::M:oses was approaching on the ar-
terial highway from Temple's rig·ht. The court said: 
"While it is true Mr. Moses had the right of way at this 
particular intersection if ~1e were proceeding lawfully, if is 
also true that Mr. Temple would not have to assume that 
he would encounter any vehicle operated at an excessive 
speed. If the Moses car was being operated at an illegal 
rate of speed, it would come from a point of obscurity to 
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the point of impact in a few seconds. At 560 feet west of 
the intersection, it could not have been seen on account of 
the obstruction created by the hill. For instance, if it were 
moving at 45 miles per hour, it would have covered the dis-
tance in about eight and one-half seconds. If travelling 55 
miles per hour, it would have covered the distance in about 
seven seconds. If traveling at 65 miles per hour, the dis-
tance would have been ·covered in about six seconds. The 
jury could have reasonably believed that Mr. Temple stopped -
his truck before going on the highway and looked but did 
not see the Moses car because it was obscured by the bill, 
and before he could get his truck straightened out on the 
highway, he was struck.'' 
In Stratton v. Bergman, 169 Va. 249, 192 S. E. 813, the 
court said: 
'' Assuming that he was making a left turn across the path 
of the truck, as claimed by the plaintiffs in error, was it neg-
ligence as a matter of law for him to have done so? We 
think not. The uncontradicted evidenee was that he was pro-
ceeding slowly and reached the intersection first.'' 
21"" *In Greenleaf v. Richards, 16 S. E. (2d) 374, 178 V.a. 
40, Richards sued Greenleaf for. damages growing out 
of a collision at the intersection of State Highway No. 29, 
and State Highw~y No. 33. :Number 29 runs approximately 
north and south while number 33 runs. east a'nd west. Rich-
ards was travelling east on number 33. Greenleaf was pro-
ceeding north over number 29 at approximately fifty miles 
an hour. The sole issue to be decided in the case was whether 
Richards was guilty of contributory negligence. The jury 
resolved that issue in bis favor. This court, in reviewing 
the judgment of the trial court on the verdict of the jury, 
said: 
"Unless Richards was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law, we cannot disturb the verdict. The trial 
court ·permitted the jury to measure his conduct. This ac-
tion of the court was proper. The uncontradicted evidence 
discloses that Richards heeded the stop sign on Highway No. 
33, and stopped his car at a point wl1ere he could see to the 
north and south on Highway No. 29 ; that he looked in both 
directions before proceeding; that the Greenleaf car was not 
in sight, and that Richards drove carefully into the inter-
section. After he started into the intersection his attention 
was directed to vehicles leaving one of the filling stations on 
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the east side of .No. 29, and the ref ore he never saw the Green-
leaf car until the moment of impact. The failure of Rich-
ards to see the approaching Greenleaf car when he looked is 
attributed to the fact that it was in the dip some 500 f e~t 
south of the intersection and obscured from his view.'' 
The failure of the plaintiff to see the defendants' car when 
he looked in that direction is due to the fact that it had not 
then come into the range of his vision. It was cut off from 
his view by the curve in the road. See the photographs re-
ferred to on page 8 of this brief. ·when the defendants' car 
first came within the range of plaintiff's vision, it was, 
22* according to the *testimony of the plaintiff, L.' C. Bruce, 
State Trooper, Read, and plaintiff's photographic evi-
dence, approximately 200 feet away. Plaintiff was then mov-
ing very slowly. Defendant, however, was covering ground 
so rapidly that his car struck plaintiff's car almost within 
an instant after it reached a point where plaintiff could see 
it. The excessive speed is evidenced by' the extent to which 
the blow demolished both cars. Although plaintiff's car was 
standing still at the moment of the impact, the blow was struck 
with such force that it caused the rear of the two cars to 
be knocked in as if each was nit from behind. The front pa.rt 
· of both cars was demolished back to the windshield. 
· In Temple v. Ellin,qton, 177 Va. 134, 12 S. E. (2d) 826, it 
was said that an inference of excessive speed on the part of 
the driver of an automobile on the hig·hway, under the cir-
cumstances, might be drawn from the force of the impact, 
and the damages to the vehicles, even though the driver tes-
tified he was driving at a lawful speed. If such an inference 
may be drawn where the driver testifies positively that he 
was driving at a lawful rate of speed, a fortiori should the 
inference be drawn where the driver admits that he does not 
know how fast he was driving. 
PLAINTIFF, THOUGH INTENDING TO MAKE A LEFT 
TURN, WAS NOT UNDER AN ABSOLUTE OR UN-
QUALIFIED DUTY TO FI~ST .SEE THAT SUCH 
MOVEMENT COULD BE MADE IN SAFETY. 
What has been said on the subject of the plaintiff's alleged 
contributory neglig·ence in failing to see the automobile 
23* *of the defenda.nts before beginning to turn left in the 
direction of 153 is applicable here and need not be re-
peated. 
Code, Section 2154(122) Motor Vehicle Code, Sec. 75(a), 
provides: 
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'' Section 75. · Signals on starting, stopping, or turning.-
( a) Every driver who intends to start, stop, or turn, or partly 
turn from a direct line, shall first see that such movement can 
be made in safety and whenever the operation of any other 
vehicle may be affected by such movement shall give a signal 
as required in this section, plainly visible to the driver of 
such other vehicle of his intention to make such movement." 
It is contended that this section means that a motorist who 
intends to make a turn from a direct line is under an abso-
lute, unqualified duty to see that such a movement can be made 
in safety befo1·e it is attempted. But the courts have not so 
construed it. Mr. Justice Gregory, in discussing this section 
in Wright v. Viar, 174 S. E. 766, 162 Va. 510, said: 
"The manifest intent and purpose of the General Assem-
. bly in enacting the statute was to minimize the dangers aris-
ing from situations such as we ha..ve here. One who has his 
car parked at a curb and desires to pull away and enter the 
traffic lane is charged by the statute with the express duty 
to first see that such movement can be made in safety to 
those who may be affected by his movement. This is a bur-
den imposed upon him. In addition to this he is also charged 
with the express duty to give the statutory signal which must 
be plainly visible to other vehicles which may be affected by 
his intended movement. This is another burden imposed . 
upon him. bi the per/ ormance of these duties he 1nust ex-
ercise ordinary care. He mu.st itse th'e care commensitrate 
with the dangers which such a. sititation presents." (Italics 
movement.' 
In V. E. <t· P. Co. v. Holtz, 162 Va. 665, 174 S. E. 870, this 
is said: 
24* *''A plaintiff who, in the proper way and at a proper 
time, has given the proper sig·nal of a purpose to make 
a left turn, when it appears that the movement can be exe-
cuted in safety, has done all that the law demands. Lawson 
v. Darter, 157 Va. 284, 160 S. E. 74. 
''This duty is fixed by statute. Code, Sec. 2154(122): 
'' 'Eyery driver who intends to start, stop, or turn, or 
partly turn from a _direct line, shall :first see that such move-
ment can be Jl!ade in safety and whenever the operation of 
any other vehicle ma.y be affected by such movement shall 
give a signal as required in this section, plainly visible to 
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the driver of such other vehicle of his intention to make such 
moement.' · 
"When 45 or 50 feet from the point of turning, Holtz sig-
naled his purpose and looked back. He saw a car coming, 
bu.t there was nothi.ng whatever to indicate that he could not 
execute with safety the 1novement intended. He could not 
continue to signal for prudent driving requires that both 
hands be upon the wheel when a right-angle turn is to be 
made. He could not continue to look back. Men are not 
Argus-eyed. He had to see that the turn was made at the 
proper point, and he had to be on the lookout for traffic which 
might be flowing along Twenty~seventh street. Moore v. 
Scott, 160 Va. 610, 169 S. E. 902. In other words, he did j1tst 
what any reasonable driver 1ni.,qht hm;e been expected to do. 
Certainly the reasonableness of his cond'lwt was a jitry ques-
tion, and we see nothing whatever to indicate that he was 
g1t1,ilty of negligence as a. matter of law." (Italics supplied.) 
,So, after all, the question is one of ordinary care. If it 
appears that the movement can be executed in safety and 
there is nothing· to indicate that it cannot be done and the 
motorist did just what any reasonable driver mig·ht have been 
expected to do, he is not guilty of contributory negligence. 
Any other rule would make a motorist an insurer every time 
he attempted to turn from a direct line and this without re-
gard to the degree of care exercised. The happening of an 
accident in the course of the movement would be conclusive 
evidence of negligence. One intending to turn might 
25 * ,x,slow down to a proper rate of speed, g·ive the proper 
signal and keep a proper lookout, and exercise the 
hig·hest degree of care known to hull}.an fore sight and yet, if 
another motorist should approach at an excessive rate of 
speed and hit the one turning before the turn is completed, 
the motorist turning· would be contributorily neg·ligent, ac-
cording to the contention of the defendants. If the view is· ob-
structed at the intersection ,vhere the turn is being made, no 
degree of .care exercised by the motorist making· the turn 
would protect him from the recklessness of another motorist, 
if the contention of the defendants be correct. 
In Atlantic Greyhound Corvora.tion v. Lyon, 107 F. (2d) 
157 ( C. C. A. 4th), Jacquelin Weeks attempted to make a left 
turn in the highway and was struck by a bus before the turn 
was completed. The line of vision of the driver of the two 
vehicles was somewhat restricted as they approached each 
other. A passenger in the bus was injured and he sued both 
the bus company and Jacquelin Weeks. There was a recov-
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erv against the company alone and it sought a reversal on 
appeal upon the ground that Weeks was at least partly, ·if 
not solely, responsible for the collision. The provision of 
the statute here relied on was stressed, both in the original 
brief of the Company and in a petition to rehear, but to no 
avail. Judge Dobie, epeaking for th~ court, said: 
'·' Another question is: Was the defendant, Jacquelin 
Weeks, as a matter of law guilty of concurring negligence f 
Or, was there any evidence which justified the court in leav-
ing· this question to the jury and the jury in their verdict 
that she was not guilty of such negligence contributing proxi-
mately to the accident1 In view of the fact that she 
26* was *required to exercise only ordinary care in the 
premises, again, though the question is a close one and 
not free from difficulty, we feel that we are not warranted in 
saying that there was no such evidence, by holding that she 
was guilty of such negligence as a matter of law. After her 
friends bad signalled to her she properly decided to tur1J 
around and follow them. The day ·was clear, the two-lane 
road was not very wide and was dry. The :filling station, with. 
entrances from the road, was a likely place for the turn. 
She was then proceeding at a moderate speed of 15 miles an 
hour. She testified that she looked in all directions before 
she began to turn and saw no cars. Miss Dinsmore ( who . 
was in the car w~th Miss Weeks) testified that she, too, looked 
in all directions without seeing any car. There was no tes-
timony that the cat of Miss ,V-eeks was improperly or un-
skillfully handled in making· the turn.'' 
THE PLAINTIFF "WAS NOT UNDER AN ABSOLUTE, 
UNQUALIFIED DUTY TO GIVE THE APPROXI-
MATE ARM SIGNAL FOR A LEFT TURN. 
In Morris v. Dame, 161 Va. 545, 171 S. E. 662 (669-70), Mr. 
Justice Epes, in his usual scholarly manner, clearly points 
out when and under what circumstances tho arm signal for 
a left turn must be given. "\Ve quote : 
'' The Virg-inia statute prescribing rules for the operation 
of vehicles on the highway provides that before the driver 
of a vehicle shall make either a left or a right turn at a road 
intersection, he shall give the prescribed signal for such a 
turn at least 50 feet before making the turn; and that the 
violation of this, or any other provision of tl1e statute, shall 
be a misdemeanor and be punishable hy a fine and/or im-
pris~mment. Acts 1926, c. 47 4, Sec. 3, subsec. c, and section 
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18, as amended by Acts 1928, c. 399, p. 1021, Michie 's Code 
Va. 1930, .Sec. 2145(4), pars. 9 and 10 and Sec. 2145(19). 
These provisions of the statute create a_ general duty on the 
part of drivers of motor vehicles to give the prescribed sig-
nal before maJdng a left or right turn at a road intersection.-
But a failure to g·iye the signal cannot be actionable negli-
gence as to any particular person unless the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case are such that the duty to *give 
27* the signal has become a particular duty owing to that 
person as an individual. 
"For the general duty imposed by the statute to become 
a particular duty owing to a particular person, he must . be 
in a position which, under a reasonable construction and in-
terpretation of the statute, brings him within the particular 
class of persons for whose protection from injury these pro-
visions of it were enacted. Wb.en the general duty imposed 
by the statute bas become a particular duty owing to a par-
ticular person, the failure to give the prescribed signal be-
comes actionable negligence as to him, provided (1) that the 
failure to comply with the statute is not excusable, and (2) 
that the failure to gi.ye the required signal is the proximate 
cause of an injury to l1im which is one of the consequences 
contemplated by this provision of the statute and that it was 
intended to prevent. 46 C. J. (Neg·. Secs. 107, 113, 114; 1 
Sherman & Redfield on Neg. (6th Ed.), Secs. 27 and 27a; 9 
Ann. Cas. note, page 427; Di Caprio v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 
231 N. Y. 94, 131 N. E. 746, 747, 16 A. L. R. 940; Cooper v . 
.Agee, 222 .Ala. 334, 132 .So. 173; Haniuton v. Minneapolis 
Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N'. W. 693, 694, 79 Am. St. Rep. 
350; Mechler v. McMahon, 184 Minn. 478, 239 N. W. 605; 
Hansen, v. Kemtnish, 201 Iowa 1008, 208 .N. W. 277, 45 A. L. 
R. 498; Carter v. Redm,ond, 142 Tenn. 258, 218 S. W. 217; 
Franklin v. Houston, Elec. Co. (Tex. Civ . .App.) 286 S. W. 
5-78; .Anderson v. WeUs, 220 Mo. App. 19, 273 S. W. 233; 
Platt v. Southern Photo Material Go., 4 Ga . .App. 159, 60 S. 
E. 1068; Indiana, etc., Co. v. Neal, 166 Ind. 458, 77 N. E. 850, 
9 .Ann .. Cas. 424; Figone v. G·u,isti, 43 Cal. App. 606, 185 P. 
694; Flynn v. Gordon, (N. H.), 165 A. 715. 
''Under a reasonable construction of a statutory provision 
such as those here under consideration, when no practicable 
or reasonable degree of care and diligence for the safety of 
another would call ·for the performance of an act required 
thereby, no duty 'to do the act arises to him as an individual. 
.Sherman & Redfield on Neg-. ( 6th Ed.), .sec. 11, p. 21. Or to 
state it in another way, when a person is in a position such 
that no practicable or reasonable ·degree of care and dili-
gence for his safety would call for the performance of an 
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act prescribed by the statute, he is not in the particular 
class of persons for whose protection from injury the pro-: 
vision of the statute requiring the act was enacted. 
'' Certainly in many cases, and perhaps in most cases, the 
facts and circumstances which operate to prevent *a 
28* person from coming within the particular class for 
whose protection the statute was enacted, will also op-
erate to prevent the failure to do the act prescribed by such 
a .statute from being- the proximate cause of an injury which 
is a sequence of the act. .But this does not change the fun-
damental proposition that under those facts and circum-
stances there was nn particular duty owing to the person in-
jured to do the act. 
'' Applying this principle to the provisions of the statute 
here under consideration, when the driver of an automobile 
is in such a position that a reasonably prudent man in the 
exercise of ordinary care and vigilance would, under all the 
circumstances of the case, haye reasonable grounds for ap-
prehending· that his making a left or right turn at a road in-
tersection might affect the operation of another vehicle on 
the highway into which he intends to turn (that is, require 
any care or action on the part of the driver of the other 
vehicle to avoid a collision other than not to increase his 
speed to one beyond what is a lawful speed along that part 
of the highway), those in the other automobile are in the 
particular class of persons for whose protection the provi-
sions were enacted. Otherwise they are not, and the driver 
of the automobile making the turn owes no particular duty 
to them to give the signal prescribed by the statute.'' 
And in Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Lyon, supra, 
Judge Dobie said: 
'' On the other side, great stress was laid on the failure of 
Miss Weeks to give the arm signal for a left-hand turn, re-
quired by the Virginia Motor Code. Code Va. 1936, Sec. 
2154(122). Even though she saw ·no cars, and might have 
thought that no one would observe such signal and hence that 
it would ( under the circumstances) be a futile gesture, she 
should have given this signal. But it does seem probable,· 
and the jury might well have believed, from her testimony 
and that of other witnesses, that, even had she given this 
signal, it would not have been observed by Eggleston, and 
hence, the failure to gi.ve the signal did not contribute to the 
collision. Then, too, the point was made that if ( as they 
testified) Misses Weeks and_Dinsmore looked carefully about 
just before making the turn, they must have seen the car of 
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Eggleston. But here, again, in the light of all the testimony 
(some of it obviously conflicting), we think •this was a 
29t." question for the jury. · 1 
' ' So, under all the circumstances, the question, as to 
Miss Weeks, of the exercise of ordinary care vel non was, we 
think, properly submitted to the jury. The jury has resolved 
that question in her favor, and we cannot, as a matter of law, 
disturb that verdict. This decision seems to be in line with 
the Virginia cases of Green v. Ruffin, 141 Va. 628, 125 S. E. 
742, 127 S. E. 486; Sawyer v. Bll1inkenship, 160 Va. 651, 169 
S. E. 551; Virginia Electric~ Pou:er Co. v. Holtz, 162 Va. 
665, 174 S. E. 870; Stratton v. Berg1na-n, 169 Va. 249, 192 S. 
E. 813. And the opinion in An,gell v. McDarn.iel, 165 Va. 1, 
181 S. E. 370, s_eems particularly in point.'' 
Of course, the violation of a. statute in such a case is neither 
a-ctionable negligence nor contribittory unless it contributes 
to the collision. In the instant case, the driver of the defend-
ants' car did not even see the plaintiff's car before the col-
lision. If lie did not see the car itself, a fortiori he would 
not have seen the arm signal. 
THERE rs NO EVIDE.NCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT GIVE THE ARM: SIGNAL FOR 
A LEFT TURN. 
Plaintiff, on direct examination, was asked the direct ques-
tion: 
"0. State to the jury, to the best of your lmowledg·e and 
belief, whether you gave that signal there for the left-hand 
turn or not¥" 
To which he answered: 
'' A. Anol'oaching the intersection and seeing· nobody com-
in~· :rnd looking again and seein~ noboclv coming· in either 
direction and looking carefullv before making the turn. I don't 
1·emember what I did; but I always make the Rignal; I 
30* have never been *accw:ted of not making the signal; it 
i~ just a thing· tlmt I do automnticallv: but whether I 
made the sfo'll or not, I don't definitely remember; but I al-
wavs make the sign. If anybodv was comin2' in front of me. 
or behind, or anywhere, I would know I made the sign; but 
not seeing anybodv I don't know whether I made the sign or 
not with my hand.'' Tr., p. 42. . · 
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-On cross examination plaintiff testified: 
"Q. You also told Mr. Dawson you did not give any hand 
signal? 
'' A. :No, I did not. 
"Q. But you have it here in the paper? 
'' A. But he read ·it differently; that is not correct. * ,ff: • 
"The statement here in the copy which says I said I did 
not give any arm or hand signal for a left turn; I did not say 
it. I told him frankly and plainly that I looked everywhere 
and did not see anything and that I did not remember whether 
I had my window down or whether I had it up. I told him if 
I had my window down my hand would go out automatically, 
as it always did, but I could not swear under the conditions 
tha.t I had the window down. He asked me point blank and 
I said, 'I do not remember definitely; but I do remember 
definitely looking in every direction'. He put it on this paper 
wrong." · 
L. C. Bruce, a passenger in plaintiff's car, testified on di-
rect examination : 
'' Q. Can you tell whether Mr. ·wmiams gave any arm sig-
nal for the turn? 
'' A. To the best of my opinion he did. 
''By Mr. Anderson: If your Honor please, we object to· 
the witness' opinion. If he knows, he can state it. 
"By the Court: The objection is sustained. State what 
you know. 
31 * *'' Q. According· to your best recollection, state 
whether he g·ave the signal or not? 
"A. I believe he did'." Tr., p. 86. 
There is no other testimony on the subject. While the 
statement taken by the insurance adjuster, Dawson, does 
contain a statement that the plaintiff did not give the signal, 
this is not testimony. The plaintiff denied making such a 
statement to Dawson, and the jury accepted the plaintiff's 
testimony as true. Such a statement, when admitted in evi-
dence, is not substantive testimony. It cannot be considered 
by the jury except for the purposes of contradicting· the per-
son making the statement. Code, Section 6215; Yellow Cab 
Co. v. Eden. 178 Va. 325, 16 S. E. (~d) 625. In Worrell v. 
Worrell, 4 S. E. (2d) 343, 174 Va. 11, the plaintiff, Miss 
Worrell, made a statement similar to the one made by Wil-
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Iiams. In discussing the effect of this statement, Mr. Justice 
Spratley, speaking for the court, said: 
''The defendant contends that the written statements, which 
:Miss Worrell admitted she had made, exonerated the driver 1 
of the bus from negligence. He relies upon the familiar prin-1. 
ciple that a plaintiff cannot make out a better case than she 
herself has testified to, citing .ll!J. assie v. Finns tone, 134 Va. 
450, 114 S. E. 652; Thalhimer Brothers v. Casci, 160 Va. 439, 
168 S. E. 433, and related cases.' 
''Without ruling upon the admissibility of. the admissions 
secured by the use of a portion of the ex parte written state-
ments, since no cross error has been assigned, we do not 
think that "the application of the rule contended for can be 
extended to the circumstances and facts of this case. 
'' Here a collision occurred with .only a moment of wa-~·n-
ing. The uncontradicted evidence of the *plaintiff 
31a * is that she was, at that time, paying no attention to 
the speed or location of the cars on the road. Her evi-
dence disclosed a lack of knowledge of facts, which were 
necessary to support her conclusions. Her written state-
ments were expressions. of opinion, subject to explanation 
and contradiction. They were but ex pa.rte admissions at 
best. They do not constitute evidence upon which she· asks 
for a recovery. She does not ask the jury to believe them as 
based upon facts within her knowledge, nor to disbelieve her 
testimony given in open court. Rather she asks that she be 
believed when she savs she did not know the material facts 
upon which she based the opinion expressed in her written 
statements. Her testimony before the jury is not in conflict 
with her other witnesses as to the negligence of the bus driver 
nor as to the physical facts surrounding the collision. 
''The rule contended for by the defendant is based upon 
instances where a plaintiff testifies in court to facts within 
his knowledge, and upon which his case turns. The ex parte 
written statements of Miss Worrell did not constitute testi-
mony before the jury. They only affected the weight and 
value of her testimony so fa1 .. as they were contradictory. 
-Considered as admissions against interest, they were not con-
clusive, but subject to explanation and entitled to such weight 
as the jury might give them.'' 
The .defend.ant,. Stillman,. did not testify on the subject at 
all; neither did his compamon, Kay. Neither saw the plain-
tiff's car until the moment of the impact, and, therefore, could 
not say whether or not any signal was given. The failure to ~ 
I 
I 
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give such a signal ( if such failure there were) would cov~ti-
tute an act of contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff. It is a familiar rule that the burden of proving 
contributory negligence is on the defendant. I~ the absence 
of such proof the court cannot assume that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence in not giving· the signal. 
In Scott v. Git1niingha11i, 161 Va. 367, 171 S. E. 104, this is 
said: 
"In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can-
32* not assume that Scott, before making the *turn, failed 
to g·ive the required signal. . The burden was upon the 
plaintiff to prove that Scott did not give the signal. She 
has failed to carry this burden.'' 
As aptly stated by the trial Judge: 
"From the evidence, it is apparent that had he given the 
signals, they would not have been seen by the defendant due 
to the curve in the road and the distance. Under such cir-
cumstances, it was not negligence to fail to give the signal. 
See Morris v. Dame's Exor., 161 Va. 545." 
CROSS EXAl\HNATION OF THE, DEFE.NDANTS' WIT-
. NESS, DAWSON, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOW-. 
ING BIAS, INTEREST OR MOTIVE, WAS NOT 
ERROR, ALTHOUGH IT NECESSARILY DIS-
CLOSED THAT THE DEF,ENDAi~TS WERE PRO-
TECTED BY LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
The case, so far as pertinent here, was presented by the 
defendants, on the theory that Dawson went to the hospital 
to see the plaintiff and took from l1im the signed statement 
in the capacity of a practicing attorney representing· the per-
sonal defendant, . Stillman. The plaintiff testified, on cross 
examination, to tbe effect that Dawson told him that he was 
a practicing· attorney, representing- Stillman, and that he came , 
to see him in that capacity. The plaintiff denied many of the 
important statements contained in· the writing, and stated 
that he did not tell Mr. Dawson anything of the kind. stating 
in detail what he did tell him. In view of these denials, and 
before the defendant, Stillman, bad testified, counsel for the 
defendants stated to the court, in the absence of the jury, 
that be desired to put l\fr. Dawson on the witness stand if 
he could do so without subjecting him to cross examination on 
the subject of liability insurance. He asked for a tentative 
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ruling of the court for. his guidance. The court ruled 
33* *that it could not positively pass on the question until , 
it was actually presented, but, for the information of 
counsel for the defendants, the court would, and did, state 
that it was of opinion that if the defendant put Dawson on 
the witness . stand, counsel for the plaintiff would have a 
right to cross examine him on the subject of his relationship 
to the insurance company carrying the liability policy on 
the defendants' car. :Counsel for the plaintiff promptly 
stated that he would certainly cross examine Dawson on that 
subject if he were permitted to do so by the court. Counsel 
for defendant then stated that in view of such advices, he 
would not put Dawson on the stand. Thereupon, the def end-
ant, Stillman, was placed on the stan~. In the course of the 
cross examination of Stillman, it developed that he did not 
authorize Dawson to go to th~ hospital to see the plaintiff; 
that he knew nothing about such a visit or the statement 
which was taken on that occasion. Thereafter, counsel for 
the defendants stated to the court that in view of this testi-
mony by Stillman, counsel felt obliged to put Dawson on 
the stand, and the court was again asked for its opinion on 
the subject of the propriety of the cross examination of Daw-
son leading to the existence of liability insurance on the car. 
The court informed counsel for the defendants that it was 
still of opinion that counsel for the plaintiff would have-the 
right to cross examine Dawson on the subject of his relation-
ship to the insurance carrier if he were placed on the stand 
by the defendants. Counsel for the defendants then sought 
to place Dawson on the stand, in the absence of the 
34* *jury, for examination on the subject. This the court 
properly declined to permit him to do. No useful pur-
pose could have been served by such an examination, in the 
absence of the jury, since the court had ruled that it would 
permit cross examination on the subject of the interest, bias, 
or motive of the witness, even though it led to a disclosure 
of liability insurance. The testimony, when given before the 
jury, would, of course, be incorporated into the record ( which 
was done), and to take the testimony of the witness, in the 
absenc.e of the jury, and again in the presence of the jury, 
would needlessly encumber the record and unnecessarily con-
sume time. The defendant, after being forewarned as to what 
would take place, deliberately placed Dawson on the wit-
ness stand and then sought to prohibit plaintiff's counsel from 
cross examining him on the subject of his interest, bias, and 
motive. If any witness was ever liable to a vigorous cross I 
examination, Dawson was. He had made numerous ·state-
ments which the plaintiff had denied as wholly inaccurate. ~ 
I 
I, 
( 
I 
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Indeed, his own testimony is contradictory. He stated in 
one breath that he was a practicing attorney in the City of 
Richmond, and in another, that he did not even hold a license 
to practice either from the State of Virginia or from the 
City. 
Much has been said in the books on the subject of the ad-
missibility of evidence tending to show that a defendant in a 
personal injury action carries liability insurance. There are 
some nine or ten cases in Virginia on the subject, none of 
them, however, dealing with the precise question which we 
have here. All of them, of course, are to the effect that 
35* it is irrelevant *and prejudicial to the defendant to in-
ject "insurance" into the case. But none of them in-
dicate in the slightest that this rule will be enforced so as to · 
limit the right of cross examination to show interest, bias or 
motive. A splendid summary of the law on the subject is 
found in 56 A. L. R. in a copious annotation on the subject 
"Intorrning Jury of Liability Insurance". At page 1439 
the Annotator says: 
'' 3. Admissibility to show bias or interest of witness. 
'' Wbile the rule excluding any testimony or statement to 
the effect that the defendant in a personal injury action is 
insured should be strictly adhered to and rig·idly enforced, 
and the court should not tolerate evasion or circumvention 
of it by indirection, still, in applying it, regard must be had 
_to the undoubted right of the plaintiff to cros~ examine wit-
nesses to show interest or bias. It was always the right of 
the party against whom a witness is called to show by cross 
·examination that he has an interest, direct or collateral, in 
the result of the trial, or has such a relation to the party that · 
bias wouJd naturally arise, and this right is not to be abridged 
or denied because incidentally facts may be developed that 
a.re irrelevant to the issue and prejudicial to the other par-
ties, for the other party takes a chance when he calls the 
witness. The rule denying the right to show that defendant 
in a neg·lip;ence case carries liability insurance is not intended 
to override the equally positive -and salutary principle that 
a party lias the right to cross examine the witness produced 
by his adversary, touching every relation tending to show 
interest or bias. If the insurance company chooses to come 
before the jury, and place its own witnesses upon the stand, 
the plaintiff should be permitted to ask them if they are not 
there for the insurance company, which has produced them, . 
or connected with it, for the case cannot honestly be placed 
before tl1e jury without disclosure of the relation which such 
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witnesses sustain to that company; in other words, an insur-
. ance company, in def ending in the name of the record def end-
ant, a personal injury action, does not have the unqualified 
right to have that fact concealed because of the possible prej-
. udice that may exist in the minds of the jurors against such 
companies. 
36* :i:,, 'Accordingly, the rule is well established that facts 
tending to show iRterest, bias, or motive on the part of 
a witness may be elicited on cross examination, although such 
examination may necessarily disclose that the defendant in 
a personal injury action is protected by insurance ; for many 
facts wholly immaterial, and even positively prejudicial, on 
the main issues of a case, may be material as touching the 
credibility of a witness." 
Later cases are included in similar annotations in 74 A. 
L. R. 849, 95 A. L. R. 388, 105 A. L. R. 1319. 
In Paxton v. Davis, 65 Fed. (2d) 1492 ( certiorari denied 
54 Sup. Ct. 51), it was expressly held that cross examining· 
indemnity company's manager, witness for defendant, as to 
whether he did not investigate and adjust claims in the lo-
cality, was held proper to show his interest of bias. 
The Virginia cases on the subject, in the order in which 
they were decided, are as follows : 
Va.-Car. Chem. Co. v. · Knight, 1.06 Va. 674. 
P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 104 S. E. 384. 
Edwards v. Laiirel Branch Coal Co., 133 Va. 534, 114 S. E. 
108. 
Rinehart & D. Co. v. Brown, 137 ya. 670, 120 S. E. 269. 
Lanham, v. Bond, 157 Va. 167, 160 S. E. 89. 
Ga.,ines v. Canipbell, 15·9 Va. 504, 166 S. E. 704. 
Majestic Steani Laundry v. Pitckett, 171 S. E. 491, 161 Va. 
524. 
Kiser v. Sidhard, 162 Va. 456, 174 S. E. 682. 
Bloxom v. McCoy, 178 Va. 343, 17 S. E. (2d) 401. 
In Virginia-Carolina Chemica.l Co:. v. Knight, it was merely 
held that in an action by an employee to recover damages for 
injuries inflicted by the alleged negligence of the master, 
the fact that the master is insured against accidents to his em-
ployees, is irrelevant to the issue and cannot be given in 
37* *evidence. 
In P. Lorillard Co. v. Cla.y, it was held that in a per-
so·nal injury a.ction reference by counsel to the fact that the 
defendant master was insured is highly improper. 
In Edwards v. Lau,rel Branch Coal Co., the plaintiff sought 
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to cross examine one of the defendant partners on the sub-
ject of whether the recovery, if any, would have to be paid 
by any one other than the defendant. This information was 
sought upon the theory that protection afforded by liability 
insurance might cause the defendants to be less careful than 
they would otherwise have been. Such cross examination, 
of course, was properly denied. 
In Rinehart v. Brown, counsel for the plaintiff, in his open-
ing statement, referred to the fac.t that the defendant was 
protected by liability insurance, and ag·ain, on cross examina-
tion, counsel for plaintiff asked a witness for the defendant 
if the defendant company did not carry liability insurance, 
and after the evidence was cl0sed, during the argument of 
the case before the jury, counsel again undertook to make 
reference to the fact that the defendant carried insurance. 
The court held that the fact that a master is insured against 
accident throws no light on ,vhether or not he has been neg-
ligent in a given case, and evidence of such insurance is ir-
. relevant and inadmissible in an action for neglig·ent injuries 
to a servant. · 
38* *In Lanham v. Bond, the court permitted counsel, in 
his opening argument, to state to the jury that he in-
tended to prove that the defendant stated at the time of the 
accident that he had insurance and that the insurance com-
pany would pay the damages, and during the course of the 
trial, plaintiff was permitted, on direct examination, to state 
that the defendant admitted to him that he had insurance, 
and that the insurance company would pay all damages .. Plain-
tiff was also permitted to cross examine the defendant to 
the same effect. It was held that this was reversible error. 
In Gairz.es v. Cam,pbell, :M:r. Justice Holt, delivering the . 
opinion, said: 
"Next it is said that the plaintiff deliberately introduced. 
testimony showing, or tending to show, the def endaut to be 
insured, and that a judgment, if reached, ,vould not fall upon 
him, but the insurance corporation. If this charge be sus-
tained by the record, then error has been committed. No fair 
reason for such an appeal has ever been suggested. Patently, 
its purpose is to spoil the Egyptians. Lanham v. Bond, 157 
Va. 167, 160 S. E. 89; Rinehart & Dennis Co. v. Bro·wn, 137 
Va. 670, 120 S. E. 269. '' 
A reading- of the evidence ref erred to shows a pretty strong 
suggestion of insurance, but it appears that it was legitimate. 
The questions asked were proper ones and the answ·ers to 
them were responsive. "\Vhile they tended to show that the 
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defendant was protected by liability insurance, this was un-
avoidable, and so the judgment below was sustained. 
In Majestic Steam Lau~ndry v. Puckett, counsel for the 
plaintiff, in his closing argument to the jury, among 
39* other *things, said: 
'' If you give me a verdict for $11,000.00, I won't go into 
Mr. Bradley's pocket for one cent of it.'' 
It was claimed that this was a furtive method of informing 
the jury that the defendants were protected by insurance. 
The court said, among other thing·s, that the statement was 
provoked by the preceding remark of defendants' counsel in 
his address to the jury when he said that Mr. Bradley was 
a hard working man and here was '' a police officer from De-
troit down here to go into the pockets of. Mr. Bradley". It 
was held that the reply of plaintiff's counsel was legitimate 
arg·ument. 
In Kiser v. Suthard, plaintiff's witness, on cross examina-
tion, testified that he was present when certain pictures were 
made. At this juncture plaintiff's counsel intervened and 
asked who made them, to which the witness replied '' It was 
two fellows, supposed to be representing insurance agent, 
having it done". The court refused to declare a mistrial 
or to set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiff because 
the remark was unsolicited and unresponsive to any ques-
tion. 
In Bloxom v. 1tf cC oy, courn;;el for the defendant argued to 
the jury that any verdict which they mig·ht render ag·ainst 
the defendant would have to be paicl out of his own pocket, 
and "out of his own hard earned wages". The court said 
the argument was objectionable since it was obviously made 
for the purpose of informing the jury that the defend-
40* dant did not carry liability *insurance and that upon 
proper objection, the jury should have been told to dis-
regard it. · 
It is thus seen that none of these cases in any way limit 
or restrict the right of leg·itimate cross examination, because 
it might disclose that the defendant is protected by insur-
ance. The cases rather indicate a broad view of the rule ex· 
eluding evidence of liability insurance, by refusing to declare 
mistrials or set aside verdict where the matter of insurance 
gets into the case inadvertently. 
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THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN LIMITING THE ARGUMENT TO THIRTY 
MINUTES ON A SIDE . 
. As stated by the trial court, in its opinion, "the testimony 
of any aid to the jury was brief and within a small com-
pass". The plaintiff was the only witness who testified fully 
on the subject of how the collision came about. Bruce, a 
passenger in plaintiff's car, testified very briefly on the sub-
ject. Neither the defendant, nor his companion, Kay, tes-
tified on the subject at all. So, the testimony, bearing di-
rectly on the vital issues in the case, was within a very nar-
row compass. While thirty minutes might have been slightly 
-to the disadvantage of the plaintiff, since he had to divide 
his time between the opening· and the closing arguments, there 
was no necessity for any such division in the case of the de-
fendants. Mr. Bowles, who is an able and experienced trial 
lawyer, could have ably and fully presented the entire . 
41* case *of the defendants within thirty minutes. Any 
other good lawyer could hav~ done the same thing. There 
was no necessity whatsoever for longer time, since there was 
no occasion for dividing the time. . 
In Jerrell v. Norfolk db Ports11wuth Belt Line R. Co., 184. 
S. E. 196, 166 Va. 70, the court, dealing· with this precise 
question, said: 
'' It is well settled in Virginia, as elsewhere, that in the 
absence of statute, the trial court 'has a superintending· con-
trol over the course of the argument to prevent the abuse 
of that or any other right. It is a power, however, to be 
exercised with discretion, and with reference to the particu-
lar circumstances of each case, subject to review by an ap-
pellate court. Word's Case, 3 Leigh. 7 43; Proff. Jury, Sec. 
249'. Jones v. Conuiiowwealth, 87 Va. 63, 68, 12 S. E. 22~, 
228. . 
'' vV e fully recognize the broad discretion which is, and 
should be, vested in .the trial court in its control over the· 
argument of counsel in any given case. There may be cases 
in which ten minutes to a side, or even less time, mfo;ht be 
sufficient. and there would be no abuse of its discretion on 
the part of the court in so limiting the argument; but in this 
particular case the questions and the amount involved were 
of too much importance and too complicated to warrant the 
court in taking· the action complained of. The case had been 
once tried and judgment rendered for the defendant by the 
lower court, and it was sent back hy this court to be tried 
by a jury instead of by the court as at the first trial. The 
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action and attitude of the court on the second trial, however, 
would seem well calculated to give the jury the impression 
that the court thought little of the plaintiff's case.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that the question of limiting 
the arg·uments of counsel was a matter wholly within the dis-
cretion of the trial court and its action in the premises cannot 
be properly made the basis of an assignment of error, unless 
the court grossly abused its discretion in the premises. 
42* No such abuse *appears in this case. 
THERE WAS NO IMPROPER ARG1U:ME\NT BY PLAIN-
TIFF'S COUNSEL. 
It is impossible for this court to pass upon the propriety 
of the argument set out on pages 52 and -53 of the petition, 
in tbe absence of a transcrtpt of the argument of counsel for 
defendants, to which the argument objected to was a reply. 
The extracts from the arg·ument of plaintiff's counsel set 
forth in the petition show that the argument was in reply to 
argument on the subject by counsel for defendants. Not only 
had Dawson told plaintiff in the hospital that he was an at-
torney at law representing Mr. Stillman, and was taking the 
statement in that capacity-he actually testified, on direct 
examination, that he made those statements to the plaintiff 
and that they were· true. 'On cross examination, however, 
he admitted that he had not qualified himself to practice law 
in the City of Richmond by paying a license to the State of 
Virginia and a license to the City of Richmond. Counsel for 
the defendants actually argued to the jury, notwithstanding 
the foregoing, that Dawson went to the hospital, in the ca-
pacity of a practicing attorney representing Stillman. The 
argument of counsel along that line provoked the arµ;ument 
in ·reply, which is objected to. As a matter of fact, the last 
sentence of the first extract from the argument of· plaintiff 
appears on its face to be incomplete. This sentence begins 
"according to his statement, his part as a lawyer is giving 
incoi·rect statements. * * * '' That is not all that was 
43"" *said on the subject and in order for this court to pass 
· upon the propriety of the argument, it is necessary that 
the entire sentence at least be reproduced accurately. The 
references to the witness representing the insurance company 
in the last part of the second extract quoted from argument 
of counsel, was, of course, for the nurpose of contradicting 
the witness, Dawson. He said he did not know that he rep-
resented the insurance comuanv when he went to the hos-
pital to see the plaintiff. He finally admitted, on cross . ex:-
I 
I 
~ 
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amination, that while he was in the hospital, he gave to a 
friend of the plaintiff, a card showing that the witness did 
represent the insurance company. .All of this was in reply 
to argument made by counsel for the defendants to the effect 
that when Dawson went to the hospital he went there rep-
resenting Stillman, without any knowledge on his part that 
his insurance company carried the liability on Stillman's 
car. 
· In M ajestio Steam, Laundry v. Puckett, 171 S. E. 491, 161 
Va. 524, defendant's counsel, in his address to the .jury, said 
that Bradley, the defendant, was a hard working man and 
that he would have to go down into his pockets to pay any 
verdict that was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff's counsel replied, "if you g·ive me a verdict for $11~-
000.00, I won't go into Mr. Bradley's pockets for one cent 
of it". The court held that this was a legitimate reply. 
In Sands v. 'Norvell, 101 S. E. 569, 126 Va. 384, this is said: 
44* ,)(," Considerable latitude must be allowed counsel in 
argument, and in the ordinary case the discretion and 
judgment of the trial court ought to be and are decisive of 
questions of this kind.'' 
THERE WAS NO ERROR PR.EJUDICIAL TO THE DE-
FENDANTS IN THE GRANTING .AND REFUS-
ING OF INSTRUCTIONS. 
The instructions given by the court, upon its own motion, 
in lieu of those prayed for by counsel for the respective par-
ties, covered every phase of the case on which the parties 
were entitled to have the jury instructed. The object of in-
stuctions is to enlighten the minds of the jurors on the law 
of the case, and when that object has been fully accomplished, 
the multiplication of instructions should be avoided. Yellow 
Cab Corporation, v. Henderson, 16 S. E. (2d) 389, 178 Va. 
207. The refusal of instructions covered by instructions given 
is not error. Third B-uckin.aham, Convm/tvnity- v. Anderson, 
17 S. E. (2d) 433, 178 Va. 478; Middlesboro Coca-Cola Bot-
tling ·works v. Campbell, 20 S. E. (2d) 479, 179 Va. 693. It 
is sufficient for the trial court to g·ive such instructions as 
are necessary and proper to enable the jury to arrive at a 
correct verdict, and, after so instructing, it may reject all 
other instructions tendered. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours d'; 
Co. v. Snead's .Adm'r., 97 S. E. 812, 124 Va. 177. And the 
refusal of requested instructions covered by those given, 
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whether they were prepared by the court, or by the parties, is 
not error. P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 104 1S. ·E. 384, 127 Va. 
734. 
Counsel for defendants stresses the failure of the 
45* *trial court to give an instruction to the effect that it 
was the plaintiff's absolute and unqualified duty be-
fore attempting a left turn, to :first see that such movement 
could be made in safety. We have already seen that the de-
fendants were not entitled to any such instruction. In the 
performance of these statutory duties the plaintiff was re-
quired to exercise ordinary care-that commensurate with 
the dangers which the situation presents. See pages 22, 23, 
24 and 25 of this brief. 
ASSIGNMENT NUMBER 6, POINT]NG OUT VARIOUS 
OTHER ERRORS NiOT SPECIFIED, IS 
NOT WELL TAKEN. 
With due respect to learned counsel for the defendants, 
we submit that these alleged errors are not of sufficient im-
portance to require discussion. Suffice it to say that none of 
them specified under that heading are well taken. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is submitted, with deference, and yet with a firm con-
viction, that the defendants have had a fair trial, free from 
prejudicial error, and that the judg·ment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respeetfully submitted, 
0. W. WILLIAMS, 
By ALLEN & ALLEN, 
His Counsel. 
MERCER STILLMAN & BERLO VENDING Co. 
'VS. 
C. W. WILLIAMS 
Record No. 2686 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE DUTIES 
OF A MOTORIST BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A LEFT 
TURN WHERE TRAFFIC REGULATION IN FORCE IS SIMILAR 
TO THAT FOUND IN VIRGINIA CODE, SECTION 2154 ( 122), 
MOTOR VEHICLE CODE, SECTION 75A. 
1. Hill V. Union Gas & Electrfr Co., 200 N. E. 199, 
Ohio, 1935. ( Held, statute requiring motorist to make 
sure that turn can be made in safety before turning 
does not impose absolute duty upon motorist, so that in 
turning he acts at his peril.) 
2. Harmon V. Gilligan, 266 N. W. 288, Iowa, 1936 
(Held automobile driver, acting as reasonably prudent 
person in believing that she can make turn in safety, 
complies with statutory provision that Motor Vehicle 
operators must see before turning that there is sufficient 
space to make such movement safely.) 
3. Ruperto V. Tho mas, 298 Pac. 851, Cal. 1931. 
(Held, such language does not mean the driver of a 
vehicle may not turn his machine at an intersection 
of streets unless there is absolutely no possibility of 
accident. It must receive a reasonable construction. 
The negligence of the driver must be determined by an 
application of the well-settled ·rule of negligence as to 
what a reasonably prudent person should do under like 
circumstances. The language should be construed to 
mean that the driver of a vehicle upon a public high-
way, before starting, stopping or turning such vehicle, 
must use such precaution as would satisfy a reasonably 
prudent person acting under similar circumstances that 
he could do so safely.) 
4. S pea,· V. Lenenberger, 112 P. 2d 43, Cat 1941. 
(Held, motorist making left turn is not required to 
know turning movement can be made with safety, 
but all that is required is that he take the precautions 
which a reasonably prudent person would take under 
the circumstances reasonably apparent to him and fact 
that collision occurred when motorist attempted to make 
left turn into driveway does not justify a holding that 
motorist before starting to turn did not first see that his 
movement could be made in safety.) 
5. Phelan V. Schneider, 146 S. W. 2d 244, Texas 
1940. (Held such a provision does not impose an 
absolute duty on a motorist, but merely requires that 
he exercise ordinary care in making decision that such 
movement can be made in safety.) 
6. Gates V. London, 185 N. W. 723, Mich. 1921. 
(Held, violation of statute not contributory negligence 
per se. Statute must receive a reasonable construction, 
it requires due care on part of driver, and whether he 
exercised due care was a question for the jury.) 
7. Cook V. Gillespie, 82 S. W. 2d 347, Ky. 1935. 
(Held, the law does not impose upon motorist the duty 
of giving a signal if his contemplated turn or change of 
course will not affect any one, though the giving of 
signals on all such occasions would be a good habit to 
cultivate.) 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge 
of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, held for the said city a.t the courtroom thereof 
in the City H?ll on the 10th day of September, 1942. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, the 24th day of January, 19'42: Came C. W. Wil-
liams, by counsel, and filed a Notice of Motion for Judgment 
a~:ainst Mercer Stillman, and Berlo Vending Company, a 
Delaware Corporation, which Notice of Motion for Judg .. 
ment is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
'' Virginia : 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
C. ,V. ·wmiams, Plaintiff. 
'l]. 
Mereer Stillman, and Berlo Vending Company, a Delaware 
eorpora tion, Defendants 
NOTlCE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Company, a Dela-
ware Corporation: 
YOU ARE HER.EBY NOTIFIED that on the 9th dav of 
February, 1942, at ten o'clock A. M. of that da.y, or as soon 
thereafter as I may be heard, the undersigned, C. W. Wil-
liams. liereinafter ref erred to as ''plaintiff,'' will make a 
motion before the Law & Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Part T,vo, at the Courtroom thereof, in the City Hall 
of said City, for a judgment ag·ainst you, Mercer· 
page 2 r :Stillman and Berlo Vending Company, and each 
· of you, jointly and severally, Berlo Vending Com-
pany being a. corporation .created by the laws of the State 
of Delaware. doing busi.ness in Virginia. pursuant to a cer-
tificate of authority g-ranted to it by the State Corporation 
Commission of Virginia, hereinafter referred to as '' defend-
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ants,'' for the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), 
which sum is due and owing to the plaintiff by the defend-
ants, and each of them, for the damages, wrongs, and injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff, and caused by the defendants as 
hereinafter set forth, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit: on or about the 14th day of F'eb-
ruary, 1941, the plaintiff was driving his 1939 Model Buick 
automobile in an easterly direction on United States High-
way No. 460, in the County of Nottoway, Virginia, and when 
the plaintiff reached a point on said highway where the same 
intersects with State Hig·hway No. 153, he slowed down and 
brought his vehicle practically to a stop preparatory to mak-
in~; a left turn into said Route 153, and while the plaintiff 
was practically at a standstill and undertaking to see that 
a left turn could be made in safety, a certain Ford automo-
bile, _owned, operated and controlled by the defendants, ap-
proached the said intersection on said Route No. 460, from 
the East, at an excessive rate of speed, and the said def end-
ants then and there ran the said Ford automobile into and 
upon the automobile driven· by the plaintiff, and then and 
there g-reatly hurt and injured the plaintiff all over bis per-
son and caused l1im great and permanent injury, disability, 
pain and mental anguish, and caused him to expend and be-
come liable for large· sums of ~o~ey i? attempting to get 
cured and healed of said mjur1es ; and also greatly 
pag·e 3 ~ damaged the plaintiff's automobile; altogether to 
the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of Ten Thou-
sand Dollars ($10,000.00). 
·wherefore, judgment will be asked of the said court at 
· the time and place hereinbef ore set forth, for the . said sum 
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). 
Given under my band this 21st day of January, 1942. 
ALLEN· & .ALLEN 
Counsel 
0. ""\V. "WILLIAMS, 
By Counsel 
page 4 r And at another day, to-wit: .At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
9th day of February, 1942. 
C. W. Williams, plaintiff 
against 
Mercer Stillman, :mil Berlo Vending O'ompany, a Delaware 
corporation, defendants 
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· MOTION. 
This day came the plaintiff, by counsel, and on his motion 
it is ordered that this case be docketed and continued. 
page 5 } .And at another day, to-wit: At a. Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
9th day of February, 1942. 
Upon motion of counsel for the plaintiff, it is ordered that 
the defendants file a statement, in writing, of their grounds 
of defense in this action, within thirty ·days from this date. 
})age 6 r .And at another day, to-wit: At .a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
10th day of March, 1942. 
This clay came the defendants, by counsel, in response to 
the order of this Court entered herein on the 9th dav of 
February, 1942, requiring· the defendants to file in writing 
their grounds of defense, a.nd tendered a statement of their 
,grounds of defense and a further statement of their grounds 
of a plea of contributory negligence, which statements a:re 
accordingly filed. 
page 7 } Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court in the City of Richmond, 
Part II. 
C. 1V. Williams, Plaintiff 
v. 
Mercer Stillman, and Berlo Vending Company, a Delaware 
Corporation, Defendants 
GR.OTJNDS OF DEFENSE AND STATEMENT OF 
· .GROUNDS OF PLEA OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIG-ENCE. 
The Defendants, Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Com-
pany, a Delaware Corporation, come and say that they are 
not liable to the plaintiff in any amou11:t whatsoever and for 
their grounds of defense, among other things, assign the fol-
lowing: 
. . 
l. The defendants deny each and every material allegation 
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contained in the plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Judgment. 
2. The defendants deny that they were negligent as charged 
in the plaintiff's Notice of :Motion for Judgment. 
3. The defendants deny that any of their servants, agents 
or employees were guilty of neglig·ence as charged in the 
plaintiff's Notice of Motion for .Judgment. 
4. The defendants deny that they, acting by or through 
any of their agents, servants, or employees, were guilty of 
any act or omission as charged in the plaintiff's Notice of 
Motion for J udg·ment, proximately causing- the damages and 
injuries complained of. 
Notwithstanding the defendants' denial of negligence in 
any particular for which they are liable to the plaintiff and 
without waiving· said defense, the defendants further say, 
in the alternative that the damag·cs and injuries 
page 8 ~ of which the plaintiff complains were either proxi-
mately caused by his own negligence or by neg·li- -
gence on his pa.rt, wl1ich efficiently contributed to cause them 
so as to bar any right of recovery in either event, the cir-
cumst:1nces thereof being as follows : 
That, while the defendants' automobile was operated in 
a lawful manner proceeding in a westerly direction on and 
along U. S. Highway No. 460 in the County of Nottoway, 
Virginia, the plaintiff, operated his automobile in a reckless, 
careless, and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed 
on and along said highway in an eastwardly direction; that 
the plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and to keep his 
car under control; that he failed to maintain proper brakes 
as required by law, and to use them in the exercise of. or-
dinary care; that he negligently ?ro~e his said automobile 
to the left of the center of the said lnghwa.y; that he failed 
to ~ive an adequate and timely signal of intention to turn, 
pa.rtly turn, slow down, or stop as required by law; that he 
ne~:ligentlv attempted to make a left turn without passing 
to the right of the center of the intersection; that he ll,eg·li-
~entlv failed to pass to tl1e right of the defendants' auto-
mobile, giving· it, as nearly as possible, one-half of the main 
trrwel portion of the roadwav; that he negligently, if he in-
tended to stop, or turn, or partly turn from a direct line, failed 
to first see that sucl1 movement could be made in safetv and 
to give a sig11al plainly visible to the driver of other vehicles 
of his intention to make such movement from a distance of 
at least fifty (50) feet before slowin,g down, stop-
page 9 ~ pin~:. turning, partly turning, or materiallv alter-
ing the course of his said automobile; and that the 
I 
\ 
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accident set forth in the plaintiff's Notice of Motion for 
Judgment was proximately caused by said negligence of the 
plaintiff and would not otherwise have resulted; that; in any 
event, the said negligence on the part of the plaintiff as 
aforesaid, contributed with the negligence of the defendants, 
if any, (which said negligence is specifically denied) to cause 
said accident: and the plaintiff is in either event, barred from 
any recovery agaim,t the defendants in this action. 
The defendants reserve the right to amend their grounds 
of defense and/or their statement of contributory negligence 
at any time as· they may be advised, to demur to the plain-
tiff's Notice of Motion for Judgment or any part thereof. 
and to move the Court to strike out the same or any part 
thereof as insufficient in law or for lack of evidence to sup-
port it. 
MERCER STILLMAN and 
BERLO VENDING COMP ANY, 
A .Delaware Corporation 
By Counsel 
AUBREY R. BO,VLES, JR. 
A. SCOTT ANDERSON 
Counsel. 
page 10 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, 
]1eld the 12th day of May, 1942. 
This day came again the plaintiff and defendants, by coun-
sel, and thereupon the defendants severally pleaded '' not 
gsuilty" and put themselves upon the Country and the plain-
tiff likewise. 
The defendant, l\forcer Stillman, then filed herein a cross-
claim to which the plaintiff pleaded "not g-uilty'' and put 
l1imself upon the Country and the said defendant, Mercer 
Stillman, likewise. 
And thereupon came a. jury, to-wit: Edgar S. Poore, Jno.-
B. Kinker, Gilbert G. Field, E. H. Cooke, A. R Betts, Sr., 
H. E. Silcox and C. Fred Kohler who were sworn well and 
truly to try the issues joined in this case· and having· partly 
heard the evidence were adjourned until tomorrow morning 
at ten o'clock. 
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page 11 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court in the City of Richmond, 
· Part II. 
C. W. Williams, Plaintiff 
1). 
Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending· Company, a Delaware 
Corporation, Defendants 
CROSS-CL.A.I~f OF MERCER STILLMAN .. 
One of the defendants herein, Mercer Stillman, comes and 
says that he is in no way indebted to the plaintiff or liable 
to him in any manner for damages set forth in his Notice of 
Motion for Judgment, but, on the contrary, says that the ac-
cident complained of and the injuries and damage~ alleg·ed 
to have been sustained were, on the contrary, caused by the 
negligent, careless, and reckless operation by the plaintiff 
of his automobile, and the defendant Mercer Stillman, here-
by gives notice that, at the trial of this complaint, he will 
claim against the plaintiff his damages sustained in said ac-
cident, and will ask judgment ag·ainst the plaintiff on his 
cross-claim herein set forth in the sum of Five Hundred Dol-
lars ($500.00), caused by the neg·ligence of the plaintiff as 
hereinafter set forth, to-wit: 
That the plaintiff was the owner and driver of a certain 
Buick automobile which he was operating in an easterly di-
rection on and along U. S. Highway No. 460; County of Not-
toway, Virginia, at or near the intersection of said Highway 
with State Highway No. 1.53 on about the 14th day of Feb-
ruary, 1941; while the defendant Mercer Still-
page 12 ~ man's automobile was operated in a lawful man-
ner proceeding- in a westerly direction on and 
a.long. said U. ,S. Hig·hway No. 460, the- plaintiff operated his 
automobile in a reckless, ·careless, and negligent manner at 
an excessive rate of speed on and along· said Highway; that 
· the plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and to keep his 
car under control; that he failed to maintain proper brakes 
as required by law, and to use them in the exercise of or-
dinary care; that he negligently drove his said automobile 
to the left of the center of the said Highway; that he failed 
to give an adequate and timely signal of his intention to 
turn, partly turn, slow down or stop as required by law; 
thn.t he neglig~ntly attempted to make a left turn without 
l)a.Asing- to the right of the center of the intersection; that 
) 
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he neg·ligently failed to pass to the right of the defendant's 
automobile, giving it, as nearly as possible one-half of the 
main tr.aveled portion of the roadway; that he negligently, 
if he intended to stop, or turn, or partly turn, from a direct 
line, failed to first see that such movement could be made 
in safety and to give a si,gnal plainly visible to the drivers of 
other vehicles of his intention to make such movement from 
a distance of at least fifty feet (50 ft.) before slowing down, 
stopping, turning·, partly turning, or materia1ly altering the 
course of l1is said automobile; and that the accident set forth 
in the plaintiff's N otiGe of Motion for Judgment was caused 
by the negligence of the plaintiff without fault on the part 
of. the defendant herein, Mercer Stillman, all to the damage 
of the said defendant's automobile as aforesaid. 
Wherefore the said defendant, Mercer Stillman, 
page 13 ~ files this, his Crm:;s...,Claim herein and asks judg-
ment against the plaintiff in said amount of Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) as aforesaid. 
MERCER STILLMAN 
By Counsel. 
BOVlLES, ANDERSON ~L\.ND BOYD 
Counsel. 
page 14 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two,, 
held the 13th day of May, 1942. 
This day C'ame again the plaintiff and defendants~ by coun-
sel. ::ind the jury sworn in this case on yesterday appeared 
in Court in accordance with their a.cljournment and having 
fully heard tl1e evidence were adjourned until tomorrow af-· 
ternoon at two o'clock. 
page 15 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, 
held the 14th day of :M:ay, 1942. 
This day came the plaintiff and defendants, by counsel, 
and the jury sworn in this case appenred in Court in accord-
ance with th<?ir adjournment and lmving heard the argu-
ments of counsel were sent out of Court to consult of a ver-
dict and after some time returned into Court with a verdict 
as to the claim of the p}aintiff herein in the words and :figures 
following to-wit': ''vVe, the Jury, on the issue joined, find 
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for the plaintiff against Mercer Stiilman and Berlo Vending 
Company and assess his damages at Three thousand ($3,000) 
· dollars.''; and with a verdict upon the cross-claim of the 
defendant, Mere.er Stillman, in the words following, to-wit: 
"We, the Jury, on. the issue joined, find for the plaintiff, C. 
W. ·wmiams. '' 
Thereupon the def end.ants, · by counsel, moved the ·Court 
to set aside the said verdicts as contrary to the law and the 
evidence and for other reasons set forth in writing and now 
filed and made a. part of the record herein, which motion the 
Court continued for argument to be heard thereon. 
page 16 ~ Virginia.: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II. 
C. W. 'Williams 
v. 
• Mercer iStillman and Berlo Vending Company, 
By Counsel for Defendant: If your Honor please, on be-· 
half of both defendants, with respect to both. the notice of 
motion for judgment and the c1:oss-claim we move the Court 
to set aside the verdict and enter u.'p judgment for the de-
fendants on the notice of. motion for judgment, and in the 
alternative to grant the defendants a new trial, and in any 
event to grant a new trial on the cross-claim, on the grounds 
that the verdict is contrarv to the law and the evidence and 
without evidence to suppoi·t it, and because of errors com-
mitted during· the course of the trial. 
page 17 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, 
held the 31st day of Aug·ust, 1942. 
Tbis clay came again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
the Court having maturely considered the motion of the de-
f end an ts to set aside the verdict of the jury in this case, is 
of opinion to overrule said motion for reasons set forth in 
writing· and now made a. part of the record, and the same 
is hereby overruled; to which action of the Court the de-
fendants, by counsel, excepted. "Whereupon, it is considered 
by the Court that the plaintiff recover of the defendants, 
Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Corporation the sum 
of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00), in accordance with the 
\ 
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verdict of the jury, with interest thereon from the 14th day 
of May, 1942, the date said verdict was rendered, together 
with the plaintiff's costs in this behalf expended. 
And the defendants having indicated their intention to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error from, and supersedeas to, said judgment, upon 
motion of the defendants, by counsel, execution of this judg-
ment is su_spended for a period of ninety days from tl1is date 
. and if such petition is presented within said period, the 
operation of this judgment is sU!spended thei~ea.fter until 
such Court shall have acted upon the petition, provided the 
defendants, or someone for them, within fifteen clays from 
this date, shall enter into bond in the penalty of three thou-
sand dollars ($3,000.00), with security to be approved by the ' 
Clerk of thi~ Court, c.onditioned and payable as t]1e law di-
rects, according· to the provisionS; of Section· 6351 of the .Code 
of Virginia. · 
page 18 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
C. W. Williams 
v. 
Mercer Stil1man 1:tncl Burlo Vending· Corporation 
ME-lvIORANDUM BY THE COURr. 
In this ease there was a verdict by the jury in favor of 
the plaintiff for $3,000.00 ag-ainst both defendants, and the 
Court is now asked to set this verdict aside as contrarv to 
the law and the evidence. " 
'rhe defendants base their motion upon three grounds: 
(1) That there is no evidence to support the verdict, 
(2) That the Court erred in refusing instructions re-
quested by the defendants and in giving Instruction X in lieu 
thereof, 
(3) That the Court limited arg·ument of counsel before 
the jury to thirtv minutes a. side. 
( 4) Because the Court over the objection of the defend-
ants allowed Clms. 0. Dawson (a defendants' witness) to 
he examined as to his relationship to a liability insurance 
company car!ying insurance on the defendants' car~ 
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'1. 
It is not necessarv to set out in detail the evidence. A 
general statement will be sufficient. The parties approached 
each other from opposite directions and ~et on a curve, 
which for a time obscured their vision of each other. They 
met at the intersection of two cross-roads which 
page 19 }- did not cross each other at right angles but on an 
ang:le somewhat as in this illustration: 
Before reaching- the intersection, the plaintiff had slowed 
down to about twenty miles per honr, and as he· approached, 
he looked in every direction and there was nothing· on either 
road. He looked throug·h bis mirror to be sure nothing- was 
behind him. He savs he looked to the front twice and to 
his right twice and ·had started to inake the turn when he 
again looked down the road and saw something coming a.t a 
very unusual rate of speed. He says he turned his car back 
to the rig-ht ancl straight in the road, applied his brakes and 
stopped his car, and almost in the same instant the defend-
ant's car crasl1ed into him. He estimates the defendant's 
speed at from sixty to ninety miles per hour. The whole 
thing happened in an instant He was not certain that he 
g·ave the statutory 8ignals before starting, and there is no 
positive evidence that he did not. 
In Scott v. Cunningha1n, 161 Va., at page 371, it is said: 
page 20 ~ · "In the absence of evidence to tl1e contrary, we 
. cannot assume that 8cott before making the turn 
failed to give the required signal.'' 
) 
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From the evidence, it is apparent that had he given 'the 
signals, they would not have been seen by the defendant due 
to the curve in the road and the distance. Under such circum-
stances, it was not negligence to fail to give the signal. See 
Morris v. Dame's Exor., 161 Va. 545. 
The evidence is somewhat in conflict, but after reviewing 
it. the facts are so similar to those in the case of Temvle v. 
Ellington, 177 Va. 145, that it is pertinent to quote exten-
sively from that case. There it was said: 
"_"'\Vhile it is true Mr. Moses l1ad the right of way at this 
particular intersection if he wore proceeding lawfully, it is 
also true that Mr. Temple would not have to assume that he 
would encounter any vehicle operated at an excessive speed. 
If the Moses car was being operated at an illegal rate of 
speed, it would come from a point of obscurity to the point 
of impact in a few seconds. A.t 560 feet west of the inter-
section, it could not have been seen on account of the ob-
struction created by the hill. For instance, if it were moving 
at 45 miles per hour, it would have covered the distance in 
about eig·ht and one-half secoI?,ds. If travelling 55 miles per 
hour, it would have covered the distance in about seven sec-
onds. If traveling at 65 miles per hour, the distance . would 
have been covered in a bout six seconds. The jury could have 
reasonably believed that Mr. Temple stopped his truck be-
fore going on the hig·hway and looked but did not see the 
Moses car because it was obscured by the hill, and before. he 
could get his truck straightened out on the highway, he was 
struck.'' 
'' The presumption in the absence of evidenc.e to the con-
trary, is that Temple did stop and that he looked for oncom-
ing· traffic.'' 
'' The jury by their verdict evidently found Mr. Moses 
guilty of operating, l1is car at nn excessive speed. * * * Like-
wise, the jury found l\fr. Temple free from any negligence 
whic.h was the proximate cause of the collision.'' 
"If the jury discredifo<l. t.he testimony of Mr. 
page 21 ~ Moses and believed that of Mrs. Brewer, this was 
within their province.'' 
'' An inferenr.e of excessive speed on the part of Moses 
mav be dra-wn from the force of the impact and the damage 
to the vel1icles even thou~·h Moses testified that he was driv-
ing· at a lawful speed. 15-16 Huddy, Automobile Law, §179." 
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Without going· into a recital in full of the evidence in this 
case, the Court is of the opinion that the prin~iples announced 
in the above case are applicable and that the evidence was 
sufficient on which to base a verdict. 
2. 
The parties requested nine instructions. Most of them 
were long and involved, some incorrect and some partly cor-
rect and partly incorrect, yet dealing with a vital point iu 
the case. The Court did not think the j_ury should g·o unin-
structed on a vital issue, and yet to patch these requests for 
instructions by deleting or adding to and making them con-
form to the other instructions without repetition did not 
tend to clarity. In order to instruct the jury clearly, the 
Court refused all requests from both parties and gave In-
struction X in lieu thereof. The plaintiff is not here com-
plaining· of the refusal to give his instruction, so he need be 
considered no further. 
The defendants requested eig·ht instructions. Five were 
long and involved and, to a ~eg-ree, arg'llmentative. ]f'ive 
were finding· instructions. The same thought was repeated 
in some, thereby unduly emphasizing it. Some of the find-
ing instructions were incomplete, and some without support-
ing evidence. 'ro point out tliese inaccuracies in detail would 
prolong this memorandum and serve no good purpose. All 
instructions are the Court's. In imparting· the 
page 22 ~ law to the jury, the court may use its own lan-
g·uag·e. It is more a.pt to use language that is 
neutral than counsel who often unintentionally in their zeal 
will emphasize their own tl1eories. The model instruction 
is simple, impartial, clear and eoncise. 
In Gottlieb v. Com ... 126 Va. 807, 813, Judge Prentiss de-
plores the fact that unfortunately many instructions which 
have received judicial sanction are couched in ·technical lan-
g·uage of doubtful meaning and with their "obscurities, re-
finements, distinctions, contradictions, hypotl1esis and ter-
giversations serve only to confuse''. When the law of the 
case has been once given to the jury, litig·ants can find no 
just ca.use for complaint. In reviewing the objections of 
the defendants to Instru.ction X, the answer: to many is found 
in the instruction itself and in the foregoing principles. A 
closer inspection of Instruction X will reveal tbe fact that 
it covers many of the matters which were urged as an ob-
jection because omitted. The Court thinks Instruction X 
substantially and simply covered every vital issue in the 
·case. 
J 
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3. 
Thirty minutes was allowed to each side to present t.heir 
case to the jury. The testimony of any aid to the jury was 
brief and within a small compass. The bulk of the r~cord 
is largely accounted for because of the efforts of counsel in 
cross examination in a vain search for additional facts and 
because of the arguments of counsel over objections to evi-
dence. v\Then these matter are sifted from the record, there 
was little left to argue to the jury who had pa-
page 23 ~ tiently listened to the evidence. 
4. 
'The witness Dawson was introduced by the defendants 
with full knowledge of counsel of his relationship _and that 
he would on cross examination be asked about this relation-
ship. Dawson's testimony was in direct conflict with that 
of the plaintiff on a vital issue. The jury had a r.ight to 
know his interest in the outcome, his bias if any, in order to 
place credence where it belonged. 
Counsel vainly try to support their objection by directing 
attention to the fact that it had been shown that the witness 
went to the hospital to interview the plaintiff as the attorney 
of the defendant Stillman. They contend that this might 
show bias and that the witness at the time of his visit did 
not lmow his company carried insurance on the defendant, 
and tha.t it was unnecessary and improper to go farther. 
The answer to this is that it is always competent to show 
the extent of the bias. A party having two clients vitally in-
terested would be more prone to deviate than if he had only 
one. It is the amount of the influence tending to draw the 
witness from the path of truth that is important. 
Another thought is that it is the bias existing at the mo-
ment the witness is testifying and not his bias at some ante-
cedent dav. 
It is an.ancient rule of evidence that a witness mav be im-
peached by showing his interest in tbe outcome. Testimony 
as to liabilitv insurance is excluded on the theory that it is 
irrelevant and likely to produce prejudice. But 
page 24 ~ when necessary to show the witness is biased or 
interested in the result, it is no longer irrelevant. 
If counsel are fearful that seven jurors will perjure them-
selves and render an unjust verdict throug·h prejudice in a 
case in which they have no interest, then other counsel may 
be equally ( even more so) fearful that a witness with two 
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clients to serve, from whom _he earns his living, might de-
part fro~ the pa.th of truth. In the opinion of the court, the 
situation presents an ideal case for a jury to consider all of 
the surrounding· circumstances. , 
The motion to set aside the verdiet will be overruled and 
judgment entered in accordance with the verdict. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR. 
Aug. 25th, 1942. 
page 25 ~ And at said day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
. ·Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held 
the 10th day of Septembet, 1942. 
This day came again the plaintiff and the defendants by 
their attorneys, and the defendants, by their attorney, hav-
ing- presented to the Court after due notice in writing and 
within .the time prescribed by law the stenogTaphic, report 
of the testimony, instructions and otl1er incidents -of t]1e trial 
of this action on May 12th to 14, 1942, and having asked the 
Court to sign and authenticate said transcript as the evi-
dence and all other incidents of the trial herein as provided 
in Rule ,21 of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and 
it appearing· to the Court that counsel for the -plaintiff have 
bad due and reasonable notice in writing of this application 
and that said transcript is presented to the Court within 
sixty days after the final judgment entered herein on Aug11st 
31, 1942, and the Judge of this Court having signed and 
authenticated said transcript constituting the evidence and 
other incidents of said trial, said transcript is thereby a 
part of the record in this proceeding. And on motion of 
the defendants by their attorney it is ordered that the origi-
nal exhibits filed in evidence at the trial of this case and 
identified by the Judge thcrP.of shall be forwarded by the 
Clerk of this Court to th~ Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia to be considered as a part of the record in this case. 
page 26 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity of the City of Richmond, Part II. 
C. W. Williams, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Company, a Delaware 
Corporation, Defendants. 
' I\ 
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Dr. Randolph Harrison Hoge. 
Before Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Judge. 
May 12-14, 1942. 
Appearances : Messrs. George E. Allen, Sr. and George 
E. Allen, Jr. Counsel for Plaintiff, 
:Messrs. Aubrey· R. Bowles and A. Scott Anderson, Coun-
sel for Defendants. 
page 27 ~ DR. R,ANDOLPH HARRJSON HOGE, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Allen : 
·Q. Please state your namet 
A. Randolph Harrison Hog·e. 
Q. How long have you been practicing your profession? 
A. Since 1931. 
Q. In Richmond, Virginia Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Have you had occasion to treat and examine Mr. C. W. 
·wmiams for injuries sustained in an automobile accident 
on or about February 14, 1941? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state what your findings were? 
A. At that time he had a bruise and a rubbed area on the 
forehead, over the left eye ; he had one rib broken on the 
right side, in the front of his chest, and he had a rather 
deep a.nd extensive laceration or cut just below the knee. 
Q. Do you know when he entered the· hospital in Rich-
mond? 
A. Yes, on February 14th. 
Q. You may refresh yourself with any memorandum of 
your own if you wish. Do you know how long he stayed 
there? 
page 28 ~ A. He was there until February 25th. 
Q. Can you give us any idea of the amount of 
suffering he endured as a result of these injuries? 
A. Well, it would be reasonable for him to suffer from the 
injuries, and it is my opinion that he did. · 
Q. Did he have any broken ribs T 
A. Yes, one. 
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Q. Was that injury painful or not f 
A. Yes, it was painful. 
Q. Wl.iat was his condition when he left the hospital? 
.A.. ·well, he was considerably improved, but not well. The 
rib was · not yet healed. The healing of the knee was cer- · 
tainly not strong by that time. 
Q. Could you give any estimate of the length of time that 
the injuries sustained by him would continue after he left 
the hospital Y 
A. That would be subject to variation in different indi-
viduals. I did not see Mr. "Williams after he left the hospi-
tal until one cla.y last week. I can. only say that it is pos-
sible that he was disabled for several months. 
Q .. Have you had occasion to examine him recently to dis-
cover whether or not he had recovered from his injuries Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you examine him Y 
A. I examined him on May 7th of this year. 
page 29 ~ Q. "\Vhat did you find? 
A. The wound of the knee had completely healed 
and one scar remained. There was no evidence of disability, 
except that when his leg- was brought backward to a great 
extent there was some pulling sustained on the knee. I had 
no evidence of any trouble in his chest, at the site of the 
broken rib, and I found no evidence of any on physical ex-
amination of the scalp or forehead, where he received a "blow. 
He stated, however, that he had had up to quite recently 
(particularly when he was driving) sensation of marked 
pressure over that right side of his head. 
Q. 1Vhat have you to say with reference to whether or not 
that might have resulted from the injury? 
A. The sensation in bis head? 
Q. Yes¥ 
A. I think tlrnt rould well have resulted from his injury, 
due to probably two factors, one a. bruising· of the nerves 
which run across the site where he got the blow on his scalp, 
plus certain nervousness which might follow an accident of 
. that kind. 
Q·. Doctor, I hand you what purports to be your bill for 
attending Mr. Williams, and ask you if that is correeU 
~- Yes, sir. 
!By Counsel for Plaintiff: We offer that bill in evidence, 
your Honor, for $50, from Dr. Hoge, and ask that 
pag·e 30} it be marked "Plaintiff's Ex. 1.''. 
I 
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Dr. Randolph Harrison Hoge. 
Note: The bill is filed, marked ''Plaintiff's Ex. 1". 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Bowles: 
Q. Dr. Hoge, was Mr. Williams conscious when in the hos-
pital? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He was rational at the time? 
A. Yes, as I recall, he was. 
Q. He was not given any treatment so he would not know 
what l1e was talking about, was he? 
A. ~o, sir. 
Q. His course during these injuries was what you doctors 
call uneventful? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, he got along very, well? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, in other words, there were no permanent disabili-
ties there¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINAT[ON. 
Bv Mr. Allen: 
·Q. Dr. Hoge, Mr. Bowles asked you whether Mr. Williams 
was conscious in the hospital during the time he 
page 31 ~ was there. I will ask you if you had to g-i.ve him 
any sedative or anything to ease pain to make 
him rest during the first part of his stay in the hospital? 
A. I cannot a11swer tha.t, as a matter of fact, because I 
don't recall. I can express an opinion whether he received 
it, but I don't reeall it. 
· Q. vVas his condition sueh as to ordinarily require or jus-
tifv giving llim things of that kind? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The accident happened, I believe, on the 14th of Feb-· 
ruary, 1941; is that right? 
A. Yes; that is the time I saw him first. 
Q. And you saw him on that day Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you saw him the next morningY 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Can you state whether or not the next morning he was 
in as good a condition to make a full and fair and aceurate 
statement of how the aooident happened as he was several 
days later! 
A. I cannot recall his exact condition the next day. 
Q. You cannot Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 32 ~ RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. Dr. Hoge, I understood you to say a moment ago that 
while in the hospital Mr. Williams was rationaH 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was equally true on the next morning? 
A. That is my recollection of his condition. 
Q. Did you have occasion to give this patient anything un-
usual so he would not know what he was doing? 
A. Patients some time have to have morphine, but in the 
doses we give it, it would not affect them so that they would 
be irrational. 
Q. You ~o not recall that Mr. Williams .at any time while 
in the hospital was in such a condition he did not know what 
he was talking about¥ 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIRE.OT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: · 
Q. You don't recall his condition the next morning with 
reference to his ability to state the details and how the ac-
cident happened? 
A. I don't recall anything unusual about his condition; nor 
is there anything on the hospital record to indicate anything 
unusual in his condition. 
{The witness stood aside.) 
· page 33 ~ Note : It is stipulated that the photographs, 
marked "Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1, No. 2 and 
No. 3", are admitted as. exhibits in the evidence. 
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the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRE.CT EXAMINATION. 
By :Mr. Allen : 
Q. Will you state your full name? 
A. Columbns Wilder Williams. 
Q. Where do you live 1 
A. I live in North Carolina. 
Q. Whereabouts 1 
A. The northem part, at Boone; I live near Elkton, North 
Carolina, 
Q. Near the old Daniel Boone trail? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have occasion to come over into Virginia on 
or about February 14th, 19411-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How were you traveling 1 
A. I was driving in a 1939 model Buick. 
Q. VVere you involved in a collision that day 
page 34 r which took place at the intersection of U. S. Route 
460 and State Highway No. 153·y 
A. I was . 
. Q. In· which direction were you traveling? 
A. I was coming· from Blackstone towards Petersburg and 
g·oing out to Spainville, on Route 153. 
Q. Whose car did you collide with? 
A. A Mr. Spillman. 
Q. And where did that collision take place, at what inter-
section f 
A. At the intersection of 460 and 153. 
Q. You were driving what type car? 
A. I was driving a 1939 Buick. 
Q. What type car was ]\fr. Spillman driving? 
A. He was driving a 1939 V-8 Ford. 
Q. What time did the collision take place?· 
A. At 8 o'clock in the morning. 
Q. What sort of day was it? 
A. It had rained the afternoon· and part of the night be-
fore and the road was wet, or partly wet, and there was a 
little mist from the road, but none to obscure any vision. 
Q. Was vi8ibility good ·around there at that time? 
A. The visibility from Blackstone all the way was perfect. 
Q. Now, I show you photograph marked '' Plaintiff's Ex-
96 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
C. W. 1Viltiams. 
hibit No. 4" and ask you to show that to the jury 
paO'e 35 ~ and state whether or not that is a fair representa-
0 tion of the intersection, taken from the Black-
stone side, looking towards Petersburgt · 
A. It is a fair :representation. 
Q. 'Now, I hand you photograph marked ''Plaintiff's Ex. 
No. 3'' and will ask you if that is a fair representation of 
the intersection, taken from the Petersburg side, looking to-
wards Blackstone 1 
A. It is fair; not quite as good as the other one. 
Q. I hand you photograph marked "Plaintiff's Ex. No. 2'', 
and will ask you if that is a fair representation of the inter-
section, taken from the Blackstone side, looking towards P~-
tersburg, but taken a little further back than ''Plaintiff's 
Ex. 3''! 
A. It is. 
Q. Now, Mr. Williams, I understand that you were travel-
ing on Route 460, going· east, that is, towards Petersburgf 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And, you state, I believe, that you were intending to 
turn into Route 153, to the lefU 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Tell the jury just exactly how you approached the in-
tersection; how you were turning and what you did 1 
A. ·when I was 250 to 300 feet away I was warned bv Mr. 
Bruce that I was coming to a very dangerous 
page 36 ~ crossing, the worst he knew, and he made the re-
mark about it as a matter of caution to me. I 
slowed down until I was possibly running twenty miles an 
hour. I approached the intersect.ion, which is about 200 feet 
across; I looked in every direction as I entered the inter-
section, as I always do, and there was nothing on either road. 
I could see as far as the roads were open, which happens to 
be not very far, P?ssi~ly ?OO feet, or something like that, 
and there was nothmg m sight anywhere. I looked through 
my mirror and made sure nothing behind me. I was running 
between double lines; there was nothing in front or behind 
and there was nothing to my right. I looked in front twice 
and to my rig-ht twice and made sure there was nothinO' be-
hind, and as I was exactly by the post at the side, withbhalf 
of my car in front and the other half behind, I made the 
turn, and just as I made the turn to go in, I looked down 
the road and saw something coming at a rate of speed which 
was very unusual. I knew I could not get through if he came 
on that way, and, believing he would stop or slow down for 
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the intersection, I turned my car to the right until I had it_ 
nearly exactly, as far as I could tell, straig·ht in the road, 
and the car was still coming, and approached the intersec-
tion, which has later proved to be about eighty feet, and 
when I saw he would not stop I applied my brake 
page 37 r and stopped my car, and almost in tlie same in-
stant, I can hardly tell what, -in a split second, his 
car crashed into mine. When it happened, I remember it 
crashed; I heard some noise ; I heard groans ; but I did not 
know anything for a little while. 
Q. When you approached the inters~ction, before you 
started to turn, knowing, however, that you were going· to 
turn, and before you got over the white line at all, how fast 
were you traveling! 
A . .Approximately twenty miles. 
Q. When you ·finally decided to begin to turn across the 
white line to the left, did you look down the road to see if 
anything wa~ coming from towards Petersburg 1 · 
A. I looked down the road next to the last thing I did and 
the last thing I did was to turn my car and look ahead. 
Q. How far had you gotten across with your front wheels, 
preparing to g·o into Route 153, before this man hit you? 
A. I was only slightly in, one or two feet. It would be out 
of the question to tell definitely, but I was over the line any-
where from two to four feet, to the best of my knowledge. 
Q. When you saw him coming and, as you say, realizing 
he was coming so fast and that you could nofmake it, what 
did you do? 
A. I moved my car a little. 
Q. Which way? 
page 38- ~ A. To the rig·h t. 
Q. Did you get your car straight? 
A. Almost exactly. 
Q. Do you know whether or not you came to a dead stop 
before you were hit? 
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief I came to a 
dead stop at the time that he entered the intersection. 
Q. At the time you first saw him, when you had g·otten 
over two to four feet across the white line, preparing to go 
into Route 153, had he gotten to the intersection? 
A. No, he was beyond the intersection when I first _ saw 
him. 
Q. Can you give us an iden: of how far he was from the 
intersection when you first saw him? 
A._ It would be hard to give an estimate. It was just a flash. 
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Q. Can you give us an estimate of the rate of speed he 
was. traveling when you first saw him Y 
A. My impression when I first saw him was anywhere from 
60 to 90 miles an hour. 
Q. You don't think it was less than 601 
A. Certainly not less than 60, and possibly more than that. 
It was just a flash; a thing you could not just easily tell, 
because it was just a dart . 
. . Q. You referred to some post. Can you indicate on this 
photograph the post you refer to 1 
pag·e 39 r A. '11he posts on the left-hand side, about two 
feet from the main highway No. 460, and there 
are .five of them. 
Q. The posts you point out are the five posts on the left 
side of 4601 
A. Yes ; on my left side as I came in. . 
Q. As you were intending to turn into Ro1J.te 153, were you 
going to turn on the far side of those posts, or the near 
sidef 
A. I was turning on the right side, which I should. I was 
where I had the post exactly to my left and then started to 
make the turn. 
Q. Do you kno-w how far it is from 460 and the post you 
speak of now and the post you speak of on the right side t 
A. Fifty feet. 
Q. Do you know how wide the traveled part of the hard 
surface is there 1 
A. Approximately fifty feet; that is, the hard surface of 
the main road, and then about two feet up to the post. 
Q. Do you know how wide 153 is on your left as you ap-
proach that. post; in other words, a person coming· out of 
153, going towards Blackstone 1 
A. It is a two-lane roadway. The road is 22 feet wide, 
but the widest part, where 153 comes into 460, is possibly 
200 feet. I stepped it across there, but did not measure it. 
Both the pictures were taken a little closer up 011 
page 40 ~ the Blackstone side, looking east, and the one 
taken 011 the Petersburg side a little further, be-
cause as you look east it shows a curve in. the road. 
Q. Does the road, in fact, curve to the easU 
A. It is a rainbow curve and you can see some i5o feet 
or 300 feet in going· around it. 
Q. What hospital were you taken to1 
A. The Medical College in Richmond. 
Q. How long did you remain there¥ 
A. Elev.en days. 
Q. "'What injuries did you sustain in the collision? 
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A. I had a cut on my knee that required twenty-one 
stiches, about half in the flesh and about half in the skin, and 
a rib broken, and they said some cartilage pulled, and a 
bruised spot on my wrist, about big as the palm of my hand, 
and my head was hurt, seemingly at the time not so bad at 
the time, buf was the last thing g·etting well; that is, it gave 
me trouble the longest. My wrist was well first. 
Q. ·what did your hospital and doctor's bills amount to? 
.li. I had first-aid treatment at Blackstone from Dr. Hurt 
of $10 and a hospital bill of $93.20, and I had a bill from Dr. 
Hog·e of $50, which made $153.20. 
Q. I hand you what purpor~s to be the hospital bill of the 
Medical College of Virginia. I will ask you if that 
page 41 r is a correct bill and if you paid that amount f 
A. That is correct. · 
Note: The hospital bill is offered in evidence by Counsel 
for Plaintiff and filed marked "Plaintiff's Ex. No. 5''. 
Q. In addition to that, I believe you said you paid Dr. Hoge 
$50? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you paid Dr. Hurt $101 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\fr. Williams, "Plaintiff's Ex. No. 3'" shows the sign 
of a cross mark on Route 460, approaching· the intersection 
from the direction in w·hich Stillman was coming, indicating 
that that was the intersection. Was that sign there at the 
time of the accidenU 
A. It was. 
Q. What is the damag·e to your automobile? 
A. I believe tha.t is stipulated at $420. 
Q. Do you know what time of day the· accident occurred? 
A. It was near 8 o 'c]ock; possibly' a few minutes after. 
Q. How do you know? 
A. Well, we had 7 o'clock breakfast in Blackstone and had 
started back to the real estate to finish the survev. '\Ve first 
examined the plats and the weather and then decided that 
we would go hack and finish the survey and we 
page 42 ~ had driven the seven miles up there, possibly mak-
in~ the trip in fifteen to eighteen minutes. 
Q. 1\fr. "Williams, how long had you been driving an au-
tomobile? 
A. Twenty-four years. 
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Q. Approximately how many miles had you driven during 
that length of time? 
A. Something more than a million. 
Q. Are you familiar with the traffic signals Y 
A. Yes, all of them. 
Q. State to the jury, to the best of your knowledge and 
belief, whether you gav:e that signal there for a .left-hand turn 
or not? 
A. Approaching the intersection and seeing nobody coming 
and looking again and seeing nobody coming in either direc-
tion and looking carefully before making the turn, I don't re-
. member what I did; but I always make the signal; I have 
never been accused of not making the signal; it is just a thing 
I do automatically; but whether I made the sign or not I don't 
definitely remember; but I always make the sign. If any-
body was coming in front of me, or behind, or anywhere, I 
would know I made the sign; but not seeing· anybody, I don't 
know whether I made the sign or not with my hand. 
Q. What business were you engaged in at that 
page 43 ~ time? 
A. The timber business. 
Q. What were you making at that time¥ 
A. A little. better than $500 a month. 
Q. How much time did you lose from work on account of 
this accident? 
A. I lost from the 14th of February to the 1st of October . 
. Q. From the 14th of February to the 1st of October? 
A. Yes ; I had my first earnings in Octo her. 
Q. Were you incapacitated during all that time from work? 
A. To the extent that I could not wade through woods and 
cruise timber. I could walk and go about, but was incapaci-
tated so far as my work was concerned, wading in brush and. 
falling in holes. 
. Q. Have you any evidence of the injury to your knee at 
· this time ? . 
A. If warm weather I don't feel it. · 
Q. ·r mean does the scar show now? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Come over and show it to the jury? 
A. (Witness exhibits his knee to the jury.) 
Q. Do you suffer any inconvenience from that now; if so, 
how! 
A. If it is fair weather and warm and I am active I don't 
even notice it; if cloudy and rainy I feel it. If I squat down 
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it hurts me; but if warm weather and my blood is 
page 44 ~ warm I don't feel it at all. 
Q. To what extent cUd this accident affect your 
nervous state Y . 
.A.. I have all my life been a tiny bit nei·vous. It did not 
affect me, but from that time on I was exceedingly nervous, 
so that for :fiye or six months everybody was uneasy about 
· me. 
Q. What was the aftermath so far as your head is con-
cerned? 
.A.. Until the last sixty days if anybody came in ahead of 
my car something like a cast would come down on me, like 
a blur on my sight. If a dog ran in front of me it nearly 
knocked me to pieces. I had to hire a driver to drive me. 
Q. Can you give me any idea of the force of-the impact¥ 
A. It broke in the front of my car up to the windshield 
and drove in the back for about two feet, the same as if 
something came in the back, and threw the candy from Mr. 
Stillman's car on both sides of the road and it went down 
the road by my car and back to the back of his car, and I 
would say it was 10 feet long on each side, or approximately 
that, maybe 12 feet, and hundreds of pieces of it scattered 
on both sides of the road. 
Q. What w~s the effect of the impact upon the Stillman 
car? 
A. It broke the windshield in front and the whole back end 
pushed in like something had run into the back of it. 
Q. Do you mean the back of it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 45 ~ Q. How do you account for that? 
A. The momentum and the roll, possibly. The 
whole. back end was pushed in: as w~ll as the front. I sat 
there a few minutes-no, I correct that, because I came to 
myself and then I wondered why I did not get out. I said 
to myself I was hurt. I got out the car and looked back in 
the car at the other two men and their heads were bleeding 
and they were not making any movement, apparently as 4ead 
as they could be. I looked at both cars. I went to the Ford 
and both sides the doors had caved in. Mr. Stillman was 
lying back this way (indicating), with his mouth open and a 
knot on his forehead that looked as big as a saucer. The 
two men were down under the seat and piled right down and 
not moving. For possibly a minute nobody ,moved, or 
groaned, or spoke-just as dead as they could be. I walked 
back of the car and saw the condition of the back and the 
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front. Then Mr. Spillman got out. He got out next after 
me. Mr. Stillman seemed wild, senseless. He said, '' What 
happened? ·what happened? What happened?" I finally 
remarked to him, ''You came down the road at a terrific 
speed and ran into this car'', and then he eased down a little 
bit and asked me, '' How fast was I running· 1 '' I said, ''Not 
less than sixty''. He said, '' I did not think I was making 
more than fifty-five". That was his exact lan-
pag·e 46 r guage. 
Q. After the wreck was at a standstill, what 
was the position of the cars in the road¥ 
A. Well, I did not measure it. I was in a condition I could 
not measure it; but my car was partly on both sides of the 
center of the road and his car was partly on both sides of' the 
center of the road, and my car .was ten or twelve feet back of 
where I knew it was when it was hit. 
Q. Go back an instant before the collision and tell where 
the two cars were. exactly the moment they came together, 
.A. I would say that my car was, possibly, by the time I 
got it stopped, the back end of 'it was nearly even with the 
stakes. I would say it stopped in twelve inches from the time 
I applied my brakes. 
Q. With reference to the center of 460, where was your car 
immediately before the impact, or right at the moment of 
the impact? 
A. The fronts of the two cars, the front wheels and bump-
ers were driven together. 
Q. Perfect head-on collision? 
A. Perf ec~ head-on collision. The position of the two cars 
when they were there would not definitely tell us anything, 
because they were knocked back. 
Q. Can you tell the jury whether or not there was ample 
space for this man to pass you on the right or left-first take 
Mr. Snillman 's left? 
page 47 ~ A. I knew the speed he was corning and I knew 
the speed I had I could not get through tl1e in-
tersection and I corrected my car the least bit, to give him 
room to pass, and as he came up to, or nearly to-it all hap-
pened in just an instant-and as he came nearly to that in-
tersection, I thoug·ht in my mind, "He is bound to stop at 
the intersection", and I had my car practically straigl1t and 
I stopped my car practically dead-still where it was; but the 
, time intervening between the time I stopped and his hitting· 
me was instantaneous. When I saw him at the intersection 
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to the time he hit me (which has later proven to be about 
70 feet) there was hardly time to think. 
Q. Was there room enough on either side of you for him 
to. pass you? 
.A.. That was what I intended for him to do. I would say, 
yes, but I did not measure it. Just oftbancl, I would say, yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. Mr. Williams, you have told us a good deal about how 
you drive, and how you always hold your hand out; how you 
were always careful. ·what I am concerned with is only what 
you did this time. Do I understand you that you were warned 
this was a terribly dangerous intersection 1 
A. Mr. Bruce told me it was. 
pag·e 48 ~ Q. I believe your exact words were, '' l\Ir. Bruce 
said it was the worst he knew"f 
A. Yes; that is what he said. . 
Q. From your observation do you think that wa~ true, what 
Mr. Bruce said? 
A. I took it in carefully and approached it as a very dan-
gerous intersection. 
Q. In ~ther words, as you approached the intersection you 
saw what kind of intersection it was and you agreed with Mr. 
Bruce that it was the worst intersection you knew f 
A. I have driven over a million miles and I have never seen 
bne worse. 
Q. You were driving eastwardly, coming towards Peters-
burg on this highway 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The road was curving to your left or your righU 
A. The road in front of me curved like that (indicating). 
Q. To the right or the left T 
A. The road was running like that (indicating) and the 
intersection was like that (indicating) and the outside curve 
was to my left and the inside to my right. 
Q. On Route 460 at the intersection was there a curve to 
the right, or to the left? 
A. I would say to the left; that is, the top of the rainbow 
to the left. 
page 49 ~ Q. You were gradually turning to the left as 
you went in the intersection-I am talking about 
460. You say there was a rainbow curve on 460; did the rain-
bow curve the way you ,,1ere g·oing? 
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A. The top of the rainbow curved-
Q. Did the road you were going on curve to your right or 
to your left Y That is a simple question Y 
A. The road on 460 would be a shade to my left; in other 
words, the bend was around to the right, but the outside of 
the curve to the left. 
Q. The road was to the right and yet the curve was to the 
left. I don't understand iU 
A. I was coming in this line (indicating) and he from this 
direction (indicating) and the cross roads. crossed like this 
(indicating) . 
Q. Let us forget the cross roads, please. Road 460 was a 
rainbow curve-did it curve to the right or the left? 
A. The·outside of the curve to mv left and the inside was 
to my right. .. . 
Q. You mean this R.oad 460, one side went this way and one · 
side this way (indicating·)? I am talking about the whole 
road-in the direction you were. going did the whole road 
turn to the left or to the right y 
A. I would say that your question cannot be sensibly an-
swered. If you will explain I will be glad to an-
page 50 r swer. · 
Q. Let us see whether you or I is sensible. This 
is a highway (indicating); there is a road with a rainbow 
curve; Were you, going to the right or the left Y Which way 
did the road curve? 
A. I was going in this way-
By the Court: Has the witness been oriented on that map? 
By l\fr. Bowles: No, I deliberately did not orient him, 
because I asked him which way did he go on the curve. 
Q. This is Blackstone and this is Petersburg? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This is the way you were going? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which way did the road curve Y 
A. The outside of the road was to my left. I mean the 
curve was on the right-hand side. The inside of the curve 
·was on the left-hand side. The outside on the right. 
Q. Was, the way you were traveling, the road curving to 
the left or to the right? 
A. The first part of the road would, possibly, be to my 
left. 
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Q. You would say that Road 460 would be curving to your 
lefty 
A. I was turning the rainbow. 
Q. You would say the ·first part of the road was 
page 51 ~ curving to your left and the rest of it curving .to 
your right? 
.A.. Yes; it would have to be. 
Q. You were turning on a round curve? 
.A.. No, it was not a round curve; just a rainbow curve . 
. Q. I understand you to testify, also, that the visibility was. 
perfect? , 
.A.. I could see the five stakes and counted. them when I 
came in sight of them, 250 feet a.way. 
Q. Then, there was no difficulty so far as fog and mist 
were concerned? 
.A.. None whatever. 
Q. Then, you could see on this road as far as could be 
seen¥ . 
.A.. Yes, probably 100 feet beyond the post. 
Q. You said you could see 250 to 300 feet? 
.A.. The 300 feet was from the middle of the road down to- ~ 
wards Petersburg; it would have been visible 250 feet. 
Q. I believe you said in your direct examination 250 to 300 
feet? 
A. I would say· definitely I think we measured it as being 
250 feet from the scene of this end of the road up to the 
post, and it was possible to see more down the center of the 
road. 300 feet, I think, would be the limit you could see 
from the middle of the intersection and from the intersec-
tion. 
Q. After this was all over you got out and you 
page 52 ~ saw this candy scattered over a 10 or 12 foot 
area? 
.A.. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You were pretty observant of what was going on, were 
you? 
A. Whsn I .first got out the car I did not feel any pain. I 
observed in a minute or two that" my chest was hurt; then 
that my wrist was liurt; then I observed a little later, five or 
ten minutes I guess, that I had a cut on my left leg and the 
gash was ten or twelve inches long on it. 
Q. You were conscious of ~hat was going on? 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. You told the two gentlemen named Martin that you 
never saw the Stillman car until it hit you, didn't you? 
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A. No, I did not. 
Q. What did you tell them about that? 
A. I don't remember that I told :Martin concerning it. 
Q. You don't remember that you told them anythiilg about 
iU 
A., I don't remember that I told him anything about it. I 
don't know Mr. :Martin. 
Q. There were two Mr. l\fartins. Did you tell either of 
them? Did yon not tell both of the gentlemen named l\far-
tin, who came up afterwards, that you did not see the Still-
man car m1til it hit you? 
A. I don't remember telling either of them anything about 
it. 
Q. The next day, at the hospital, l\fr. CharHe Dawson, a 
lawyer, of Richmond, Va., came to see you, did he 
page 53 r 110t ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You told him you did not §,ee the Stillman car until it 
was 50 feet from you, did you not? 
A. No, I did not tell him that. 
Q. Did he not write down what you told him? 
·A.DidH 
Q. Did not he1 
A. He wrote something. 
Q. Did you read it? 
A. I was not able to read it. 
Q. Did he read it to you 1 
A. :M:y son was sitting· there on the other side of tlie bed 
and he read it and my son said, "No, he did not tell you 
that". My son is a lav;ryer. 
Q. Is your son here? 
.A. No~ 
Q. "\iVhere does he live t 
.A. In Charlotte, North ·Cnrolina. He was on the other 
side of the bed. He had not graduated at the time. He was 
a student at Wake Forest. He said, "That is not what Daddy 
told you. You ha.ve at least three or four things in there 
that are wrong''. l\'fy son told him what tl1ey were. I was 
all in a quiver and a jerk. I had been given medicine three 
or four time~ 11ncl ·wlrnn mv son came in the nurse would not 
let him talk to 'me at :first. :M:y son read it cor. 
pag·e 54 r redly then to me. . 
Q. Your son was a lawyer? 
A. He is now. 
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Q. He would not let Mr. Dawson put anything in there 
until he said it was· correct? 
A. He rewrote it and wrote it correctly and the record of 
it shows it. Dawson did not write it correctly. 
Q. Have you seen it Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·when did you see it? 
A. The 7th of this month, when I came up here. I told -Mr. 
Dawson I would not sign it unless I had a copy. He said, ''I 
will g·ive you a copy". 
Q. He gave you a copyf 
A. No. Tl1e minute he wi·ote it he grabbed his hat and 
went out. 
Q. Your lawyer was presented with a copy1 
A. He was given a copy of the paper recently, when he 
asked for it. 
Q. He has it now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had it while you were preparing for this trial, did 
you not'¥ 
A. I saw it the 7th of this month. 
Q. You saw it yesterday? 
page 55 r A. No, I saw it this morning, but did not read 
it then. 
Q. You saw it and read it the 7th of this month 1 
A. I saw it and read it the 7th of this month. 
Q. Who had it? 
A. Mr. Allen, Junior. 
Q. And he read it to you 1 
A. No; he read it to me and I read it. 
Q. Your son, who is now a lawyer, read it to you, and :M:r. 
Dawson read it to you, and you signed it? 
A. I made Mr. Dawson read it tho second time and he read 
it correctly; but he made some misstatements in 
page 56 r it. Dawson was not fair in his statements at all; 
he was very biased. When he finished, Mr. Bruce, 
who is also a lawyer now, said, "Mr. ·wmiams was just hurt 
and is not able to.make a report'", and Mr. Dawson turned 
his back and beat his hand with his fist and made a gesture 
and said, "It has got to be sig·necl before I can pay it". That 
is what he said, and I said, "I realize it has to be signed be-
fore it can be paid". But when Mr. Dawson came in he said, 
''I represent Mr. Stillman", and I thoug·ht he was an at-
torney for Mr. Stillman. He said, "Mr. Stillman 'phoned 
me ~bout this wreck and if he owes you anything I will pay 
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it''. He cross questioned and cross examined me and I told· 
him everything absolutely true as far as I knew it and guessed 
at the rest of the things, &c., and he represented to me 
he was there to do the fair and honest thing. I thought Mr. 
Stillman admitted liability and was going to pay what was 
due me when it was over. Mr. Bruc-e 's son came in and told 
·him I was unable to sign anything physically and mentally, 
and then he jumped up and struck his hand and said, "It 
has got to be signed before it can be paid". · . 
Q. Mr. Dawson took a kind of unfair advantage of you Y 
A. He did not write it correctly. 
Q. You also told Mr. Dawson you did not give any hand 
signal Y · 
page 57 ~ A. No, I did not. 
Q. But you have it here in this paper? 
A. But he read it differently; that is not correct. 
Q. You say you did not tell Mr. Dawson and this statement 
did not have in it at the time that you did not see the car 
until it was 50 feet from vou Y 
A. No. He said, "When did you first see it?" I said, 
'' When I cut out of the intersection''. He said, '' How far¥'' 
I said, "I don't know". He said, "Estimate it". I said, "I 
don't know whether 50 feet or more·". It has been shown 
since the intersection is about 70 feet. 
Q. Did you measure it? 
A. No; I stepped it off and it is approximately 75 or 80 
feet. 
Q. Let us get this correctly. You looked twice, 
A. I looked facing me twice and to my right twice. 
Q. How many times to your rear Y 
A. I said I looked through my mirror and saw nothing 
coming from the back. 
Q. How many times did you do that? 
A. Well, once or twice. 
Q. I think you said before you did it twice Y 
A. I did it twice; I will say I always look twice. 
Q. Your routine is when approaching an intersection you · 
look forward twice, to your back twice and to your 
page 58 ~ right twice? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How manv times did you look to the left? 
A. I looked forward, then to the left .one time and then 
looked to my left for the final look. 
Q. Was that when you got hit, when you looked to the left Y 
A. I had turned to- look to the left and caught sight of the 
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thing com:ing. Mr. Bruce made some remark; I don't re-
member what he said now. 
Q. Is it l not true you did not see this car until you turned 
to the left? 
.A. I had made my final pass and realized all roads were 
clear and I turned to the left (no sense in looking to the right 
on 460) a1)d I caught something· coming, maybe 50 or maybe 
75. feet away. · 
Q. That:, thing was as far as you could see t 
.A. No; ft had come part of the distance without my seeing 
it and it c,ame the rest of it; so I could not tell how fast it 
was coming·, because it is like seeing and hearing a train com-
ing· on thei,railroad at 90 miles an hour; like a humming bird 
when I was a· boy. 
Q. How imuch had that car come when you did not see it? 
A. Impossible to tell. 
' Q. Half !
1 
that distance, you reckon? 
I A. If I .were to answer you that correctly, it 
page 59 ~ :would be.like I told Mr. Dawson-
I Q. Let us stick to what I asked you, if you don't 
mind. You can tell all about Mr. Dawson later. , You can 
remember ~o many things definitely, don't you remember how 
much of that 250 or 300 feet that car had come when you did 
not see it f 1
1 
.A. I wo-q.ld not venture to say, because I saw both sides of 
the road; I saw both banks, and I could not say. 
Q. When you did see it you tried to get back on your side 
of the road, did you not Y 
.A. I turned it slightly. . 
Q. If you had seen it you would not have turned would you? 
A. No. 1, 
Q. You cf.id not see it until it hit you, did you? 
A.. No, Ij did not say that. 
Q. How far did you see iU Was it 100 feet away, do you 
thinkt I , 
A. The thole thing, for the last 100 or 150 feet, happened 
in one second arid it is hard to get those things. I would 
say if a wng;on had been g-?ing ac.ross there it would have 
been bound to have . been hit; or 1f an old man or an old 
woman liaal been going over tl1ere they would have been bound 
to have beJn Jiit. · · 
By the ¢ourt: Mr. W.illiams, answer Mr. Bowles' ques-
tions without argument. 
I 
• 
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page 60 ~ By ·witness : His question is so indefinite that 
it is hard for me to give an answer, because from 
the time I would have made an estimate it chang·ed; it was 
a flying speed. 
. By the Court: If you cannot answer the question, say so. 
By Mr. Bowles: . 
Q. I think you said something about something going 150 
feet a second; how did you arrive at thaU 
A. vVell, 69 miles an hour is 100 feet a second. 
Q. It is 100 feet a second t 
A. Yes, and to the best of my knowledge and belief he was 
making 75 miles an hour, possibly more than that; but to be 
safe I would say he was going 75 miles an hour. 
Q. That would be 150 feet a second? 150 feet a second would 
be 100 miles an hour, would it nott 
A. I would say from 100 to 150 feet. 
Q. I am definitely interested in this particular thing and 
would like you to g·ive your attention to it and, as far as 
you can, answer me definitely. You said when you were turn-
ing·, or about to turn, that the post ,vas exactly to your left? 
A. As near as I could state it. 
Q. Do you mean personally, or your automobile, or whatf 
A. I mean from my window, from where I was 
page 61 ~ turning, that I started to turn, that the stakes were 
out like this (indicating·) to my left. 
Q. Then, your automobile had not advanced in an east-
wardly direction even with the post; is that what you meant 
to sayl . 
A. The middle of my car was advanced even with the post, 
or as near as I can tell it, when I started to make my turn. 
Q. Was that when you started to make your turn, or when 
you were turning? 
A. That is when I started to make my turn, I was even up 
with it. 
Q. Wlien you undertook to turn what happened! 
A. I then turned my car back; it was the shortest way out. 
Q. You bad not seen him when you undertook to turn f 
.A.. No. 
Q. And, after you started to turn and got well into the 
turn, you saw him coming? 
A. I saw him coming. 
Q. Then you went back1 
.A.. Yes. 
~- You had started to make a left turn t 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And then changed it and went back in the other direc-
tion? 
A. Turned it a foot or two and then saw him. 
Q. Had you turned enough to get your left-hand 
page 62 r rear wheel across the white line? 
A. To the best of my knowledge it had not 
crossed, my left-hand wheel had, but my right-hand had not. 
Q. Which is which1 
A. I beg your pardon, I will correct it. l\ily left-hand 
wheel was, as I have said, at the time, I think, 2 to 4 feet 
across. 
Q. That was your left front wheel, was it nott 
A. 1\1:y left front wheel. I said wrong, I could not see my 
rear wheel. · 
Q. Then, you had turned your left rear wheel enough to 
get near the center of the road? 
A. I could not hear the question? 
Q. I say, you had made enough of a left-hand turn to bring 
your left-hand rear wheel to the center of the road? 
· A. l\fy left rear wheel was supposed to be in the center of 
the road without any turn at all. I did not understand the 
question like that. · 
Q. I don't understand your answer-'' supposed to be in 
the centerPf 
A. l\fy left-hand front wheel and my left rea.r wheel were 
right up near the middle of the road as I approached. 
Q. And, you were turning into the intersection practically 
on the white line anyhow? 
A. Yes, rig·ht up to it. 
Q. You turned the car to the left? 
page 63 ~ A. Ye8. 
Q. Had you turned it enough so your left-hand 
rear wheel would p:o on the white line, or not, before you 
turned it to the right? 
A. That I cannot answer. 
Q. After the accident was over, the left-hand rear :wheel 
was in the middle of the road, as I understand you? 
A. I would not swear definitelv about that. it was near 
the center of the roa.d. I did nof measure it. 
Q. You c;tated in your direct examination this thing, that 
as you saw him coming and you were turning and he was 
nearly into the intersection the thought went through your 
mind that he was bound to stop for the intersection. Wby 
did you lmve any such thoug·ht as that? 
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A. A fellow coming to such a dangerous cross road is due 
to ·have his car under perfect control and I thought he would 
have his car under control, or violate the law. 
Q. What law would he viol~te, according to youY 
A. If my car or anybody else was in the way and he run 
over it, it would b~ a violation of the law. . . 
Q. Like this dog that you were talking about if that run 
in front of you Y If somebody run out in front <,f him and 
he did not stop. you think he would be violating the law! 
A. He should stop. 
page 64 }- Q. ·were you observing any stop sig-n Y 
A. A sign down the road which he says he did 
not see. 
Q. vVhat kind of sign! 
A. One that showed the cross road. 
Q. Your idea was that because this sig·n was there he was 
bound to stop a.t the intersection? 
. A. My idea was before he got to the cross road he was 
bound according to the law to stop. , 
Q. And as you had turned your car in the intersection he 
was bound to stop? 
A. I saw his car. 
Q. You said there was room enough on either side for him 
to pass 1 
A. I said that was what I intended. 
Q. Which side did you intend him to pass on! 
A. Which did I intendf 
Q. I understood you to say you intended for him to pass 
on either side? 
A. I said I stopped my car, intending or providing for 
him to pass on either side. 
Q, In other words, you stopped in the middle of the road 1 
A. I stopped over the line of the middle of the road be-
fore he got to the intersection, and the road( is 75 feet there. 
Q. The road is 20 feet wide Y 
page 65 }- A.· 22. 
Q. You were in the middle of the road, allow-
in!r him room room, on either side? 
A. That was my idea. In other words, my idea was to get 
him in the best poi:;ition possible for him not to hit me. When 
I saw he was ·coming into the intersection there I stopped 
dead still, and I also said, from the time I stopped still until 
he hit me was such I could hardly distinguish it. 
Q. Mr. Williams, you said Mr. Stillman said he did not 
think he was going more than 55 miles an hourY 
.. 
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A. That is what I said. 
Q. That is the thing you asked Mr. Dawson to change, is 
it not! · 
A. Mr. Dawson said in the statement he first wrote that 
it was densely foggy. I told him I had not said that, my 
son told him I did not say that. 
Q. ·what did you say? 
A. I said it ·was slightly foggy. . 
Q. You said it was densely foggy or quite foggy, did you 
not? 
A. I did not tell him densely foggy or quite foggy. 
Q. What he wrote the first time was densely foggyY 
A. Yes. · · 
Q. That was on the statement. 
A. Yes, densely foggy. 
Q. You objected to that? 
• A. Mv son did. 
page 66 ~ Q. Did he ·change that Y 
A. He changed that. (J. What did he change it to? 
A. Slightly, as I remember it. 
· Q. You have just seen it here on May 7th? 
A. I saw it on Mav 7th. 
Q. You asked him,".also, to change this thing about fifty-
five miles an hour¥ 
A. The thing that I objected to was that he said that I 
said to Mr. Stillman that I could not swear that he was mak-
i.nge sixty miles an hour. The truth was I stated to him that 
I would not swear, and the reason was that we were too 
badly hurt and it would not do any good to swearing. 
Q. And he changed that? 
A. He did not chang·e that; it was just like he first stated 
it. 
Q. Look at this and see whether that is changed or not, if 
you don't mind 1 
A. I would not mind at all. 
Q. Look and see if it is changed f 
A. I don't see it on here; I ·have not read this; I read 
the copy. 
Q. The copy shows it was changed, too,. don't it Y (Might 
we have the copy we gave you, Mr . .Allen?) 
(By Mr. Allen : Here it is.) 
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page 67 ~ Q. vVhat does the statement say now, in the 
statement where it is changed Y 
A. I don't read it well. 
Q. "\Vould you mind me reading it for you 7 
.A. No. 
Q. The statement says this: ''The only conversation I 
had with the other driver was that I stated to him he was 
running sixty miles per hour. He sai.d would you swea.r to 
that. I replied, 'I couldn't.' He said he thought he was 
not going more than fifty-five miles per hour." He did 
change it after you told him, did he not Y 
.A. It does not show a change in your reading. 
Q. Is not the tl1ing·, itself, marked up with the change! 
A. Yes, but you make it appear that I would not swear he 
was going sixty miles an hour, when the truth was I did not 
want to go into swearing down there; we were too badly 
hurt. • 
Q. But the change shows here; the scratc.hed mark says: 
'' He said he thought he was not going· more than 55 miles 
per hour? 
A. No, Mr . .Stillman's exact words were-
Q. I am talking about what is written on this piece of 
paper, that was changed, was it noU . 
A. There was a ohange there. 
Q. You said aw bile ago there was no chang·e there? 
A. It is wrong. He did not get it as I told him. 
page 68 ~ Q. The thing we are talking· about is the change 
on there? 
A. It is changed on ther{?. I want to read it. He asked if 
I had anv conversation witr. the other driver. He states 
tbat I said, '' The only conversation I had with the other 
driver was that I stated to him he was running sixty miles 
per hour. He said would you swear to that? I replied, 'I 
couldn't'.'' My reply was not that I could not; but my re-
ply was to the effect that I did not want to; I did not want 
to go into swearing. · 
Q. The only thing, you say, that js wrong on the pa.per is 
that he has "could not'' and your reply was "did not want 
to''. I am talking about tllis particular question of your 
conversation with Mr. Stillman and not anytlling else in the 
statement. Is that a fact, or not? 
A. That is a fact, as I understand the question; but there 
are some bad errors in the body of the thing. 
By Mr. Allen: Go ahead and tell about it. 
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By Mr. Bowles: I understand he has already told it. Have 
you got any more, Mr. Williams? 
A. I will read a little; I can catch it. 
Q. Read it to yourself, if you don't mind and point out the 
errors. 
By Mr. Allen: Read it out aloud.· 
By Mr. Bowles: You can read it out then. 
page 69 ~ By tl1e Court: I think Mr. Allen has a right 
to insist on his reading it out and telling the jury 
what things in there are incorrect. 
By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor please, I would prefer to 
cross-examine him on some of the things in there before that. 
By the Court: You put the question to him if that is the 
only thing· in there that is incorrect. 
By }\fr. Bowles: I beg· yout pardon, your Honor; I did 
not put it that way. I had limited myself to one specific 
thing. 
By the Court: Do you ~tate to the court and the jury 
that you have not attempted to contradict or g·et him t9 
say nothing else in that statement is incorrect? 
By Mr. Bowles: Three things. 
By the Court: ·what were they? 
By Mr. Bowles: About not seeing the car until it was 50 
feet from him, about the, fog and the .question as to what 
Mr. Stillman said to him. Those are the only things I have 
gone into up to this time. 
By the Court: Do you state to this jury and the court 
that you are not attempting to get him to say they are the 
only three incorrect statements in that paper Y 
page 70 ~ By Mr. Bowles: No; I have only asked those 
three questions and I would pref er to take them 
up. 
By the Court : You can take them up with that understand-
ing, that you have not asked him but about those three ques-
tions and the witness ]ms stated that there are errors in 
the statement. We are all under some difficulty by your mak-
ing your questions a little Jong a.nd intricate. I have had 
reason to follow some of them and I understand you to ask 
the witness something different from what you tell me you 
did ask him; but I think your questions are a little long and 
hard to follow at times. · 
. By Mr. Bowles: I am sorry the Court is under that ap-
prehension. I will put the witness's statement in right n?w 
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and get rid of all this trouble. You have that opportunity 
right now, Mr. Williams. 
Bv Mr. Bowles : 
.. Q. Go to it, Mr. Williams. and say anything you please 
about this statement, 
A. I am honest in saying I have not been trying to evade 
anything. 
Rv the Court: That was not called for . .Answer the ques-
.. tions. 
·page 71 ~ By Witness: The questions are so that I have 
difficulty to understand them, the points. that are 
shady in this thing and misleading. 
By Mr. Bowles: I object to his stating they are shady. 
By Witness: The statement here in the copy which says 
I said I did not give any arm or hand signal for a left turn; 
I did not say it. I told him frankly and plainly tha.t I looked 
everywhere and did not see anything and that I did not re-
me.mbcr whether I I1ad my window down or whether I had it 
up. I tolcl him if I had my window down my hand would go 
out automatically., as it always did, but I could not swear 
under the conditions that I had the window down. He asked . 
me point blank and I said, "I don't remember definitely, 
but I do remember definitely looking in every direction.'' 
He put it on this paper wrong. He says on this statement 
here: '' * * • I was traveling before starting my turn, came 
into view. . This car was about 30 to 50 feet from me''. I 
told llim verv franklv I could not tell how far it was from 
me, but it was well outside the intersection and that I did 
not have much idea how wide the intersection was, but that 
the. car was outside the intersection. I could. not be definite 
as to how far, but I know it was outside the intersection, 
and I :pow lmow it was 75 feet from the intersection, and he 
put the car was 30 to 50 feet from me. That is 
page 72 ~ wrong. 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
· ··Q. So, you have. undertaken to tell us everything that was 
wron~ in this statement? 
A. He said I did not see any car coming in any direction; 
tha.t I did not give any hand or arm signal to make a turn; 
that I started to make my left turn .going not more than 20 
to 25 miles per hour. I told him when I came into the in-
tersection if I remember ; correctly,· when the left side of 
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my car was heading northeast in making the turn and the 
left side of my car about 4. feet north or across the outer 
lane a Ford coming· from Peters burg, or east to west, or 
coming from the opposite direction I was traveling before 
· starting· my turn, came in to view. 
Q. The sentence which you have· just read which said, 
''When the left side of my car was heading· northeast in 
making the turn and the· left side of my car about 4 feet north 
or ,across the outer lane, a Ford coming from Petersburg 
or east to west, or coming from the opposite direction I was 
traveling before starting my turn, came into view", is that 
correct? 
A. That is correct to the best of mv knowledge. 
Q. "\Ve can depend on· that being true? 
A. Tb the best of my knowledg·e; but the statement that 
the car was 30 to 50 feet away I made it absolutely .clear to 
him I did not know how far it was from me. 
page 73 ~ Q. Would you mind stating what you mean by 
saying, ': ... When the left side of my car was head-
ing northeast'' ? 
A. I mean the left-hand side of my car was about 4 feet 
from the right-hand side. 
Q. In other words, the left-hand side of your car was over, 
or a little more, over the eastbound highway when you saw 
this automobile coming¥ 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. Are there any other things on there that are wrong? 
A. Those are the serious ones. 
Q. Let us have all of them f 
A. The f ogg'Y and the distance from me and the one about 
swearing. 
Q. How about the distance from you, is that 30 to 50 feet 1 
A. I sav what I have alreadv said. 
Q. If you don't mind, answer the question? 
.A.. I have answered it two or three times. 
Q. We are right where we started from, that the foggy, 
the 30 to 50 feet and the swearing· is all that is wrong in 
this statement, is that correct? 
A. Those are all that I recall. 
Q. Let us get them all. Don't come back later and say 
there are others? 
A. l{e goe$ on at the bottom and says: "The above dia-
g-ram shows my car as car A. The dotted line in-
page 74 f dicates path of travel of left wheel. After I was 
turned heading toward cross road and saw on-
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coming· ear, I tried to turn or cut back to my side of the 
road, but I was· going too slow and couldn't get out of the 
way. .At the time of the collision all four of my wheels were 
across or on the north side of the road and mv car was al-
most straight east". That don't ~orrespond "'with what I 
have said up there, so that is another error. 
Q. Do you deny that at the time you gave that statement 
to Mr. Dawson that you stated all four of your wheels were 
on the north side of the center of the highway? 
.A. I deny that I told him all four. of my wheels we1·e on 
the north side of the center of the highway. 
Q. Diel you ask him to correct the statement? 
A. My son did all the asking. 
Q. Diel your son ask him to correct the statement t 
A. He did. 
Q. Then, this is the :fifth thing you say is wrong. I want 
to :find everything that is wrong. Is ·that alH 
A. As far as I recall tlmt is all. 
Q. That is alU 
A. So far as I know. 
Q. The dotted line on this diagram showed the path of 
your left wheel; is that correct? 
A. If the clotted line showed the path of my rear 
page 75 ~ wheel, tl1en I would have been almost out the 
road. That is not true. 
Q. I asked you, is that dotted line correct or not 1 
A. The clotted line as it is there is very poor. 
Q. I offer this statement in evidence and ask you to iden-
tify your signature to it? · 
A. I identify my signature, but I say Mr. Dawson is not 
truthful in his statement. 
By Mr. Bowles: I call to the attention of the Court that 
this witness is stating· that the statement of another witness 
is not truthful or honest. 
By the Court: Mr. V{illiams, the words "not truthful" 
i~ not a nice statement. You could say ''not correct". 
By Witness: I will try to follow your Honor's wishes. 
By 1\fr. Bowles: I don't think at this time we have any 
further questions, your Honor, but I would like to have the 
right to recall him if we desire. 
By Mr. Allen : I would like to ask, Mr. Bowles, if you 
will put l\fr. Dawson on? 
By Mr. Bowles: I reserve the right to put him on at a 
later stage if I desire to do so. 
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Note : The stat~ment is filed in evidence, ma.rked ''De-· 
.fenclant's Ex. 1". 
page 76 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Mr. Williams, this statement starts off· with the state-
ment that the collision took place about 8 :30 A. M., did you 
make any statement to that effect, 
A. No definite statement. I told him 8 to 8 :30; I did not 
look at mv watch. 
Q. And ~he put clown 8 :30 f 
A. Yes. 
Q. vVas this cliag-ram on this statement when you signed 
iU 
A. No, he did not let me see it. 
Q. You did not see the diagram when yon signed the state-
ment? 
A. No, I was unable to examine it; I was in a jerk and 
quiver before be got through. 
Q. ,vhere did Mr. Dawson see you? 
A. I was in the bed, in my room at the hospital. 
Q. At the Medical Hospital of Virginia! 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·wbo else was in the room at the time? 
A. Mv son was in the room when he came in and L. C. 
Bruce. j·r. came in while he was there. 
Q. Was Mr. Bruce one· of the occupants of the car tha.t 
was in the accidentf . 
A. Mr. Bruce, Senior, was. 
Q. Was Mr. Bruce, Senior, in the room at the 
page 77 ~ time this statement was taken Y 
A. No : he was in his bed. His son was there. 
Q. Did you ever see this man Dawson before? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know what his business was there? 
A. He came in and said he was representing Mr. Stillman; 
tl1nt Stillman ]1ad 'phoned him about the· wreck and that he 
was representing Mr. Stillman, and that if they owed me 
anything they wanted to pay it. 
Q. Did you use the :fi,g·ures 30 to 50 feet. and, if so, what 
did you have reference to when you used them? 
A. I told him that the car was well outside the intersec-
tion, hut I could not say how far it was. 
· Q. Did you use the :figures, "30 to 50 feet away" at all? 
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A. I said it was well outside of the intersection. He said, 
"Do you know how far?" I said, '' I don't know; it might 
have been 30 to 50 feet''. 
Q. The 30 to 50 feet had reference· to outside the inter-
section? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he put it 30 to 50 feet away from you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·Did he make any promise to you a.t the time you signed 
this statement that he would return and then give you a copy¥ 
A. Just before I signed it, I said, '' If I sign 
page 78 ~ it"-we had argued over it a long. time-I said, 
"If I sign it I want a copy". He said, "You 
shall have it". 
Q. Did he give you a copy? 
A. No, he went out very quickly. 
Q. Did you get a copy until you got it through your law-
yers? 
A. I have never bad a ·copy. I reported it to my attorneys 
and they got a copy. 
Q. We got it for you? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Bowles: Will you stipulate you never had any 
difficulty in getting a copy, Mr. Allen? 
By Mr. Allen : "\Ve had no difficulty in getting it, I be-
lieve ten or twelve days after we asked for it. 
· Q. Mr. Bowles examined you at length as to what hap-
pened immediatelv before you turned and what happened 
when you did. f ask you tliis question: Immediately be-
fore the front wheels of your car turned over the white line 
to the left, did you look down the road to Petersburg·? 1 
A. I did immediately before I did and it was the last thing. 
I turned my eyes before I did. 
Q. You did not see anything coming t 
· A. No.· I did not. 
Q. Then you turned your eyes to Road 153, the side you 
were turning to, and saw nothing· coming? 
A. That is rig-ht. 
page 79 ~ Q. YOU were then turning your left side from 
· 460 going into Route 153? 
· A. Yes. I have a recollection of four things then: one 
thing that it was coming outside the intersection; then to 
the intersection: then _that it was eoming· into my car, and 
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then the crash, and I do not remember any more until I came 
to. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. Mr. Williams, I forgot to ask you one question. After 
you got out the hospital did Mr. Stillman take you to Blaek-
stone f 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. And you stopped at the scene of this accident and you 
told him it was your fault, did you not Y 
A. No. 
Q. You . told him you were heading east and west, is that 
right, when you were struck f 
A. Say that again. 
Q. You told l\fr. Stillma~ that your car was all -the way 
ac.ro.ss on the north side of the road; that your car was 
straight up and down Road 460 east and west, or on the 
north side of the road, when you were struck? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you not tell him thatY 
A. No. 
page 80 ~ Q. Did you not stop along the place and meas-
ure the distances f 
.A.. We walked around the place and discussed it, but I 
did not tell him that. 
Q. You did not tell him anything that I have said Y 
A. I did not tell him in the language or details that you 
have asked them. 
Q. But you did tell him the substance of what I have said i 
A. I did not tell him the substance of it. 
By Mr. Allen: Let him tell what he said. 
By the Court : It is best to let the jury know what he 
did tell him now.' , 
A. Mr. Stillman, a day or two before I was to leave the 
·hospital, came to see me and came in the room and brought 
his children and had singing and praying in the room, and 
wanted to drive me down to Blackstone when he went, and I 
told him I thought I would be able to go with him and he 
came in on the 25th and I drove with him to Blackstone, at a 
very high rate of· speed. I looked at the speedometer and 
told him-
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By Mr. Bowles: I object. 
By the Court : What are you telling about now Y 
A.. 'When he took me to Blackstone. 
·By the Court: That is irrelevant, is it noH 
By Mr. Bowles: Wha.t I am objecting to, is this witness 
arguinp; the case. 
pag·e 81 ~ By the Court: Don't argue the ca.se, but an-
swer the questions asked you . 
.A. I beg the Court's pardon. We went down to the scene. 
He said he did not see the cross ro.ad sign before he g·o t 
there and did not see my car until right on top of it, and 
his son said, "What do you mean, right on top of iU" He 
did not know where the cars rested and a neighbor came up 
and told~s where the cars rested. I could not swear within 
a foot of where the cars rested. I was there about thirty 
minutes waiting for Dr. Hurt to come to dress me. I was 
suffering severely and the long·er I stayed the more I hurt. 
By the Court : Any more questions T 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
· Q. I might say you have not answered my question, Mr. Wil-
liams, as to whether you told Mr. Stillman you were on the 
north side of the road when vou were struck? 
A_. I did not tell him that . ., 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Allen: 
·Q. In discussing the speed and the rate of speed Mr. Still-
man drives g-enerally, did he make any statement to you on 
the drive referred to about how fa.st he always drives? 
By Mr. Bowles: I object. 
Bv the Court: I think that is irrelevant. By Mr. Allen: I withdraw the question. 
By Mr. Bowles: I have no further questions to make of 
him at this time. 
·(The witness stood aside.) 
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being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
. DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Mr. Bruce, where do you live? 
A. Winston-Salem. 
Q. State your full name? 
A. I sign my name Luther C. Bruce; they have it some 
places just Luther Bruce. 
Q. You live in ·winston-Salem, North Carolina. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you in the automobile with Mr. Williams when 
his car came into collision with a ca.r driven bv Mr. Still-
man f ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. About what time of day was it? 
A. Well, to the best of my opinion-I did not have the 
correct time-but I am sure it was around 8 :10 or 8 :l 5. 
Q. How do you fix that time 1 
A. ·wen, we left Blackstone around 8 o'clock, probably 
a little before 8 o'clock. vVe started out towards Winston-
Salem and changed our mind and came back and had gotten 
out tha.t far; and to the best of my knowledge that is about 
the time it was. 
Q. ·who was in the car? 
A. In the car I was in 1 
page 83 ~ Q. Yes¥ 
A. Mr. Williams, myself and Mr. Joe l\£cGee, 
from North Carolina. 
Q. Which seat were you in? 
A. ·By Mr. ·wmiams on his right. 
Q. Will you describe to the Court and jury how Mr. Wil-
liams approached tllis intersection; how he was traveling? 
A. Well, Mr. Williams was driving very carefully. It was 
a damp morning; had been raining the night before and we 
were driving along the road. I noticed he was driving forty 
miles an hour. When we started to turn out Road 153, I 
believe it was, Mr. Williams started to slow down and just 
as we approaehed this 153 he commenced to turn and he 
slowed very slow and I seen the car coming and I said, 
''Look." About that time 1\1:r. ··wmiams seen it. He had 
started to turn. Evidently Mr. Williams seen it; he did not 
say anything, but instead of making his turn he straight-
ened his ca.r back to the right to where this man could go 
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on by. This man had approached closer. He was prob-
ably 200 or 250 feet when I first seen him down the road. 
When he came closer he had not slowed his speed.- The last 
I seen of him he was 50 or 60 feet and it looked like he 
turned his car right towards us. When he did I said, '' He 
is g·oing to hit us'' and I turned ·my head down like that 
(indicating) and that is all I know for a short 
page 84 ~ period. · 
Q. Did you make any remark to Mr. vVillia.m.s 
when approaching· this intersection with reference to the 
character of this intersection? 
A. I do reca.11, approaching· this intersection, probably 300 
feet, that I said, ''I never been use to those stobs being put 
in the road driving in Virginia'', and Mr. Williams never· 
said anything about it. He never said whether he had or 
not. He made no answer. 
Q. Did you know· of the intersection before that? 
A.. Yes, I had traveled over it quite a few times. 
Q. Wnen l\fr. Williams first started to make his turn, just 
beginning to make his turn, slowing· up and just about in 
the act of making his turn, was the Stillman car in sight? 
A. I did not see ]\fr. Stillman's car until Mr. Williams 
started to make his turn. I seen it and I saicl, ''Look". Just 
when he started to p;o across the interseetion, he straightened 
bis car back, and, to the best of my opinion, probably the 
front end of it was over the white line 12 inches, maybe. I 
could not see that, you know; just estimate that. 
Q. When you first saw the Stillman car was Mr. Williams' 
car in the intersection? 
A. ,¥hen I first seen Mr. Stillman's car l\fr. Williams had 
· not gotten quite over the line, or, if so, not much. 
page 85 ~ He was just starting to make bis turn. He had 
just ehanged like he was making his turn and evi-
dently, from the way he acted, he saw him a.bout the time I 
did. 
Q. When you first saw Mr. !Stillman's car had Mr. ,vn-
liams rrotten opposite that stob on the west? 
A. He was going by at the right of the stob; he was just 
a..bou t to turn. 
Q. He had not turned ; had just prepared to turn? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. How far was the Stillman ca.r away at that timeY 
A. Well, the first I seen of the car it was about 250 feet. 
I just mean something approximately like that. 
Q. Had it gotten to the intersection Y 
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A. No, it had not gotten to the intersection then. It came 
on to the intersection. Mr. Williams had barely turned 
his car straight, say about 4 feet, and I saw Mr. Stillman's 
car turn to us. That is when I beg-an to cover up and duck 
mv head . 
. ~Q. Could you give us any idea 110w fast the Stillman car 
was runnina-1 · 
A. I would sav sixtv-five to seventv miles an hour. 
Q. Did it apparentiy slow up at "an before coming into 
Mr. "'\Villiams' car? 
A. The last I seen him, when he got a certain distance I 
began to cover up. I thought there would be a 
page 86 ~ collision; I thought probably a piece of glass 
might get in my eyes. 
Q. Can you tell whether Mr. Williams gave any arm sig'Ilal 
for the turn 7 
A. To the best of my opinion he did. 
By Mr. Anderson: If your Honor please, we object to 
'the witness's opinion. If he knows he can state it. 
By the Court: The objection is sustained. State what 
you know. 
Q. According- to your best recollection, state whether he 
gave the sig'llal or not 1 
A. I believe he did. 
By Mr. Anderson: Your Honor, I ask the Court to tell 
the jury to disregard the witness's statement where he said 
he believes. That is his opinion. 
By the Court: We want your recollection; not your opin-
ion; if you have any recollection you can state it. 
A. It is hard for me to explain just how I want to answer 
that question; but I had been riding with him a couple of 
days and I would not be positive right now whether he did 
give the signal. 
Q. You say you would not be positive? 
A. ]] would not be positive that he did. 
Q. You Jmve not answered a.s to your recollection, or not. 
All I want to know is whether you have any recol-
page 87 ~ lection whether he gave the signal, or not? 
A. There was a lot happened there in quick 
time, and, as I said awhile ag·o, Mr. Williams had been ·driv-
ing awfully cautious_;. 
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By Mr. Bowles: I object. 
By the Court: You were asked only what was your recol-
lection, if you have any. You ·are not required to go into 
something prior to this time, or to tell what Mr. Williams 
was doing prior to that time. If you can answer the ques-
tion do so. 
A. I cannot say that he put his hand out. I cannot 
honestly say that, because, as I say, a lot happened that I 
did not see.· 
Q. You are not interested in this case one way or the 
other, the outcome of it, are you f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know about what position Mr. "Williams' car 
was in the road at the instant of the collision? 
A. Mr. Williams bad turned his car; I don't know how 
far it was over the line. I was sitting in the front seat; I 
could not see over there. He had turned his car. He was 
on the rig·ht-hand side of the road up to the time he started 
to turn and he had turned his car at an angle something 
like that (indicating). ..When he saw this car he turned his 
car straight as near as possible. He tried to 
page 88 ~ straighten back in the road and I could not say 
just exactly. I have seen a blueprint of it; I have 
seen the highway patrolman's sketch of it and it is very 
similar to the way I am describing. 
Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Stillman on 
the subject of how the accident happened? 
A. This l1appencd on Saturday morning and Saturday af-
ternoon, some time in the afternoon, I don't remember just 
what the hour was, he came up to the hospital, Medical Col-
lege of Virginia. He came in my room and said, '' This is 
Mr. Stillman; I was in the wreck with Mr. ·wmiams, that 
you were riding with." He said, "Are you mad at me?" 
I said, ''No, I am not mad with you.'' I said, "It is very 
unfortunate that this thing·. happened.'' He said, '' If Mr. 
Williams had had his lights on I would have seen him.'' 
I said, "I don't lmow whether Mr. Williams' lights were 
on or not." He said, "I had my lights on." I said, "Yes, 
I remember your lights.'' So, he stay eel around a few min-
utes and asked could he have a prayer with me. I told 
him if he felt like he was justified and capable of praying 
for me I would be gfad if he did. So, he did. I saw him 
again Sunday afternoon. He brought so11_1e gentleman with 
him .Saturday. Sunday afternoon he brought some gentle-
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man and his children. I don't remember seeing Mr. Still-
man anv more after that. 
page 89 r Q. ·what was the state of the weather as to 
visibilitv at the time of this collision? 
A. It ha.d rainecl the afternoon _before and that night and 
it was between clearing off and raining. It was a semi-
cloudy morning-. It was a little hazy; not what you call 
foggy, but somewhat like that. 
Q. Could you see a car ahead of you-? 
A. Yes, the visibility was good. 
Q. Did you notice any cars with lights on? 1 
A. I noticed some of the cars with lights on them. 
Q. Dimmers or full lights? 
A. Dimmers ; but it was not raining right then. 
CROSS EXA!ilNATION. 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
··Q. Mr. Bruce, you say you, Mr. Williams and Mr. McGee 
were all sitting on the front seat?~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. vVho was in the middle? 
A. I was. 
Q. You were in the front seat, Mr. "'Williams on your left, 
you in the middle and Mr. McGee on your right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How did he compare in size? 
A. Probably the size of this gentleman here (indicating·). 
Q. Not as large as you are? 
pag·e 90 ~ A. No. 
before? 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. You say you had been by this intersection 
Q. ·vvould you say it was a pa.rticularlv dangerous inter-
section? .. 
A. Well, I have never had any near accident there. I had 
always thought it looked like a wide open place. 
Q. You would not think it was an especially dangerous in-
tersection, would yon? 
A. No, I would not. 
Q. Then, you could not have said to Mr. Williams before 
yon got there that it was the most dang·erous intersection 
vou knew of? 
~ .A.. I would not say I did. 
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Q. Would you remember it if you bad said tbatY 
A. I have not made the remark here, and have not made 
it before, that I remember. I made the remark, not · know-
ing· anything- about that, just taLlcing, said I bad never got 
use to these Virginia markers on the highways. 
Q. When you say ''Virginia markers", you mean those 
little sticks in the road, with the ''stop'' sign on them f 
A. Yes. 
Q. You know it is the right thing to go around those sticks 
to the rig·ht of them T 
pag·e 91 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. ,vas not the occasion of your remark to Mr. 
WilliamR because. Mr. Williams was getting ready to turn to 
the left on that sign Y 
A. Not particuln-rlv. 
Q. vV11'af do you mean by "particularly"Y 
A. I thought he knew the rules of the road. I just hap-
pened to mention that. . 
Q. Did not Mr. ·wmiams undertake to turn to the left of 
that sfo,nY 
A. No. 
Q. He was on the left side of the road when he got there, 
was he noU 
A. ·Vl ell, evidently part of his car was on the left· side of 
the road. 
Q. How much.would you say? 
A. I· could not tell just where the cars were sitting after 
they were hit. I did not see them after they were hit; but 
I know he was past the sto bs. I have seen the blueprint. 
Q. ·where did you see this blueprint t 
A. Up in Mr. Stallard's office. I ]mve seen it a. number 
of times ; fo fact, I have one at 110me, the State highway 
drawing. It is a photostatic copy of the State highway 
drawing. 
Q. As I understood, you said when you first 
pag·e 92 ~ saw the Stillman car coming :Mr. Williams' wheels 
had not vet crossed over the white lineY 
A. Mr. Williams 'bad turned his car a little bit to the left, 
as thmw·h lie Wfls going; to make the turn. I seen this car 
and said "Look" and he evidentlv seen it at the same time 
ancl he tried to b.1rn his car bac1~. 
Q. You said on your direct examination, as I understood 
you, when you first saw Mr. ,Stillman's car Mr. Williams 
bad not yet turned over the white line Y 
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A. Turning it. I don't think Mr. Williams' car ever got 
all the way across the road. 
· Q. I don't want to insist on your being particular, Mr. 
Bruce, but I understood you to say when you first saw Mr. 
Stillman's ca.r none of Mr. Williams' car had crossed the 
white line? · 
A. I did not sav that. 
Q. When you first saw the car, then, how much of Mr. 
Williams' car had crossed the center. line? 
A. Well, his front wheels, he was turning when this car, 
I first seen it, I did not know whether Mr. Williams seen 
it or not. I said, "Loo1r". J\fr. Williams seen it evidently 
about the same time I did, and he was tra·veling so fast; the 
next thing I said, ''He is going to hit us.'' He was coming 
pretty rapid. 
Q. What I am trying' to get at is your best esti-
page 93 ~ mate. You are painting a picture of what oc- · 
curred by words here, and I arn trying to get 
from you your best recollection as to what was the position 
of Mr. Williams' car, as to how much of it was over on the 
left side of the white line before Mr. Williams turned? 
A. He was making- a left turn, but it is up to somebody else 
to tell you that. He l1ad made his first turn and I called 
his attention to that car and he straightened his car as 
much as he could and then he stopped and then this man came 
right on to us and came into us, head-on collision. 
Q. You were sitting in the car? 
A. Yes. Q. Would you say your position had crossed the road, or 
noU 
A. No, it had not. 
Q. I am still talking about when you first saw the Still-
man car, you were personally and physically w·ell on the right 
side of the road Y 
A. I was sitting- in the center of the car and Mr. Williams 
had made his turn so far and tried to straighten back. I 
could not tell you just where mv body wa.s, nor where the 
cars were, more than they hit; becaus~ I did not see them 
anv more. I think Mr. Williams was twelve or fourteen 
inches over the white line. 
Q. Your impression is that Mr. Williams' front wheel was 
twelve inches or more over the white line when 
page 94 ~ you first saw the car f 
A. Yes, when I called .his attention to it. I 
don't know where they were when he started back. 
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Q. You said, '' Lo"ok' ', and then he undertook to straighten 
back? 
A. Yes. , , 
· Q. Would you say that his front wheel had gotten over tlie 
white line enoug·h for it to be obvious he wa.s g·oing· to turn 
to the left! 
A. If anybody bad seen him they would know he was going 
to turn to the left. 
Q. But he did not continue thaU 
A. No. 
Q. He straightened up enough to come straight on the 
road? 
A. I have answered that several times. I think Mr. Wil-
liams' car was JJractically in the center of the road when 
they bit. 
Q. That is your impression? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say Mr. Stillman came to see you the very Satur-
day afternoon of the accident, 
A.. He came to see me the Saturdav afternoon of the acci-
dent following- the accident on Friday. 
Q. Mr. Stillman .was hurt? 
A. He had a cane, I believe, when in my room. 
page 95 ~ Q. Was it not a week later that he c.ame to see 
you1 
A. No, it was the next day. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
BEECHER E. ST.ALLARD, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
· Q. Mr. Stallard, what is your occupation? 
A. Lawyer. 
Q. How long· have you been practicing· law? 
A.. About eleven years. . 
Q. I believe you are also a member of the General Assem-
bly of Virginia? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Mercer Still-
man, one of the defendants in this case with reference to the 
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accident under investigation here; if so, when and where 
and what did he ~av Y . 
A. I cannot recali exactly when it was, but it was shortly 
after the accident Mr. Stillman came to mv office with ref-
erence to putting a vending ma.chine in the Richmond De-
fense Council headquarters; w· e had some discussion about 
putting in a vending machine in the Richmond 
page 96 r Defense Council. T.hen he said, "You are hand-
ling a. claim against me, are you not?'' I said, 
"Yes, but I did not ask you to come and talk to me about it 
here." He made a statement which I wrote down. I do 
not recall the substance, but if I had my file I could tell you 
exactlv what he said. 
Q. See if that is your file? 
A. This is what he said: "If Mr. "Williams had had his 
lig·hts on I could have seen him. I had mine on. You know, 
it was raining." The question came up how fast he was run-
ning. He stated, "I would not estimate how fast I was go-
ing. I left Richmond about 7 o'clock. I had gone about 55 
miles.'' I jotted down some questions I ,yould have asked 
him, but I did not ask him. These questions were the ex-
tent of what I asked him. 
Q. I hand you another memorandum and will ask ·you if 
you made that memorandum and if that refreshes your 
memorv about anything said by Mr. Stillman? 
A. The statement on here was made to me by somebody 
else, particularly what Mr. Stillman had said; but Mr . .Still-
man was not present. 
By Mr. Anderson: We object to that. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. Was Mr. Stillman present when that diagram was 
made? 
A. No, this was made down at Blackstone.. Mr. Stillman 
was not present. 
page 97 r CROSS EXAMLNATION. 
By Mr. Bowles : 
Q~ At the time that you sent for this man to talk about 
vending machines you had already sued him for :M:r. Bruce, 
had vou not? 
A.· No, I had not. I don't think it had been but two weeks, 
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if that that I had sued him later, I don't recall, but about 
tw.o weeks after I had been employed by Mr. Bruce. 
Q. Did Mr. Bruce employ you immediately after the acci-
dent happened ·r 
A. Mr. Bruce employed me, I would say, about a week 
after he was hurt. I would say less than that. 
Q. And it was about two weeks after it happened Y 
A. Might or not have been~ I had had dealings with Mr. 
Stillman before that. 
Q. You sent for him about the vending machine 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he opened up the conversation f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you questioned him? 
A. No, I did not question him at all .. I wrote some ques-
tions down that I would have asked him. 
Q. You did not ask him any questions 7 
A. No, he volunteered. I don't think he would tell you that 
I asked him any questions. 
page 98 ~ Q. And he told you he had his lights on and if 
Mr. Williams had had his lights on he would have 
seen him? 
A. Y eij ; I wrote it down a minute or two after he left. I 
think, possibly, I had the file on my desk, I could not tell. 
· Q. He said he·would not estimate his speed? 
A. Yes. 
. Q. That he left Richmond about 7 o'clock and he had gone 
about 55 miles Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that time, that accident? 
A. I don't really recall. . I think the Motor .Vehicle Com-
mission records would tell. 
Q. Do you recall that? 
A. If you want me to reflect, that maybe was 8 :30 or 9 :15. 
Q. You don't know? . 
. A. No, only what was told me. I don't recall what they 
told me. I would not recall what he told me if I had not 
wrote it down. 
Q. Did you take these pictures of the scene of the acci-
denU 
A. Yes, I took these three .or four pictures of the scene of 
the accident. Then I went up to Blackstone and took the 
pictures of the automobiles in the accident, which are here, 
and had them developed. 
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Q. Please file those with your evidence and let the ste-
nographer mark them 1 
page 99 ~ A. I so file them in evidence. 
Note : The pictures are filed, marked '' Defts. Ex. 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6 and 7". · 
Q. Mr. Stallard, I am referring now to "Defendant's Ex. 
2 ". Will you tell me in what direction that picture shows; 
in what direction was the camera pointing! · A: Looking east, towards Petersburg. 
Q. And that was taken from what position¥ 
A. I think that was where the· stobs are. 
Q. The stop sign? 
A. The stop sign and stobs; the stop sign. 
Q. "Defendant's Ex. No. 5" is taken from the opposite 
direction; that is, looking wesU 
A. Looking west; yes. 
Q. That is taken, as is plain from the picture, just east of 
the highway marker sign t 
A. Yes. 
Q. This picture, "Defendant's E,x. No. 7", is that a pic-
ture of the highway marker sign,' the stobs and looking down 
the road to Spainville Y 
A. Yes, that was taken looking down the road to Spain-
ville. 
Q. That is the road into which Mr. Williams was intend-
ing to turn? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. These two pictures, ''Defendant's Ex. 3 and 
page 100 .~ 4", appear, possibly, to be duplicates. Those are 
pictures of the front of the Buick, are they not 7 
A. Yes, that is a picture of the front of the Buick car. 
Q. This picture, '' Ex. 6' ', is about what you are able to see 
of the front of the Ford car? 
A. The front of the Ford car. It shows the Virginia lice;nse 
on it. 
{The witness was excused.) 
-Bv Mr. Allen: We rest. By Mr. Bowles: I have a motion, if your Honor please. 
By the ·Court: Gentlemen of the jury, will you retire fron:i 
the courtroom. 
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J11ry out. 
By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor please, I just remembered 
that I made a note to ask Mr. Stallard another question and 
I have sent Mr. Anderson out to see if he can catch him. 
By the Court: Do you ·want the jury back1 
By Mr. Bowles: If you don't mind, just for one question. 
Jury in. 
BEECHER E. STALLARD, 
being recalled by Counsel for Defendant, testified as fol-
lows:· 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. Mr. Stallard, I meant to ask you-you have 
page 101 ~ been to this scene when you took the· pictures and 
are familiar with it? 
A. I have been there on several occasions. 
Q. ·what is the distance one vehicle can see another there, 
approximately¥ 
A. Looking from where you turn to Spainville, you can see 
a maximum of 400 yards to the east and I would say a mini-
. mum of 250 yards. Looking to the other way you could only 
see to about the center of where the stobs are, that is, look-
ing from the east. 
Q. In other words, an automobile at the intersection could 
see 400 yards up the road? 
A. That is only an estimate. I am not very good on esti-
mating· distances. I find I am not very good at that. I might 
estimate a distance was twenty miles and it would be fifteen 
miles on the plains of New Mexico. 
Q. You say looking to the east you could see 400 -yards 1 
A. That is an estimate. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv :M:r. Allen: . 
.. Q. I hand you '' Ex. No. 4'' ; that is taken from the south-
ern or western side of the intersecting road f 
A. That is right. . 
· Q. Looking· towards Petersburg, in an easterly direction, 
down Route 153 ¥ 
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A. That is right. 
page 102 r Q. Can you give an estimate of how far a man 
. can see down that road to Spain ville going from 
Blackstone to Petersburg¥ 
A. That would be a guess. From the center here is about 
150 yards to the scene. 
Q. Suppose a man is approaching 153, some little distance 
before he gets to 153, he has to tum and look before he gets 
to 153, a little south or west, before he gets to 153, how far 
would that be 1 
A. If he were back fifty yards you would deduct that from 
the 150 yards to the scene. 
Q. So, t;tie figures you give are guess work 1 
.A.. Yes, my estimates were made from the center line there. 
RE-CR08S EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. ·The point I am getting at is, l\ir. Stallard, if an automo 4 
bile had already come up here, approaching this intersec-
tion and was cautiously undertaking to turn out left, when 
he got opposite there, rig·ht in the center shown in ''Ex. 4" 
-this is the position in which "Defendant's Ex. 2'' was 
taken? 
A. As I recall I was standing right in front of these stobs. 
Q .. A person in an automobile there, undertaking· to turn 
left and getting ready to turn left, how far could he straighten 
there and see an automobile coming from Petersburg! 
A. He could see from 350 to 400 vards. I did 
page 103 r did not estimate from the south side of the road. 
I think the picture will show it without my esti-
mating it. 
Q. This picture, ''Defendant's Ex. No. 2'', was looking 
towards Blackstone, was it not f 
A. Y eR, looking t~wards Blackstone. 
Q. And a car commg from Blackstone looks clown that road 
as shown in ''E:x. 2''1 · 
A. Yes. 
(The witness stood aside.) . 
By Mr. Allen: The plaintiff rests. 
By l\fr. Bowles: Now, you Honor, I would like to make 
mv motion. I am sorry to have taken the Court's time. 
"By the Co tut: The jury will retire. -
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Jury out. 
By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor please, the defend.ant 
moves the Court to strike the plaintiff's evidence, on the 
ground that the same has· failed to show any primary negli-
g·ence on the part of the defendant, and more particularly 
on the ground that the plaintiff's own evidence shows he is 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
· I am very serious about that, your Honor, for these rea-
sons: the plaintiff, himself, has shown very 
page 104 ~ plainly and yery definitely that he undertook to 
make a left turn in the face of oncoming traffic 
which he could very easily have seen. He says, hims~lf, that 
the visibility was excellent and it has been shown that a 
vehicle could be seen at least 300 feet there. As shown by 
his own testimony, he began to make · a left turn, proceeded 
to move and, contrary to the statute that provides having· · 
commenced to· make a move on the highway he should con-
tinue it, he then turned and made a right turn. 
Furthermore, the duty is on this driver, under the law, 
when making a left turi~, to first see that it can be made in 
safety. If he had exercised reasonable care as a matter of 
law he could not have placed himself in the position where 
this collision would have occurred. 
Furthermore, if your Honor please, the evidence discloses 
that he stopped in the highway in a position which was not 
a correct one on the highway nnder the surrounding condi-
tions, and I submit to the Court that he is on his own state-
ment guilty of negligence which efficiently contributed to 
cause the accident. 
By the Court: The motion is overruled. I think there is 
sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. 
By Mr. Bowles : We except to the ruling of the Court. 
page 105 ~ ' .W. H. READ, 
a witness introduced on -behalf of' the Defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Anderson: 
Q. Please state your name Y 
A. W. H. Read, Junior. 
Q. Are you a State police officer? 
A. Yes. 
M. Stillman and Berlo Vending Co. v. C. "'\¥. Williams 137 
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Q. How long have you be.en one Y 
A. About six years .. 
Q. On February 14, 1941, where were you ·stationed Y 
A. At Blackstone, -Nottoway County, Virginia. 
Q. Did you investigat~ an accident that occurred at the 
intersection of Route 460 and 153, in :Nottoway County, in-
volving a Buick and a Ford Y 
A. I did. 
Q. About what time was it when you got there 1 
A. To the best of my knowledge, from what I could gather 
at the scene, the accident happened about 8 :30 in the morn-
ing. I got there about an hour afterwards, about 9 :30. 
Q. You got there about 9:30? 
A. About 9 :30 in the morning; yes. 
Q. From the evidenc·e you secured about the case, the ac-
. cident happened about 8 :30? 
page 106 ~ A. Yes. 
· Q. Were the cars still there when you got 
theret 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. Did the investigation show that they had been moved 
before you got there? 
A. It appeared that they had not been moved. 
Q. ·no you know the position of the cars with reference to 
the stop sign on Road 153 from Spainville and with refer-
ence to the center line on Ro,d 460? 
A. I could not say exactly. 
Q. Did you make some measurements up there Y 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Tell the jury what the measurements were that you made 
and if you have any papers that refresh your mind? 
A. I have a diagram here th~t I drew of the accident. 
Q. You may ref er to the diagram T 
A. The cars stopped head-on, approximately in the cen-
ter of the highway. They struck approximately in the center 
of the highway. The cars were setting almost in the center 
of the hig·hway, approximately in the center; hit head-on, just 
as they stopped after the collision, and they were just a little 
bit ~est of the stop sign in the Spainville intersection of the 
road that goes to Spain ville, Road l 53. · 
By Mr. Anderson: If your Honor please, may 
page 107 ~ he show. the jury the diagram he made. . 
By the Court: I see no objection. It is not 
drawn to scale. 
138 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
W. H. Read. 
By "'\Vitness: No, sir. I have some measurements I took 
there. . 
By the Court: He may illustrate by the paper, but not 
put the paper in evidence. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. Mr. Read, was that diagram made contemporaneously 
with the time of the accident T 
A. Not this one, but I made this one from the one which I 
made at the time of the accident. 
By ·witness: Gentlemen, this represents Route 460, run-
ning from Blackstone to Petersburg. This car here repre-
sents the Buick car, which was driven by Mr. Williams in this 
direction, to Petersburg. This car het·e represents the Ford, 
driven by Mr. Stillman, which was headed towards Black-
stone. The cars were sitting- in that position when I g·ot to 
the scene of the accident, and the only measurements I could 
make were from the outside wheels of each car to the outside 
of the highway. There were no skid marks from either the 
Buick or the Ford. These were measurements I took from 
the wheels to the outside of the highway. The Williams' car 
the left front wheel was 5 feet, 6 inches from 
page 108 r the'·outer edge of Route 460; the right front wheel 
. was 8 feet, 6 inches from Route 153; the left rear 
wheel was 7 feet, 6 inches from Route 460; the right rear 
wheel was 7 feet, 4 inches from Route 153. The Stillman car 
the left front wheel was 5 feet, 6 inches from Route 460; the 
right front wheel was 8 feet, 6 inches from Route 153; the 
left rear wheel was 4 feet from Route 460; the left rear wheel 
was 8 feet, 6 inches from Route 153. 
By Mr. Bowles: Do I understand your Honor to rule that 
we might not put that diagram in as an exhibit with this 
witness's testimony? 
By the Court: You may not. 
By Mr. Bowles: As a memorandum of what he testified 
could he not make a diagram now of what he testified to? 
What I want him to do is to make a picture of his testimony 
at this time, so those measurements c~n be remembered. 
By the Court: I understand he has told the jury what 
those distances were. 
By Mr. Bowles: I understand; but I would like for him to 
make a diag-ram and show those measurements. 
By Mr. Allen: We object, because not drawn to scale and 
.. 
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entirely misleading to put a memorandum. in that cannot be 
drawn to scale. 
By Mr. Bowles: I would like to have this of-
. page 109 } fleer now take a piece of paper and show the po-
sition of the cars and show the measurements he 
has just testified to. 
By the Court: .He has just given the distances and the wit-
ness cannot make a memorandum at this time and hand that 
to the jury . 
By Mr. Bowles: Your Honor rules that this witness, who 
has made exact measurements with a tape line, may not now 
introduce a presently made free-hand sketch showing those 
measurements? 
By the Court: He may not. He may tell the jury what h~ 
did. In aid of his testimony he may illustrate by the paper, 
but not put that paper in evidence. 
By Mr. Bowles: I am talking about the one I would like 
for him to draw right now. Your Honor will not permit.him 
to put that in evidence? 
By the Court : iN o. 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception to your Honor's rul-
mg. 
By Mr. Anderson: 
Q. Had the drivers of the automobiles left the scene when 
you were there 1 
A. They had. 
Q. Did you interview them? 
A. I don't recall whether I did or not 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
• Q. Mr. Officer, when did you make this dia-
page 110 ~ gram you have been talking about; about what 
time was it? 
A. I made one at the scene of the accident and made one 
possibly three months later. 
· Q. Did you copy that from the one you made at the scene 
of the accident? 
A. I did. 
By Mr. Bowles: I want that in evidence, as an exhibit, your 
Honor. 
By Mr. Allen: I object. 
Bv the Court: It is not allowed to be filed as an exhibit. By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception. 
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Q. Where was the front of the Ford and the front of the 
Buick with reference to the stop sign on the north of the in-
tersection, at the Spainville road Y 
A. Just a few feet west. 
Q. This is a drawing made to scale by a civil engineer, 
W. W. LePrade. To the left is Petersburg. This is to the 
west, or Blackstone. Here is the stop sign in the Spainville 
Toad. I understand you to , say the front of the Ford and 
the front of the Buick were a few feet to the west of the stop 
. sign? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Which side of the road were they on Y 
A. Approximately in the center. 
page 111 r Q. Were the measurements exactly as you gave 
them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How was the weather that morning? 
A. Very foggy and ~omewhat of a rain, and the visibility 
was restricted to possibly 400 feet when I got to the scene 
of the accident. 
Q. Do you know what the visibility was about 8 :30 that 
morning? 
A. I do not. 
Q. ,,There were you at 8 :30? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Where did you get the call to come to this accident f 
A. I don't recall that. 
Q. Do you know what time you went on duty that morn-
ing¥ 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: · , 
Q. Did you make a report ot the State Motor Vehicle De-
partment of your findings Y 
A. I suppose I did; I don't remember definitely whether 
I did or not. I am supposed to, but don't know definitely 
whether I did. · 
Q. Did you view the surrounding circumstances with any 
effort to make any estimate of the speed at which Spillman 
was driving immediately before the accident upon 
page 112 r approaching the curve or intersection Y 
A. The only thing I had to go by was the dam-
age to the cars. 
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Q. The force of impact f 
A. Yes. · 
Q; Did you make any estimate of that! 
A. If I made an accident report I estimated the speed on 
that. 
By Mr. Anderson: We object to any statement the witness 
may make with reference to the speed. 
By the Court: He has not been asked that. 
Q. How long have you been engaged in patrol work? 
A. About six years. 
Q. Are you in a position to give any opinion as to what 
would be a safe speed under the conditions there that morn-
ing, approaching from Blackstone as well as from Peters-
burg! 
By Mr. Anderson: I object to that. It is purely an opin-· 
ion. I don't think the witness has qualified sufficiently to 
give his opinion on it. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. Did you make measurements of the mouth of 15.g where 
it joins 460¥ 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you measure the mouth of 460 opposite 
page 113 ~ 153 Y 
A. I did. 
Q. How wide is itY 
A. I don't know. I have not that measurement with me. 
Q. Did you take notice of any warning sign approaching 
this intersection from the direction from which Mr. Stillman 
was approaching? 
. A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you make any measurement of the warning sign 
approaching from BJackstone, one the other side? 
A. I don't recall that. I have no notes on the case. 
Q. You spoke of the sign. ,v as that the center of the square 
indicated by "stop" at the mouth of 4601 
A. There was orie there. 
Q. How far can that stop sign be seen by the driver of a 
car approaching· the intersection from towards Petersburg? 
A. I would say 200 feet ·an~ay. · 
Q. Is the top of that sign about as high as an automobile? 
A. Approximately so, yes. 
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Q. If a person approaching the fotersection from towards 
Petersburg could see that stop sign about 200 feet and the 
stop sign was about the height of an automobile, then a per-
son sitting in an automobile could see a person approaching 
from Petersburg about the same distance? 
A. I did not get that question. 
page 114 ~ Q. I understand you to say a person approach-
ing that intersection from Petersburg, as Still-
man was, could see that stop sign in the center of the mouth 
of 460 for 200 feet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I ask you if a person approached that intersection 
from towards Blackstone and got fo a plac.e about where 
that stop sign is in the mouth of 153 he could see the ap-
proaching car from the same distance, could he not t 
A. Yes, he could. 
Q. Then, a person approaching this intersection from 
Blackstone how far could he see a person approaching from 
the other side, from towards Petersburg, when the person 
approaching from Blackstone gets to the double white line 
(I hand you "Plaintiff's Ex. ·No. 2, which shows the white 
line )-a car approaching the intersection from Blackstone 
and reaching that white line, how far can he see a car ap-
proaching from Petersburg f 
A. Just a short distance. 
Q. So, a person approaching this intersection from Black-
stone could not see far along the road until he got up near 
there? . 
A. He would have to be close to 153, to see a car approach-
ing· 153, coming from Petersburg. 
RE-DIRECT EX ... t\.MINATION. 
By Mr . .Anderson: 
Q. Mr. Read, this st.op sig·n is to control traffic 
page 115 ~ approaching from 153, is it,. not, 
A. Yes. 
Q. It does not affect traffic approaching 153 on 460? 
A. No. 
Q. I understand you to say the front o"f the Ford and the 
front of the Buick were a little west of the stop sign y 
A. That is correct. 
Q. With reference to the rest of the Buick car, where was tt, . 
A. Still further west. 
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Q. Of the stop sign 1 
A. Yes. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. You speak of where the cars were when you got there 
after the impact? 
A. After they had stopped, yes. 
Q. You don't know where they were when they actually 
came together? 
A. I do not. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By J\fr. Anderson : 
Q. Mr. Read, was there any mark on the road, or any in-
dication whatever that the impact had taken place up east of 
the stop sign, or even with the stop sign? 
A. I was unable to find anything to indicate 
page 116 ~ it happened anywhere else. 
Q. Was there any debris, oi: any mark of the 
cars west of the stop sign, towards Blackstone? 
A. I never saw any. 
Q. Was there anything to indicate that is where they 
stopped, any mud or anything? 
A. There was some mud; not a great deal of debris up arid 
down the highway. 
Q. Did you find any debris, or nmd, or anything east of the 
stop sign f 
A. No, not any more than there was the other way, just as 
though the cars had hit there and the mud had flew out from 
the under side. . 
Q. Did you find any debris behind the Ford from where.. 
!hev had hit? 
A. I did not notice any. 
Q. Was the most of the debris right under the cars where 
they were? · · 
A. Yes. 
Q. And not any to the west or east? 
A. No. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
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By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor please, these plats made 
.by Mr. W. W. LePrade are asked to be filed as exhibits. 
By the Court: All right, file them. 
Note: The plats are filed, marked "Def ts. Ex. No. 8 
and 9". · 
page 117 } W. P. PAYNE, 
a witness for the plaintiff, being introduced at 
this time by agreement of counsel, being first· duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Please state your name T 
A. W. P. Payne. 
Q. What, is your occupation? 
A. Commercial photographer. 
Q. I believe you took the photogr·aphs which have been 
introduced in evidence as "Plaintiff's Exhibits 2~ 3 and 4"? 
A. I took these photographs. 
Q. Did you at the same time make certain measurements? 
A. I did. 
Q. State to the jury what measurements you took? 
A. Do you want me to give each measurement? 
Q. Yest . · 
A. I made a measurement from an intersection, a cross 
road sign, east of this intersection, to some stakes that were 
in the .center, or approximately the center, of the cross road. 
By Mr. Bowles: Wliat stakes f There are two sets of stakes 
there. 
page 118 } A. Those stakes are the stakes on the north 
side of the road. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Come and point the stakes out on the photograph. I 
hand you "Plaintiff's Ex. 3'' and ask you to point out the 
cross road sign you talk about? 
A. This is the cross road sign. 
Q. I hand you the "Plaintiff's Ex. 4'' and ask you to point 
out the stakes you ref er to Y · 
A. These are the stakes. 
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Q. The stakes in the center of 153, on the north of 4607 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that distance T 
.A. 457 feet. Froni this same sign; that is, a point opposite 
on the road from the beginning of the intersection, is 320 
feet. 
By Mr. Bowles: I object to that measurement, because I 
don't know what he conceives to be the beginning of the 
intersection, and unless he speaks of the intersection ac-
cording to the definition, I object to it. 
By the Court: He can draw it if he does not make it suf-
ficiently clear. If he don't say anything by his testimony you 
probably will not make any objection. 
By Mr. Bowles: I make the objection as stated. 
By the 1Court: Your objection is overruled. 
page 119 } By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception to the 
Court's ruling. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. :From this same sign-do you mean by that the cross-
ing sign? 
A. That is right. 
Q. From the beginning of the intersection is 320 feet. 
What do you mean by the beginning of the intersection?. 
· A. I mean where the hard surf ace of 153 on the north side 
of the road, which is the right side of 450, looking towards 
Blackstone, comes out and meets the hard surf ace of 460. 
By Mr. Bowles: I object to that, because that is contrary 
to what the statute says is the beginning of an intersection. 
By the ·Court: The objection is overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception to the Court's ruling. 
Q. That distance is 320 feeU 
A. That is right. I also made a measurement from a simi-
lar sign post on the west side, a cross road sign. 
Q. Point tlmt out to the jury! 
A. This is a sign post on the south side of Road 460; west 
of this intersection. From this sign post, from the beginning 
of the intersection, the south side of 460, is 288 feet from 
tl1is same sign post to a set of stakes on the south side of, 
the road. 
Q. South side of which road Y 
A. 460. 
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page 120 r By Mr. Bowles: For the sake of the record, I 
want to make the same objection to the statement 
about the south side of the road. 
By the Court: Objection overruled. · 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception. 
By Witness : From the same sign post to stakes on the 
south side of the center of the road is 390 feet. 
By Mr. Allen : 
Q. You are pointing now to stakes on "Plaintiff's Ex. 4"? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. What is your next measurement? 
A. From the same sign post to the post in the center of 
stakes on north side of 460 is 429 feet. 
Q. Those stakes on the north side of 460 are the stakes 
that are in the cross road of 153? · 
A. That is right. I measured the road, the highway hard 
surface of 460, that is 22 feet wide. That is back beyond the 
flare. It does not include any of the flare from 153. 
Q. I am now looking at "Plaintiff's Ex. 4", the hard sur-
face, which you say is 22 feet wide, is the hard surface about 
opposite the sets of poles on the north and south side of 460; 
it does not include the surface from the edge of the flare to 
the post on each side? 
A. This measurement of 22 feet is not in the intersection, 
but back of the intersection, where there is no 
page 121 ~ interference from either road. 
Q. Do you know the distance between the set 
of stakes in south of 153 and the set of stakes on the south 
side of 460? 
A. You mean the distance between the two sets of stakes-
because they are not opposite each other Y 
Q. Yes? 
A. That distance is 50 feet. 
Q. Are they approximately opposite each other? 
A. No, the stakes on the south side of the road are west of 
the stakes on the north side of the road. 
Q. How much west 1 
A. It would be approximately 25 feet. 
Q. Did you measure the width of the mouth of 153 where 
it joins 4607 
A. I don't think I did. 
Q. Mr. Payne, if you did not measure the width of the 
mouth of 153. where it joins 460, could you give us any esti-
mate of the distance as you observed it when you were there? 
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A. I would·not like to say how wide it is. It is an extremely 
wide flare. 
Q. About how many times the ordinary width of the road? 
A. I would say the flare over all is easily three times the 
width of the ordinary road. 
page 122 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: Without waiving my exceptiqn, if your· 
Honor please, I will proceed to cross examine lVIr. Payne. 
Q. This is toward Petersburg, Mr. Payne. Now, this sign 
that one will see when on the right-hand side of the highway 
coming from Petersburg was on the right-hand side? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was a sign that had a ·block cross on it? 
A. Yes. 
Q·. Indicating that an intersection was up ahead? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. You gave the distance from that sign, which was just 
at the edge of the traveled portion of 460? 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. On the west side of this intersection I am putting a Y 
here (indicating diagram). That is the point you measured 
on the road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you take this measurement of 22 on this road f 
A. I think it was west of the sign, or in the vicinity of the 
sig·n post. 
Q. That would be some 457 feet away from where these 
two roads cross one another? 
A. Approximately, between 375 and 400 feet. 
Q. You did not undertake to measure the width 
page 123 ~ of the road where the stop signs were f 
A. You mean in the intersection? 
Q. Yes? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The measurement of 22 feet that you made was back up 
the road some 400 feet away? 
A. Yes. If I may make a statement without venturing to 
give any information, I made a measuremnt from a stake 
on the north side of the road to a point approximately op-
posite to where the stakes were on the opposite side of the 
road. 
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Q. What was thaU 
A. 25 feet. · 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. That measurement was taken, then about opposite 153 Y 
A. It was taken from the stake on the north side of the 
road. 
Q. Straight across the ·road Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. The hard surf ace there is 25 feet wide Y 
· :A. Yes, between the two stakes. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: ·. 
Q. The distance between the two stakes is 25 
page 124 ~ feet on the perpendicular Y · 
A. Yes, across the road. . 
Q. Whether that was gravel, hard surface or what, you 
don't know! 
A. Approximat_ely the same class. of material. 
Q. Th~. actual distance between those two sets of stakes 
was 50 feet? 
A.. Yes. 
( The witness stood aside.) 
page 125 ~- -CHARLES MARTIN, . 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT .EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Anderson: 
Q. Please state your name 1 
A.. Charles Martin. 
Q. Where do · you live, Mr. Martin Y 
A.. I live at Bhtckstone, R. F. D. 1. 
Q. Is that a place near W ellville Y 
,A.. Yes, I did live at Well ville at the time· this thing hap-
pened. . . 
Q. On February 14th, a little ·over a year ago, this accident 
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happened that we are discussing here today. It happened 
at an intersootion Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not see that accident, did you Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far did you live from that place? 
A. That distance is 400 yards. 
Q. That is, east of itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were there when this accident happened Y 
A. ·No, sir. 
, Q.· How did you know an accident had hap-
page 126 ~ pened? 
A. Mr. Dalton said there was an accident at the 
intersection of the road and some parties were jammed in 
the car .and could not get out and he wanted some one to help 
get them out. 
Q. Did you g·o up there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you take anyone up there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Four of your employees Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you got there where were these parties with ref er-
ence to the road 153 Y 
A. The Ford car, going west, was right even with the stop 
sign in the west lane. 
Q. You mean the Ford was headed west in the road, even 
with the stop sig-n Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was the Buick? 
A. The Buick was jammed right into it. 
Q. We are talking about 460-was the front of the Buick 
west of the ·Ford? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Head-on? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The men were out of the car? 
page 127 r A. Yes, except one ; he was in the Ford. 
Q. Do you know about how long after the ac-
cident it was before you got there? 
A. I don't know; about five minutes I suppose. 
Q. About what time was it when you got there? 
A. It was fairly early in the morning; I could not say just 
what time. · 
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Q. Tell the jury what kind of morning that was? 
A. It was very foggy and ypu could not see very far. 
Q. Did you notice whether either of the cars had its lights 
on? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you notice whether any of the cars that passed there 
had lights on? 
A. ,No; I was not there over a minute. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I dropped those men and turned around and stopped 
back of the Ford. Thev went on up to the car and when I 
got there they were taJring :M:r. Kay out. 
Q. A man named Kay? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which side clid they take him out? 
A. The rig·ht side. 
Q. Did t4ey have any trouble lifting him out? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What? 
page 128 ~ A. The seat was jammed so they could not 
get him out. 
Q. Did they have any trouble about getting him out of 
the car? 
A. In taking llim out. we were blocked by the stop sign 
when we went to take him out. 
Q. You mean the ear was right by the stop sign and you 
had fronble taking· the man out on account of the stop sign T 
A. I can't sav how close it was to him. 
Q. Please say that a.gain? 
A. "\Vhen we bromrht him out the door of the car come 
over the stop sig·n a~d we broug·ht him back this way and 
j?,·ot l1im out. As quick as we g·ot llim out and in my car I 
brou~ht him rfo·l1t awav. 
Q. You brought him 'to Richmond 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know where the cars were with reference to the 
center line on road 460? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You did not take any notice of that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You do say the Ford was in the west hand lane going 
west? 
A. Ye~. sir; bound to have been, or we would not have 
had trouble in getting him out. 
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Q . .And the Buirk was right in front of the Ford Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
page 129 ~ Q. I hand you here· a map, which is called ''De-
fendant's Ex. 9" which was drawn bv a sur-
veyor~ This is the intersection here. This end o(the map 
is east. Here is your compass, pointing north. This rot:td 
towards Spainville, It runs sort of northeast, don't it, 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Wellville is southwest? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The suveyor has marked a stop sign. What side is 
that on f Is it on the north side of 460? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury on the map here just where you saw the 
FordY 
A. Right about here. 
Q. Put a mark there. Put your initials there f 
A. (Witness puts his initials at the point designated, 
"0. M.'' 
Q. The mark was put directly over the top of "00" on the 
map? 
A. I intended to put the mark to the west of the center 
line. To the best of my knowledge that is where it occurred. 
Bv the Court: 
"'Q. What did you say? 
A. To the best of my knowledge the car was setting to the 
west of the c.enter line. 
page 130 r By Mr. Anderson: 
Q. ·where was the Buick Y 
A. The Buick, as far as I could tell, was right in front of 
the Ford ; head on, lights, tires and all. · 
Q. You mean the Buick tires were touching the front Ford 
tires and the lights? 
A. Yes; they seemed to be locked together. I never took 
particular notice. · 
Q. Will you put an "X" mark where the Buick wasY 
·By the Court: I don't want to put another '' X'' in there. 
The other witness put an ''X" mark and a "Y". 
By Mr. Bowles. He has already put an ''X'' there. Can 
he nut a circle around the '' X''? 
By the Court: Yes. 
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Q. You have put an "X'' with a circle around it to show 
where the Buick was T 
A. Yes, sir! 
Q. Did vou hear Mr.· Williams, the driver of the Buick, 
make anv .. statement there at the scene of the accident about 
the other carY 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
' By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Mr. Martin, you did not see the accident T 
A. No, sir. · 
page 131 r Q. YOU got there afterwards Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You do not know how long afterwards, except from 
hearsavf 
· A. No, sir. 
Q. When 'you g·ot there the cars were in the position you 
have described. Could you just generally say that those ca~s 
· were about opposite the entrance or mouth of 153 into 46M 
A. The Ford car was opposite the stop sign and the Buick 
was west of it. 
Q. You don't know where the cars actually came together l 
A. No, ~ir. 
( The witness stood aside.) 
page 132 r J. W. MARTIN, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Anderson: 
Q. Mr. Martin, will you please state your full name? 
A . .Tohn W. Martin. 
Q. Where do you live? . 
A. I reside about six miles north of W ellville and it is about 
twelve miles east of Blackstone. 
Q. Are you in the lumber yard business there on Route 
4607 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far is your yard from the intersection of Route 
153 and 460? · 
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A. About 450 yards. . 
Q. On the day of February 14, 1941, were you at your place 
of busin~ss shortly after an accident happened up at that 
intersection Y 
A. I was on mi way to my place; of business; I had to pass 
by that intersection. · 
Q. Did you see that accident happen? 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. You came along and saw that it had happened Y 
A. Yes; there were several cars there. It had happened 
some little time before that. 
page 133 ~ Q. Do you know what time it was that you 
got there? 
A. I am supposed to be there at my work at 7 :30. This 
morning was a little rainy and I was a little late and I took 
a little time to dress and I was approximately thirty-five 
to forty minutes late. I was supposed to be there at 7 :30. . 
Q. That would throw you by that.place about 8:15 o'clockY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you stop to look at the place of the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had the people left the place of the accident Y 
A. Two were there. 
Q. Who were they? 
A. Mr. "'Williams and Mr. Stillman. 
Q. Where were the cars with reference to Road 153Y That 
stop sign is on the north side of Road 460, in the mouth 
of Road 153, which goes to Spainville-where were the cars 
with reference to that sign Y 
A. The Ford, which I understand was driven by Mr. Still-
man the front door· was just about opposite that stop sign. 
Q. 'Which way was that Ford headed Y 
A. Headed west, towards Blackstone. 
Q. Where was the Buick with reference to that stop signT 
A. The two cars were locked together. 
Q. What part of the carsY 
page 134 ~ A. The front part of the cars, bumper and tires 
and wheels right together. 
Q. Head-on collision? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vV as the Bufok towards Blackstone from the sign, or 
towards Petersburg-? Was it east or west of the sign Y 
A. West of the sign. 
Q. Right in front of the Ford Y 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were the cars witll reference to the center line of 
Route 460? 
_t\.. That is a little hazy to me; but as well as I remember 
each side was across the center line. The mark had gotten 
a little dim. Since that they have done awav with that cen-
ter line and hardly have it· there any more."' The left front 
of each car was across the line and the rear of each car was 
over the line. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Stillman's condition? 
A. He seemed to be dazed; a large knot on his forehead 
and one leg cut right badly. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Williams? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q; Did. you hear him make any statement about the acci-
dent? · 
.A. Well, he was dazed; about the same condition. I brought 
both of them to Richmond to the hospital. I 
page 135 ~ heard both of them make several statements ; both 
dazed and both did quite a bit of talking. 
Q. Wnat did l\fr. Williams say? 
A. I could not remember all they said. Both said they 
did not remember much about the accident. 
Q. Did you hear l\ifr. Williams make any statement about 
whether he saw the car? 
A. Mr. Williams said he did not see the car that he col-
lided with at that time; but since that time, since he was 
over _his dazed condition, he said he did; that the lights of 
his car reflected on the front of the other car. 
Q. ·when did he make his first statement? 
A. The first statement was before I took him to the hos-
pital. The next statement was quite a while, later. 
Q. "'\Vas it a year later? 
A. No, not a year later; approximately thirty to sixty 
davs later. Q. What did he say at that time Y 
A. He said he saw the lig·hts of bis car; he said the lights 
of his car were shorted with his brake and when he stepped 
on his brak~ that he saw bis lights reflected on the other 
man's bumper; h~ remembered that. 
Q. And that is all he saw? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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pag·e 136- }- CROSS EXAMINAT[ON. 
Bv Mr . .Allen: 
"Q. You say Mr. Williams did a good deal of talking -on 
the way to Richmond f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he out of his head Y 
A. I would not say he was exactly out of his head, but 
dazed. 
Q. But talked about religion? 
A. Yes, he and Mr. Stillman talked a. good bit about re-
ligion. 
Q. Both were dazed 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they did not seem to know much about the accident 
at that time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. "'\\Then you arrived there and found those cars locked to-
g·ether, did the right-band door of the Stillman car open 
without touching the stake on the right-hand side? 
A. I could not sa.v as to that. I walked to the left-hand 
side of the cars,-to the left of Mr. Stillman' car and the 
right of Mr. ·wmiams' car. ' 
Q. That is a broad intersection there! 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. You do not know exactly where the cars came in con-
tact with eaeh other? 
A. No, I do not. 
page 137 }- Q. ·was the Stillman car right opposite the 
stake, in 153 ? 
A. Yes, the front door was about opposite the stakes. 
RE-DIRECT· EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Anderson: 
Q. Did you see any marks on the road 7 
A. No, I did not; but I did not look for any. 
RE..JOROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr . .Allen: 
Q. Let me ask you something about those cars. Can you 
describe the extent to which the two cars were damag~d? 
Take the Stillman ear :first? 
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A. The front of the car was crushed in. There had been 
quite a lot of candy in the car. The lights were on. The 
radio was on; in fact, I turned it off; it had evidently been 
turned down. The back of the car was pulled in from the 
impact, the back seat, in the center. 
Q. How do you account for that? 
A. The back was pulled in. 
Q. As if somebody had hit it from behind Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The radio of the car was on? 
A. Yes sir. Mr. WiHiams' car, the front part was all 
mashed in; the steering wheel was pushed up out of line; 
the wmdshield was broken. 
page 138 ~ Q. Was the back of his car broken in like the 
.Stillman carY · 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Anderson: 
· Q. Do you mean the bacl~ seat in the center of the Stillman 
car was knocked in, or the back part t · 
A. The back seat was like that and the candy hitting it 
had pulled the car hi just as if it had been hit. 
Q. · The trunk? 
. A. Yes, between the trunk and t~e light had been pulled 
ID. . 
Q. Where was the candy? . 
A. They were picking it up; some on the road and they 
,had most of it up, when I arrived, putting· it back in the car. 
' (The witness was excused.) 
pa~e 139 ~ HOWARD "\VAIN"\VRIGHT, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Anderson: 
0. Please state your nameT 
A. Howard Wainwright. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. Blackstone, Virgi.nia. 
Q. What business are you in? 
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A. Ford dealer at Blackstone. 
Q. On the morning of Feb,rnary 14, 1941, a little over a 
year ago, did you receive a call about a wreck at the inter-
section of 153 and 460? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what did you do as a result of that call 7 
A. I got in my car and went to the scene of the accident 
and found a wreck there. 
Q. Did you take a wrecker there? 
A. I sent for one, because I was not requested to pull it 
in when I got the message. · 
Q. When you got there, with reference to a stop sign in 
the mouth of 153, on the north side of 460--with reference 
. to that sign where were those cars? 
page 140 r A. The Ford was going west, with the right-
hand door open right against the sign. 
Q. When vou opened the Ford door it would touch the 
sign? · 
A. Almost. 
Q. Where was the front part of the ·Ford with reference 
to the sign? 
A. It was west of the sign. 
Q. Where was the Buick? 
A. Directly in front of the Ford. 
Q. State wha.t the location of the cars was with reference 
to the center line of Route 460? 
A. The cars were stuck face to face, bumper against 
bumper and the lights, and all four wheels were on the north 
of the white line of 460, right jam together; could not have 
made a better job if you had drive~ them together. 
Q. What time of day was it when you got there 7 
A .. Approximately· 9 o'clock. 
Q. Had the cars been moved when you got there or noU 
A. N oJI they had not. 
Q. What did you do in order to move the. cars? 
A. I did not inove them. ·when I arrived there Mr. Martir. 
was carrying the occupants away in his car. Some of them 
a.sked that I move the cars, so I returned to town as quick 
as I could to get the wrecker and sent some boys to get the 
, c~~ . 
page 141 r Q. Were you there when the wrecker came 
back? 
A. No, sir. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Allen: 
·Q. Mr. v\Tainwright, how long have you been in business 
at Blackstone Y 
A. Twenty-five years. 
Q. Ford dealer there. 
A. Yes, work for the ],ord people. 
Q. In your experience do you pick up many wrecks Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you describe the extent of the damage to each of 
these cars ; that is, the extent to which both was demolished 7 
Tuke the Ford first? 
.A. The Ford car was mashed; the radiator, grill and the 
front; the wh~le front mashed up in the front of the car; 
the seat torn off and the pedal off. · 
Q. How about the back of the Ford Y 
.li.. Pushed in; the trunk pushed in. 
Q. Now take the Buick Y 
.A. I never did see the ·Buick after it was brought to Black-
stone; just only at the wreck. 
Q. Was the Buick there when you got there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not take any particular notice of it Y 
A. No. there was such a commotion there. 
page 142 ~ Q. Did you see any evidence there ori · the high-
way of the Buick having been knocked back Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how far had the Buick been knocked back? 
A. About half the length of the car. 
• I 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. .Anderson : 
Q. Mr. Wainwright, wliat was the evidence you saw that 
indicated that the Buick had been knocked back¥ 
A. It looked like the Ford was loaded so heavv was the 
reason it knocked the Buick back. " 
Q. Is that all the evidence you are basing that on Y 
A. Yes ; as far as speed is concerned I could not say. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Allen: 
· Q. Did you see any .skid marks, mud or anything down 
there that indicated that the Buick was knocked back? 
··1 
i 
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Thomas George Kay. 
By Mr. Bowles: I object to that. 
By the Court : This man is on cross examination. 
Q. Did you see any skid marks, mud, or debris there by 
which you could tell approximately how much the Buick had 
been Ia1ocked back? 
By ]\fr. Bowles: Your Honor he has already 
page 143 ~ said the only thing· you could base that on was 
the weight of the load. 
By the Court : Objection overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles: Exception noted. 
A. No, sir, I could not. 
Q. ,\7here was the candy knocked, mostly 1 
A. Out of the front doors. 
Q. Out of the front doors of what car? 
A. Of the Ford car. 
(The witness was excused.) 
page 144 ~ THOMAS GEORGE KAY, 
· a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as folloW's : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. Anderson: 
Q. ·wm you state your full name y 
A. Tl10mas George l(ay. 
Q. ·where do you live now? 
A. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
Q .. How old are you? 
A. Tweniv-four. 
Q. Did· you ever live in Virginia Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you employed? 
A. By the Berlo Vending; Company. I was employed by 
Mr. Stillman; but I come under the Berlo Vending Company. 
Q. You are ~till employed by them Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Are you any kin of Mr. Stillman? 
A. We are brothers-in-law. He married my sister. 
Q. On :H'ebruary 14, 1941, were you working with him Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Were you with him on _a trip when they had this acci-
dent on Route 460 and Route 153? 
~- Yes, sir. 
page 145 ~ Q. Where were you riding in the car? 
A. Beside him in the front seat. 
Q. Tell the jury what you saw; what you were doing and 
as much· as you know about this accident! · 
A. As we left Richmond, about 6:30, we were traveling 
towards Blackstone and the last thing that I can remember 
was seeing a sign pointing· towards Blackstone. I don't 
know exactly where that was. I had been looking up occa-
sionally, but I was largely occupied in filing my finger nails, 
as I had the utmost confidence in Mr. Stillman's driving 
and felt that it was not necessary to watch the road. The 
last thing I remember seeing was seeing the sign to Black-
stone, and the next thing I was in Petersburg, having been 
brought ther~ by some one else's car, having been injured 
in the accident. 
Q. What was the weather that morning·Y 
A. Quite foggy. 
Q. Do you know whether or not he had lµs lights on Y 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge how fast this car 
was going that you were riding inf 
A. I do not. 
Q. Can you estimate it Y 
.ft.. I would say, roug·hly, between 40 and 45. 
Q. You did not Jook at the speedometer? 
page 146 ~ . A. I did not. 
Q. ,Vas the speed of such an amount as to at-
tract your attention or make you feel uneasy Y 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. You were hurt and brought to Richmond? · 
A. Yes. · 
Q. You don't know anything about the position of the cars 
or what you hit, if anything? 
A. No, I do not. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Allen: 
·Q. Mr. Kay, you say t4e visibility was not very good? 
A. That is right. · 
· Q. Could you not see very far ahead Y 
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A. Well, just the average distance on a foggy morning. 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Stillman had on his bright 
lights or dimmers Y 
.A. I believe his bright lights. . 
Q. You did not see the accident or know what side of the 
road you were on, or what happened? 
A. No, I do not. 
( The witness was excused.) 
page 147 ~ Bv Mr. Bowles: Will your Honor excuse the 
jury? 
By the Court : Yes. The jury will retire from the court-
room. 
t.Tury out. 
By Mr. Bowles:. Your Honor has heard reference to· l\fr. 
C. O. Dawson, who took the statement from Mr. Williams. 
Mr. Dawson is a licensed attorney to practice before the 
Richmond bar. Mr. Dawson's other connection I would pre-
fer not to be inquired into .. Mr. Allen probably knows about 
tbk 
By Mr. Allen: If your Honor please, if they put Mr. 
Dawson on the ·witness stand it is our purpose to ask for 
"the right to cross-examine him as to why he took that state-
ment, whom he represents and other inquiries. They can-
not put an adjuster of the insurance company on the witness 
stand and we not lmve the right to cross-examine him on the 
witness stand. We have the right to ask Mr. Dawson on the 
witness stand whom he represented and why he went there 
and took tliat i:;tatement. 
'By Mr. Bowles: I expected Mr. Allen to have that view 
of it, and we have the opposite view. Mr. Dawson repre-
sented Mr. Stillman. He was a lawyer who had previously 
represented Mr. Stillman. The fact that he was also repre-
sentin.9: an insurance company I think is improper in this 
ease. I would like to Imow thP. Court's ruling on that before 
I put Mr. Dawson on the witness stand. I would 
page 148 ~ like to liav-e Mr. Dawson's testimony taken, but 
whether taken before the jury that is our choice 
to make. I would like to make it now, if I can. 
By the Court : I think if he ~·oes on the stand they can 
inquire into his connections to show 'his bias. My present 
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intention is to allow the other side to make that examina-
tion as to whether that carrier was interested in this re-
covery; not just thaf he was representing an insurance com-
pany generally. If he took that statement in the interest 
of his employer in this case I expect to let that be shown. 
By Mr. Bowles: Under the circumstances, would your 
Honor permit us to except to your Honor's ruling and put 
Mr. Dawson's testimony on. I don't want to put his testi-
mony on in the presence of the jury, in the light of your 
Honor's ruling, of course. 
. By the Court : How do you propose to get that in Y It is 
a moot question until he becomes a witness. 
By Mr. Bowles: That is why I ask the Court's ruling· in 
advance. 
By the Court: I am indicating my ruling, but I cannot 
make any ruling positively until the po~nt arises. ~f you 
introduce him as a witnees I will allow Mr. Allen to cross-
examine him on his bias. 
By Mr. Bowles: I now state that I offer Mr. Dawson as a 
witness to deny tha.t statement of Mr. Williams, 
page 149 ~ and if the Court refuses to allow it for that pur-
pose alone, I will except to the Court's ruling, 
and if that is true I will not put Mr. Dawson on. 
By the Court: I cannot rule on a moot question. 
By Mr. Bowles: If there be any damage by the ruling, it 
is alreadv done and I cannot rectifv it. 
By the"' Court: If I make any mistake in letting that testi-
mony in, your remedy would be by appeal. 
By Mr. Bowles: On the other hand, I don't know what 
Mr. Allen will ask, therefore I ask the Court to allow us to 
put Mr. Dawson's evidence in out of the presence of the 
jury. Will the Court permit me to examine ·Mr. Dawson 
now, out of the presence of the jury, and Mr. Allen examine 
him, and not let the jury l1ear what he has testified Y 
By the Court: No, because I cannot base my ruling un-
less I know what he would say. 
By Mr. Bowles: Will your Honor give us a moment to 
confer! 
Bv the Court: Yes. By Mr. Bowles. (After conference): If your Honor please, 
in view of the Court's statement to me, I do not desire to 
put Mr. Dawson on in the presence of the jury. In order to 
get the record straight, I now ask the Court the privilege 
of putting in the record, out of the presence of the jury, 
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the report which Mr. Dawson would give, which 
page 150 ~ I avow to the Court is a denial of all the state- . 
ments by Mr. ·wmiams regarding the written 
statement as to the repres~ntations made by Mr. Dawson to 
him. 
By the Court: As I understand there has been no ruling. 
You stated you desired to put him on in reference to the 
statement, but without the right of the 'plaintiff to go into 
his other connections; but .at that stage Mr. Allen stated 
he desired to question him about his connections to show 
bias. I indicated, but I have not made a ruling, that I would 
allow 1\fr. Allen to go into that. Now there is no occasion 
for anything to be taken up out of th~ hearing of the jury. 
· By Mr. Bowles: Unless I offer the written report. 
Bv the Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Bowles: The reason I do not offer the written re-
port is the indication that you would permit Mr. Allen to 
go into the question of the insnranee, and as between the 
two dilemmas I choose to not put him on; but I would like 
the Court of Appeals to know what he said. 
By the Court: I ha.ve made no ruling. Merely for con-
venience, I have advised you what I expected to do. 
By Mr. Bowles: I cannot secure your ruling without put-
ting myself in that dilemma. 
By the. Court: There has been no ruling at this time. 
. By 1\fr. Bowles : There is a ruling by the Court 
page 151 ~ that I cannot introduce Mr. Dawson's testimony 
in the record without putting it in before the 
jury? 
By the Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Bowles: I except to the Court's ruling·. 
By the Court: Let the jury come in. 
Jury in. 
vV. MERCER STILLMAN, 
the defendant, being· first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Anderson: 
·Q. State your full name? 
A. "\V. Mercer Stillman. 
Q. "Where do you live? 
A. Longwood, Route 13, Richmond, Va. 
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Q. Are you employed by the Berlo Vending Company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is your job? 
A. District Manager of the said Berlo Vending Company, 
placing· the machines, servicing them, placing candy in them, 
&c. 
Q. Ancl you are in charge of the whole State of Virginia Y 
A. Yes. 
page 152 ~ Q. On February 14, 1941, were you out on the 
road for your employer Y 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. What time did you leave Richmond? 
A. It was between 6 :30 and quarter to 7 o'clock. 
Q. Where were you goingY 
A. I had a number of stops that day, Kenbridge, Victoria, 
Lynchburg, Roanoke, and other places. 
Q. You had not made any stops before this accident oc-
curred Y 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. ·Whom did you have in the car with you? 
A. Mr. Kay. 
Q. How much candy did you have in the car with you? 
A. I do not have any definite record of the a.mount of 
candy that I had at the time; but judging from the candy I 
use on those trips, the normal amount would be between 50 
and 60 boxes of candy, of an average of 8 pounds to the 
box. 
Q. Wnom did the car you were driving belong to f 
A. My wife and I. 
Bv the Court: 
·Q. Whom did you say? 
A. Ivly wife and I. 
Q ..• Jo0intly? 
A. Yes. 
pag·e 153 ~ By Mr. _.\.nderson: 
· Q. License issued in your name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What 8ort of weather was there that morning! 
A. It was a very foggy morning; had been raining; not 
raining all the time, but had rained a good bit. during the 
night; but very foggy in the morning. 
Q. What about your lights, did you have them on or notf 
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A. I put the lights on when I left home quite early in the 
morning and I left. them on. 
Q. As you drove on and approached this intersection, tell 
the jury if you lmow how fast you were -going? 
.A. I was not watching the speedometer and could not 
rightly say exactly how fast I was going; but I try at all 
times and was keeping my car under perfect control, and 
was keeping my 8peed in reference to the weather. 
Q. Can you estimate what your speed was? 
A. I judge I was going· between 40 and 45 miles an hour. 
Q. On which side of the road were you driving? 
A. I was driving on the right-hand side of the road. 
Q. As you approached this intersection what did you see? 
A. I don't recall seeing anything. As other witnesses have 
stated, my forehead was swollen and I do not recall any-
thing that happened on the road ten minutes before that. I 
was knocked unconscious; the first time I was 
page 154 r ever knocked that way; and I cannot recall see-
ing anything· in the road. 
· Q. By that do you mean you did not see anything, or just 
don't remember? 
A .. I just don't remember. . 
Q. When is the next time that you knew anythingT 
A. I come to some minutes later and the first thing I no-
ticed was Mr. Kay, who was riding with me, was gone from 
my car. I got out of my car and walked around and I asked 
what had become· of Mr. Kay, because I was concerned. 
Naturally, when you get out of a car you look down to see 
what you are stepping on and I saw a white line as I stepped 
out the left-hand door of mv car from under the wheel. 
Q. Did you look.around {hen? · · 
A. It is very hazy. I just got out the car and looked down 
and I don't recall that I looked around or what I did at the 
time. 
Q. Can you tell the jury of your own knowledge where 
your/car was located on the road with reference to this stop 
sign or anything after this accident? . 
A. When I stepped out the car and saw the white line by 
my car I have a faint recollection of seeing- a white sign 
opposite the rig·ht door of my ·car, which was standing 
open. 
page 155 r Q. Do you recall seeing the other car? 
A. I don't recall seeing· the car after the acci;. 
dent. 
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Q. Where were you taken after .the accident? 
.A. We were taken into Petersburg and we stopped there 
and inquired at the hospital at Petersburg and asked if Mr. 
Kay was there. They said the hospital was full and they 
had come on to Richmond with Mr. Kay, and we then pro-
ceeded on to the M~dical College Hospital at Richmond. 
Q. Did you receive proper medical aid? 
A. I did. 
Q. By whorni 
A. By a doctor. I don't recall his name. He came out to . 
the scene of the accident and put a patch over my knee and 
one over mv eve. 
Q. Diel you have any bones broken? 
A. They said my nose was broken at the Medical College 
of Virginia Hospital. 
Q. With reference to the damage to your automobile. I 
believe it was stipulated that it was $473. Is that correct? 
A. Yes; to the best of ·my knowledge it is. 
Q. After this accident occurred did you drive Mr. Wil-
liams the -plaintiff in this case, up to Blackstone? 
A. I did. 
Q. When was that? 
..A. I believe that was on Tuesday; about ten 
page 156 ~ or eleven days after the accident oc·cur:red. 
Q. Did you stop up there at the scene of the 
accident¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell the jury what was said and what happened? 
A. I don't recall exactly what was said, or what happened. 
We got out and looked around and observed the scene of the 
accident; but I don't recall any conversation we had at the 
time. 
Q. Did you ever have any talk with Mr ... Williams after the 
accident about the accident and whose fa.ult it was? 
A. As we were driving towards Blackstone on that after-
noon, Mr. ·wmiams seemed to be a. little worried. He said 
he had started to make the turn there and he was on the 
left side of tl1e road and he saw he was dead wrong at that 
time and if I had hit him then he was dead wrong and he 
tried to get back to the rig·ht, to pull on his-right side of the 
road. 
Q. Was anybody else in. the car at the time he made that 
st:;itementt 
A. No one but my son; he is only five years old. 
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Q. Tell the jury about any conversation that you had with 
Mr. Bruce at the hospital. Did you go to see him? 
A. Yes, I did. I don't recall exactly the word passed; but 
I was concerned about Mr. Bruce, since he was injured, and 
I hate to see' pepple injured, since I studied about 
page 157 ~ it five years. 
By the Court: That is irrelevant. 
A. I just went to look and to ask if he would like for my 
cl1ildren to sing for him. He said ]1e would and I asked if 
all right to say a prayer for him and he said yes. 
Q. Did you go to see Mr. Stallard at his place of business, 
his oflicef 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you make any statement to him up there about this 
accident? · 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you say, ''If M1·. Williams had had his lights on I 
could have seen him", and that "I had my lig:hts on. You 
know it was raining·". Diel you say those words? 
A. I could have said them. 
By tlle Court : 
· Q. Did you say them? 
.A.. I don't recall whether I did sav them or not; it has 
been quite some time ago. · 
Bv Mr. Anderson: 
"Q. You won't deny that you said those words? 
A. No, I do not. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Mr. Stillman, there has been some refer-
page 158 ~ ence made to a man by the name of Dawson, who 
went to the hospital and took some statements 
from Mr. Williams I believe and possibly went to the hos-
pitA.l to ~Pe M1·. Bruce. Did you go with Mr. Dawson 7 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you see him there? 
A. No, I_ did not. . 
Q. Diel you lmow he was g-oing· at the time Y 
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A. No. 
Q. Did you leave Richmond that morning going· towards 
Blackstone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did vou start your journey from Richmond Y 
A. From my home, 7620 Sweet Briar Road, Longwood. 
Q. What part of Richmond is that in Y 
A. W~st end of Richmond; just off Pattreson Avenue, past 
Three Chopt Road. 
Q. A little off Patterson Avenue! 
A. Yes. 
Q. E;ow far was it from the city limits as they existed at 
that time! 
A. I could pot tell you exactly. 
Q. Was it outside Richmond city limits then 1 
A. Yes; it was and still is. 
, Q. Did you go across the Boulevard Bridge, 
page 159 ~ or go through downtown Y · 
A. I went across the Lee Bridge. 
Q. You came downtown and went across the Lee Bridge? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. What time did you leave your home Y 
A. Between 6 :30 and 7. 
Q. W11at time did you leave Richmond proper? 
A. I don't recall; I did not make any record. 
Q. Did you not tell Mr. Stallard on the occasion you men-
tioned a while ago that you left Richmond about 7 o'clock Y 
A. I said I did not deny the statement; but I don't recall 
what I said at the time. 
Q. Did you not say you left Richmond about 7 o'clock Y 
A. I don't recall making that statement. 
Q. Did you not tell Mr. Stallard you had gone about 55 
miles! 
A. I believe I said I did not remember that I told Mr. 
Stallard that. I don't clenv that ·1 told Mr. Stallard that. 
Q. Did you go through the City of Petersburg! · 
A. I did not go through the city proper. 
Q. You went across the Appomattox Bridge Y 
A. Yes, but did not go through Sycamore Street. 
Q. You went on through a back street there Y 
A. Yes, a back stteet; no traffic. 
Q. How many stop lights did you pass going t?rough 
Petersburg? 
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A. I did not go through any stop lights. All 
page 160 ~ the lights were green when I passed by them. 
Q. As I recall, you don't remember seeing 
much of the accident at alU 
A. That is exactly right. 
Q. You undertook to state you saw a white line when you 
stepped out the car Y 
A. That was after the accident, if you please. 
Q. What is the last thing you remember after the acci-
dent? 
A. The lick I received on the ·head. 
Q. You can't say you saw Mr. Williams after the accident t 
A. No. 
Q. And, you can't remember where the collision was Y 
A. Other than mv car was on the right side opposite the 
stop sign. · 
Q. We are talking about memory now and immediately be-
fore the cars came together, ·can you. remember where your · 
car wasY 
A. No. 
Q. And you can't remember where Mr. Williams' car was Y 
A. :N"o, sir. · 
Q. Was there anything in the highway to prevent you from 
seeing Mr. ,vmiams' car, if it was in the mtersection when 
you approached the intersection f · 
A. I cannot recall anything that happened for some min-
utes previous to the accident. 
Q. You have been there since and have seen 
page 161 ~ the intersection since f 
A. Yes ; I have seen pictures of it today. 
Q. You remember how the intersection looked the . last 
time you sa:w iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. With reference to the intersection the last time you 
saw it, if a man is in the intersection, turning, or fixing to 
turn, is there anything as you approach the intersection to 
keep you from seeing· him? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember the occasion on which yo_u took Mr. 
Williams up to Blackstone; I believe your little boy was with 
you? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember telling· Mr. Williams on that occasion 
you did not see him until you were right on top of him and 
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your little boy said, "What do you mean by right on top of 
him f '' and you said, '' Rig·ht there'' Y . 
A. I don't recall it. · 
Q. You ·don't deny it? 
A. No. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
Bv the Court: At this time we will take a recess until 10 
o'clock in the morning, May 13, 1942. 
page 162 ~ May 13, 1942. 10 o'clock A. M:. 
At this point the hearing of this suit was resumed, with the 
same parties present. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. I~ your Honor please, in the light of certain questions 
asked ]\fr. Stillman by Mr. Allen, we would like to call Mr. 
Charles 0. Dawson. · 
By the Court: All right. 
CHARLES 0. DAWSON, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendants, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. Are you Mr. Charles 0. Dawson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are a practicing attorney, Mr. Dawson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where do you have your office? 
A. 307 American Bank Building·, Richmond, Va. 
Q. Are you the Mr. Dawson who on behalf of 
page 163 ~ Mr. Mercer Stillman took this statement from 
Mr. C. Vv. Williams on February 15th, and whose 
name is signed as witness thereto? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I hand you this statement, which is filed as "Defend-
ant's Ex. ,No. 1 '', so you can refer to it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Dawson, what was the first notice that you had of 
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the fact that Mr. Stillman had been in an accidenU 
A. On -Saturday morning I had a telephone call from a 
neig·hbor of Mr. ,Stillman. He told me that Mr. Stillman 
had been involved in an accident the day before and was 
rather seriously injured, and that Mr. Stillman was in the 
hospital. He told me that Mr.· Kay's brother-in-law, Mr. 
Kay, was riding· with Mr. Stillman. He told me that there 
were two cars involved and asked me to look into it and in-
vestigate it for him. 
· Q. Had you seen any report of the accident in the morn-
ing newspaper? 
A. Yes; there was a notice in the paper, which stated that 
the injured parties were in the hospital. 
Q. Did that morning newspaper tell who was in the hos-
pital for treatment f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you go to the hospital t 
A. I then called Mr. Stillman's home and talked 
page 164 ~ with Mrs. Stillman. :She told me her husband had 
been brought home from the hospital and was 
in a serious condition and could not talk with anyone. She 
told me Mr. Stillman's brother-in-law was in a serious con-
dition in the hospital; so I went on up to the hospital. 
Q. When you went to the hospital whom did you go to 
see? 
A. I went to see Mr. Kay, but could not see him. 
Q. Whyf 
A. He was in the ward, but at that time was in the operat-
ing room ancl having· a cast or something put on and I could 
not see him. 
Q. Did you see any of the other people involved in the ac-
cident that morning? 
A. I went to see the other people. They were all in one 
room. I went in the room, and Mr. ·Williams, Mr. Bruce, Jr., 
and Mr. Williams, Jr., were there. I spoke to Mr. ·Williams 
and told him I was ]\fr. Stillman's attorney and had just 
seen an account of the accident. He told me to sit clown and 
introduced me to his son and Mr. Bruce, Jr. We talked 
about the accident a few minutes and then Mr. Bruce, Jr., 
took me across the hall and introduced me to his father. Mr. 
Bruce was rather seriously injured and did not know much 
about the accident. As a matter of fact, I did not talk to him. 
about the accident. I told him I would talk to 
page 165 ~ him at a later date and inquire about the acci-
dent. I also went to see Mr. McGee. He was 
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an elderly man, rather hard· of hearing. I told him I would 
see him later. I went to Mr. Williams at that time and those 
people told me they did .not know how long they would stay 
in Virginia; that they wanted to go back to 'North Carolina. 
I told them I would see them later and talk to them about 
the accident. After getting· ·some information, I asked Mr. 
Williams would he let me take a written statement of the 
accident and he said yes. I sat by the bed and wrote the 
statement we have before us. Then the question of a dia-
gram came up. · I drew three or four different ones and each 
time it was not right. Finally Mr. Williams and, I believe, 
the two young men helped with. the diagram. They niade a 
rough sket.ch; then I drew the diagram in the statement; 
put the cars in there as. I was told. The statement was read 
to Mr. Williams in the presence of both, or one of the young 
men. I changed one word, "quite" to "slightly". He ap-
proved that. We went over that statement. After I read 
it over, I gave it to Mr. "Williams and he read it himself, and 
he sig·ned the statement. I am not sure, but I think one or 
both of the young· men were in the room. I told them if they 
went home, to North -Carolina, they could communicate at a 
later date with me. That is about all that happened at that 
time. 
page 166 ~ Q. How promptly did you leave after he signed 
the statement? 
A. I stayed there for fifteen or twenty minutes. After we . 
talked about the accident, he told me that his son and Mr. 
Bruce's son were .law students-I don't know whether they 
were still students at the time, or had been. Mr. Williams 
was very courteous at all times and no fuss. 
Q. How long did you stay there and talk to Mr. Williams 
and the other gentlemen; then went out to Mr .. Bruce's room 
and then came back and wrote the statement and corrected 
it and changed the diagram several times? 
A. The overall time I was n the hospital at that time was 
about two hours and one hour and twenty-five minutes, prob-
ably, spent with Mr. Williams. 
0. Mr. Daw·son, did you. in your conversation with Mr. 
Wil1iams tell him that if he would sign the statement that 
you would promise to pay him something? 
.Pi.. :N'o, sir. . 
Q. Did you tell him that the statement had to be signed in 
order for you to pay him something·f · 
A. No, .sir. 
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Q. Did you by any means, either threats, or intimidation, 
or inducement undertake to induce Mr. Williams to give you 
this statement, or sign it, or anything· of that sort Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 167 } Q. Did you promise to giye Mr. Wi1liams a 
copy of this sta~ement and then refuse to give it 
to him? 
A. I was not asked to give him a copy of the statement. 
If I had been asked I would have made a copy and given. it 
to him. · , 
Q. Mr. Dawson, in regard to the statement, itself, on page 
1 of the statement, which is four pages long, I note that there 
is a change in this sentence-I wi11 read it as it originally 
was and then as it was changed-''The roads were wet and 
it was quite foggy". The· change is that the word "quite" 
is scratched over and the word "slightly'' is written above. 
Who directed that change Y 
A. Mr. Williams. 
Q. Who made the change? 
A. I made the change. 
Q. When you read that corrected thing back to him did you 
read "slightly'' or did you read ''quite"? · 
.A.. ''Slightly.'' 
Q. Then, I understand you to say, Mr. Williams read the 
whole thing over, himself, as much as he chose and then 
signed iU 
A. That is 1·ight. 
Q. Was he in bed! 
A. Yes. 
Q. What physical motion did he go through in 
page 168 ~ signin~· it? 
A. ls I recall, his bed was wound up a little 
biU 
Q. The back of it, the headboard? 
A. Yes, and he held it in his hands and laid it on his knee 
and signed it. 
Q. On page 3 I read the change made on that page as it 
appeared originally and then in its changed form: '' The 
only conversation I had with the other driver was that I 
stated to him he was rnnni.ng sixty miles per hour. He said 
·he was not going sixty miles and thought he may have been 
doing fifty-five miles per· hour". This is the statement in 
its present form and then its changed form: '' The only con-
versation I had with the other driver was that . I stated to 
him he was running sixty miles per hour. He said would you 
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swear to that. I replied, '' I couldn't''. He said he thought 
he was not going more than 55 miles per hour.'' Who di-
rected that change? 
.A. Mr. Williams. 
. Q. vVho made the change¥ 
.A. I made the change. 
Q. Did Mr. ,vmiams read the statement as it is now in 
the present form Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were. there any other changes in the form from what 
it is now1 
A. None whatever. 
page 169 ~ Q. Mr. Dawson on page 2 appears this state-
ment: '' I did not give any arm or hand or any 
signals for a left turn." Did Mr. Williams make that state-:-
ment to you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he make it verbally? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Did he see it written down here?. 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the same page appears this statement: "This car 
was about 30-50 feet from me." In reference to the previ-
ous statement: "When the left side of my car was heading 
northeast in making the turn and the left side of -my car 
about 4 feet north or across the outer lane, a Ford coming 
from Petersburg or east to west, or coming from the opposite 
direction I was traveling, before starting my tlilrn, came into 
view. This car was about 30-50 feet from me.'' Did he 
make that statement to vou? 
A. "'Y"es, sir. w 
Q. Did he make it verbally¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you read it to him? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. I have already asked you about the changes in the state-
ment, and I now want to ask you about the diagram. In the 
diagram it. shows the dotted line behind the left 
pag·e 170 ~ rear wheel of M:r. Williams' car. Was that dotted 
line put down there in accordance with Mr. Wil-
liams' direction, or in accordance with his agreement Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Dawson, at the time that you went to see Mr. Wil-
liams, on that morning, whatever day of week it was-morn-
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ing· of February 15th, 1941, were you then. representing the 
Berlo Vending· Company in the investigation? 
A. No, sir. · ! 
Q. You subsequently looked after their interest, did you 
not? 
A. I did, yes, sir. 
Q. In the investigation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By l\fr. Allen: 
Q. l\fr. Dawson, I understand you to say that you are an 
attorney-at-law? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where are you from? 
A. Do you mean where I was born? 
Q. Where did you come from to Richmond? 
A. Pennsylvania. 
Q. How long have you been living in Richmond? 
A. Since :March, 1939. 
page 171 ~ Q. Been here then about two years? 
A. Three years. 
Q. Are you a member of the City Bar Association? 
A. No, I don't believe I am. I paid my bar fees and I am 
a member of the Virginia State Bar. 
Q. A member of the Virginia State Bar, in which, you have 
to pav a fee? 
A. i pay, something every year. 
Q. I know you pay the State Bar dues. I mean do you pay 
a license to the City of Richmond f 
A. No, sir. 
Q . .So, you are not an attorney-at-law qualified to prac-
tice in the City of R.fohmond, or the State of Virginia? 
A. I handle some matters in the City of Richmond. 
Q. You have not paid the City license, or the State license? 
A. I am a member of the State Bar of Virginia and pay 
the fees. 
Q. You pay a membership fee? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you pay the State of Virginia any State license? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you pay a license tax based on your income Y 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. So, then, when you went to see Mr. Williams ·and made 
the statement in the presence of ,Mr. Bruce and 
page 172 r Mr. Williams' son that you were an attonrny-at-
law, representing Mr. Stillman, that was not true, 
was iU 
By Mr. Bowles: I object, if your Honor please. I don't 
think going into the question of whether a. man pays his 
license fee makes him a lawyer, or not. 
B'y the Court: I think that is a question of law, Mr. Allen. 
Q. ~s a matter of fact, Mr. Stillman did not know when 
you went to see Mr. Williams, did he? 
.A. That I don't know. I received this telephone message 
Saturday morning. 
Q. From whom! 
A. From a neig·hbor of Mr. Stillm~n, a man I did not know 
at that time, but have since met" him. 
Q. As a matter of fact, when you went there to get this 
statement, you were in the employ-
By Mr. Bowles (interposing): I object. 
By the Court: Let the attorney finish his question and 
the attorney can then make his objection. 
By Mr. Bowles: It is the comment in the question that I 
object to. 
By the Court: I don't know whether the question is right 
or not until I hear the question. 
Q. (continued): of the insurance company car-
page 173 ~ rying the public liability and property damage in-
surance on the car which Stillman was driving at 
the time of t11e wreck? 
By Mr. Bowles: I object, if your Honor please, on several 
grounds. I attempted to object before I heard the word "in-
surance'', so the Court would be· in the JJosition that even 
if the Court were to rule in my favor the jury would not hear 
the word "insurance". 
Second, I object on the ground that there is no possible 
basis for the introduction by the plaintifl:i in the case of the 
word "immrance ", because any reasonable bias that the jurv 
might believe has already been shown by Mr. Dawson ;hen 
he testified that he was interested in Mr. Stillman's investi-
gation of this accident, and I submit to the· Court that the 
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injection of insurance on top of that cannot possibly aid the 
jury in finding any further bias and would be introduced 
solely for the purpose of influencing the jury to give an im-
proper verdict. . 
By the Court: The objection is overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception. 
By Mr. Allen: Will the stenographer repeat the question Y 
Q. As a matter of fact, when you went there to get this 
statement you were in the employ of the insur-
page 17 4 r ance company carrying the public liability and 
property damage insurance on the car which 
Stillman was driving at the time of the wreck? 
A. In order to answer that I might have to enlarge a little 
bit. When this telephone call came in I did not have any 
knowledge that Stillman was insured with us. It subsequently 
developed, when a wire came after I had gone to the hospital 
in answer to this telephone call, that the insurance had been 
carried by our company and that it was issued from Phila-
delphia. That is why I had no knowledge of it. 
By the Court: I have not heard your answer to the ques-
tion. -
A. The question was did I not go there for the insurance 
company. · · 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. You understand, I did not ask you in the question if you 
went there in behalf of the .insurance company. The ques-
tion was, if at the time you were not in the employ of the in-
surance company carrying the insurance on the car 7 
By Mr. Bowles: May I he understood, your Honor, as ob-
jecting to this question on the grounds that I have previously 
stated. 
By Witness: May I have that question repeated again y 
By Mr. Allen: Read both questions. 
page 175 ~ Stenograph_er reads: 
Q. As ·a matter of fact, when you went there to get this 
statement, you were in th.e employ of the insurance company 
carrying the public liability· and property damage insurance 
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on the car which Stillman was driving at the time of the 
wreckf-
Q.. You understand, I did not ask you in the question if you 
went there in behalf of the insurance company. The question 
was, if at the time you were not in the employ of the insur-
ance .company carrying the insurance on the car Y 
A. That is rather difficult to answer. At the time I went 
to the hospital I was employed by an insurance company. 
Whether the insurance company had the automobile policy I 
did not know. 
Q. At the time you were in the hospital did you not give 
young :M:r. Bruce your card stating what insurance company 
you were employed by Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was not this insurance company on that card? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. And you tell the jury yon did not know whether you 
represented that insurance company, or noU 
A. That is quite true. 
Q. You have not at any time notified any of 
page 176 ~ the officials of this court, or in any way endeav-
ored to have your name put on the papers to 
show that you represented Mr. Stillman, have you y 
A.. ·what is that question Y 
Q. You have not notified in any way any court official that 
you represented Mr. Stillman and your name is not on the 
papers? 
A. No. What papers do you refer to? 
Q. The court papers Y 
A. No. 
Q. When you took the statement of Mr. Williams did you 
have a carbon with vou? 
A.. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did you make some carbons Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many carbons? 
A. Original and two carbons. 
Q. Why did you not give Mr. Williams a copy¥ 
A. He did not ask me for one. 
Q. Did not Mr. Williams tell you he would sign the state-
ment if you would give him a copy of it in the presence of 
young· Mr. Bruce and young Mr. Williams y 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Did not Mr. Williams state he would sign the state-
ment if you would give him a copy and was not 
page 177 }- that statement made by Mr. Williams in the pres-
Iiams? 
ence of young Mr. Bruce and young Mr. Wil-
A. As I said, two were present in the room, one or two 
young men at the time. 
Q. Was not that statement made before Mr. Williams 
signed the statement t 
.A. ]\fr. Williams never asked me to give him a copy of the 
statement. 
Q. I asked you was not the statement made by Mr. Wil-
liams that he would sig·n the statement if you would give him 
a copy? 
A. ,No, sir. 
Q. Did not Mr. Williams sign the three copies? 
A. I don't know. Sometimes they sign them and some-
times they sign the original and I doI].'t use the carbon. 
Q. Did he not sign the original and two carbon copies? 
A. I could not answer that right now. I am only inter-
ested in the original. . 
Q. So, you don't know whether he signed the two carbon 
copies or not 1 
A. Definitely, I don't know. If he signed the two ca-rbons 
he may have signed them with the two carbons between. 
Q. Immediately the statements were signed you left the 
hospital and did not give Mr. Williams a copy? 
.A. On the contrary, that is not true. 
page 178 ~ Q. Did you give him a copy1 
A. He did not ask for a copy. 
Q. vVas the statement written in your language, or did you 
take down Mr. ·wmiams' dictation¥ 
.A. He did not dictate the words, but I tried to put it down 
in words that met his approval. 
Q. You discussed the matter with 1\fr. Williams and you 
summed up the words used by Mr. ,vmiams and reduced to 
writing the words in your own language; is not that true? 
A. Not exactly. 
Q. What did you do? 
.A. May I refer to this statemenU 
Q. Yes¥ 
A. The statement reads: "My name is Columbus Wil-
liams, age 58." I don't know how that could be written' any 
other way. 
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Q. Would you say those· are the exact words that Mr. Wil-
liams used? 
A. I asked him what his name was. He .said, Columbus 
Williams. I asked how old he was. He said, 58. I asked 
where he lived. He said, Boone, North Carolina. 
Q. So, you did not put any of your questions down. You 
put down, '' My name is Columbus Williams, age 58. I live 
· at Boone, N ort)l Carolina' 'Y 
page 179 ~ Q. Let us take the next sentence : '' On Feb-
ruary 14, 1941, about.8:30 A. M. I was driving 
my 1939 Buick, accompanied by Joe McGee and Luther 
Bruce, when involved in an accident at U. ,S. Va. 460 and a 
Virginia highway cross-road leading to Spainville. '' Is that 
sentence word for word, as taken by dictation, the language 
of Williams, or is it the substance of what Mr. Williams 
said, but in your own language~ 
A. It is not as dictated word for word. 
Q. Then, it must be the substance as you understood it, 
reduced to words in your own language f 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. Is it not a fact that instead of Mr. Williams telling you 
the accident happened at 8 :30, he told you it happened from 
8 to 8:30Y 
A. I asked him what time it happened and I put down, from 
what he said, about 8 :30. The word "about'' is in there. 
Q. ''I was going toward Petersburg or east on Route 460.'' 
Are those your words, or Mr. Williams' f 
A. I don't know. The man was going towards Petersburg 
and he was traveling on Route 460. 
Q. Why did you put the statement he was going towards 
Blackstone t 
A. That is an error. The "A" and "C" in the diagram 
should be reversed. As I explained before, the 
page 180 r diagram was made four or five different times 
and I had never been to the scene of the accident, 
nor familiar with the accident, and it was difficult to place 
the automobiles as Mr. Williams told me on the diagram. 
Mr. ·Williams and, I believe, Mr. Bruee sketched the diagram, 
as they were familiar with the place, and I made the diagram. 
There is an error there. The ''A'' should be ''C '' and where 
the "C'' is should be "A". 
Q. At the bottom of the diagram you have a statement: 
"Th<J above diagram shows my car as car A." Is that Mr. 
Williams speaking! 
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.A.. 1:es, sir. · 
Q. And you asked Mr. ·Williams to sign that statement 
showing his car going towards Blackstone, when, as a mat-
ter of fact, it was going in the opposite direction Y 
A. That was an error. · 
Q. Did ]\fr. Williams read that statement Y 
A. 1: es, sir. 
Q. He read it and signed it with that error in it Y 
A. 1: es, sir. 
Q. Oo back where you left off: '' The roads were wet and 
it was slightly foggy/' Are they the words of Mr. Williams, 
taken from dictation, or are they the substance of what Mr. 
Williams told you, as you understood it Y 
A. I asked Mr. Williams whether it was rain-
page 181 ~ ing, dry or the roads were wet. He said it was 
quite foggy, and I put it '' quite foggy" and he 
asked that it be changed to ''slightly fogg-y'' and I changed 
it to "slightly fog·gy~'. 
Q. I asked you whether they were the words of Mr. Wil-
liams, or the substance of what Mr. Williams said, reduced 
to writing in your languageY · 
.lt. It WM the substance of what Mr. Williams said that I 
reduced to writing in my language. 
Q. '' The cross road did not intersect at right angies, but 
extended from northeast to southwest." I take it that sen-
tence is not in the language of Mr. Williams, but is the sub-
. stance of what he said, reduced to writing in your language, 
and that it does describe the conditions at that intersection Y 
A. 1: es, sir. 
Q. '' As I neared the intersection I pulled close to the cen-
ter of the road." Is that your languag·e or Mr. Williams'? 
A. I think you did not read that correctly. 
Q. '' As I neared the intersection I pulled close to the cen-
ter of the road." Is that the way you had it V 
A. Wait a minute. I don't see that on here. 1:ou skipped 
something. ''Slightly fop:gy. I did not have on any lights. 
As I came to a cross-road I .slowed up. The road is a two-
lane highway." 
page 182 ~ By Mr. Bowles: Did you skip that, Mr. Allen, 
or did Mr. Dawson skip it? 
By Mr. Allen: I skipped it. 
By J\fr. Bowles: He did not make a mistake, did heT 
By Mr. Alle:p: No. 
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By Mr. Allen: 
Q. The next is, "'I did not have on any lights". Is that 
your language, or Mr. '\Villiams't 
A. Frankly, I don't know how that CQuld be described dif-
ferently. I asked hini if he had on any lights and he said, 
no. I put it, "I did not _have on any lights". 
Q. "As I came to a cross-road I slowed up." Is that your 
languag·e or Mr. Williams' t · 
A. That is, in substance, his language. 
Q. "The road is a two-lane highway." Is that your lan-
guage, or Mr. Williams'! · 
A. That is purely his language. I did not know whether 
it was a two, three, four or :five-lane highway. 
Q. '' The cross-road did not intersect at right angles, but 
extended from northeast to southwest.'' You have already 
stated that was the substance of the language as Mr. Wil-
liams gave it to you. '' As I neared the intersection I pulled 
close to the center of the road.''? 
A. He said as he got close to the intersection he pulled 
toward the center of the road. 
page 183 ~ Q. Is that the substance of what he said, or 
his language as dictated to you? 
A. He said he pulled to the center of the road and I put 
that do:wn there. · 
Q. Do you take shorthand? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. The next sentence is, "I did ·not see any cars coming 
from any direction." Is that tl1e substance of what he stated, 
or is that the exact language as taken from dictation? 
A. It is the substance of what he stated. 
Q. As a matter of fact, did he not tell you that he looked 
twice in every direction and that just before he turned left 
to make his final turn across the white line he looked to his 
right and did not see any car, and after he had gotten over 
a few feet back to his right again there was the car? 
A. No. sir. 
Q. Did you not find l\fr. Williams very cordial? 
A. Yes, very cordial. 
Q. Did he not tell you what I have just stated 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. All he said was, '' I did not see any cars coming from 
anv direction.''? 
A. At that point in the center of the road he did not see 
any cars; later, when he went to make his turn, he told me he 
did not see-
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page 184 r Q. (interposing): I asked ·you, is that all he 
· said, '' I did not see any cars coming in any di-
rection. '' 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is the substance of what he said? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. '' I did not g·ive any arm or hand or any signals for a 
left turn.'' Is that Mr. Williams' exact language, or is that 
the substance of what Mr. "Williams said, reduced to your own 
language! 
A. In response to my question whether he gave any arm 
or hand signals he said he gave no arm or hand signals for 
a left turn. 
Q. In other words; that is the substance of what he said, 
reduced to your own language! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not put down any of your questions, did you Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. '' I started to make my left turn going· not more than 
20-25 miles per hour." Is that your lang11age or Mr. Wil-
liams'? 
A. I asked how fast he was going·, he stated he was going 
20 to 25 miles per hour. 
Q. Do you mean to say he stated that when he started to 
make that left turn that he was going 20 to 25 miles an hour? 
By :Wir. Bowles: That is arg11mentative. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
page 185, r Q. I asked you : '' I started to make my left 
turn going not more than 20 to 25 miles per 
hour.'' Is that your language or is every word of it the 
words of Mr. Williams? 
A. It was in response to the question I asked him at what 
speed he was going when he went to make his left turn. 
Q. I want to know whether every word of that sentence 
is the language of Mr. Williams ta.ken from dictation, or is 
the substance of what he said put in your own language? 
A. The substance of what ]\fr. Williams said, reduced to 
writing. 
Q. '' When the left side of my car was heading northeast 
in making the turn and the left side of my car about 4 feet 
north or across the out.er lane, a Ford coming from Peters-
burg or east to west, or coming from the opposite direction 
I was traveling before starting my turn, came into view." 
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Now, is that log sentence taken from Mr. Williams' dicta-
tion, word for word, or the substance of what he said, put 
in your own language f 
By Mr. Bowles: Your Honor, I read that sentence to Mr. 
Williams and he said it was correct in every detail. I object 
to the question. 
By the Court: The objection is overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles : I note an exception. 
A. In order to answer that question, I think a word of ex-
planation might be necessary. 
By the Court: Yon can ·answer the question 
page 186 ~ first and then give your explanation. 
A. It was the sum and substance of what Mr. Williams told 
me, reduced to writing, and I put it that way for the follow-
ing reasons: I wanted to definitely establish the direction 
of these automobiles and what way they were going and com-
ing. Mr. Williams' statement to me was sometimes difficult 
to understand which way the cars were proceeding. Mr. Wil-
liams said, ''When the left side of my car was heading north-
east in making the turn and the left side of my car''-the 
highway runs g·enerally east and west--the left side of the 
road would be north of the center line-'' about 4 feet north, or 
across the -outer lane'', a Ford coming· from Petersburg· or 
east, or coming "from the opposite direction' '-I put those 
three things in there so there would be no confusion-'' com-
ing from f1·oni the opposite direction I was traveling before 
starting my turn, eame into view". · 
Q. Is it not a fact that Mr. Williams told you that his 
car was from two to four feet, instead of four feet, as you 
have it here, across the white line? . 
A. As I recall it, this is just what he told me. 
Q. Now, your next sentence is, '' This car was about 30 to 
50· feet from me''. I take it vou meant there that sentence 
to be taken in connection with the previous sentence that 
when Mr. Williams undertook to make ·the left 
·page 187 ~ turn the Ford car was 30 to · 50 feet from him. Is 
· that the impression you intended to maket 
By Mr. Bowles: I don't think that question is fair. l\fr. 
Allen's question is not inclusive of the previous sentence. I 
think in fairness to Mr. Dawson it should state, relating to 
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where the car was at a time when Mr. Williams' car was about 
4 feet northeast. 
By Mr. Allen: I withdraw· the question. 
Q. Mr. Dawson, I ask you to read the s~ntence: ''.This 
car was about 30 to 50 feet from me." Then· read the sen-
tence next preceding that? 
A. '' When the left side of mv car''-
Q. (interposing) Just read it to yourself. There is no 
sense reading it.aloud, unless you want toY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Taking .those two sentences together, did you intend to 
create the impression by making this statement that when 
Mr. Williams started to make his left turn the Stillman au-
tomobile was 30 to 50 ·feet from him Y 
By Mr. Bowles: I object. I don't think. it is fair to put 
this witness in the position that he intended to create any im-
pression. Mr. Dawson stated, "It is exactly what Mr. Wil-. 
Iiams told me''. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
page 188 ~ Q. Then, I understand you to say that when 
Mr. Williams started to make this turn 1\fr. Still-
man's car was 30 to 50 feet from him f 
A.. Yes, eir. 
Q. Is it not fact that if Mr. Williams used any figures there 
at all, he was very indefinite and the whole conversation was 
about the· intersection which was mentioned just preceding 
that sentence, and the 30 to 50 feet related to 30 to 50 feet 
beyond the intersection? 
A. As I stated before, we discussed this matter at length, 
before I asked him if I could reduce it to writing, and he 
then stated in answer to my question where his car was when 
he first saw the F'ord what I have stated in the two sentences 
preceding the statement about the Ford being 30 to 50 feet 
from him, and stated "This car was 30 to 50 feet from me". 
Q. The two sentences, as I understand you to say, are in 
your own language f_rom what you understood Mr. Williams 
to say? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I asked you if immediately before you got that infor-
mation did not Mr. Williams tell you about the intersection 
and the center of the intersection and stated that 30 to 50 
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feet as related to that intersection as beyond the intersec-
ion? 
page 189 ~ A. That was not my understanding at the time 
I was talking· to Mr. Williams. 
Q. Continuing you say, "At that time I was right at the 
turn or intersection''. Is that Mr. ·wmiams' language or 
your language 1 
A. It was his language as to the position of his car when 
he saw the oth~r car and I wrote it down that way, he was 
right at the turn or intersection when he saw the other car. 
Q. Did he tell you he had commenced to turn before he saw 
the other car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he tell you he had commenced to turn before the 
other car came into view? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then you say, '' A second later the front of the Ford 
car struck the front of my car". Is that your language or 
Mr. Williams'? 
A. It is in response to the question what happened there 
and he said the accident occurred. I asked him how long, or 
how much time elapsed and he said only a split second. I did 
not know any other word than to say "A second later". 
Q. Mr. Dawson, without questioning· you any further as to 
whether any particular lang1iage was Mr. Williams' or yours, 
the fact is this entire statement of what Mr. Wil-
page 190 ~ Iiams said is the substance of what he said as you 
understood it-1 reduced to your .language? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Let us get a little,further-you say: '' The only conver-
sation I had with the other driver was that I stated to him 
he was running sixty miles per hour. He said, would you 
swear to that. I replied, 'I couldn't'. He said he thought 
he was not going more than 55 miles per hour.'' Is it not a 
fact that Mr. ·wmiams told you Mr. Stillman was running 
from sixty to ninety miles an hour and you stated sixty? 
A. No, Mr. Williams stated the only conversation he had 
with the other driver driver was I told him he was running 
sixty miles an hour, and he said, '' He was not sure, but he 
thought he may have been going fifty-five". Mr. Williams 
asked that that be changed to read, "I stated to him he was 
running sixty miles an hour, and he said, 'Would you swear 
to that?' Mr. Williams replied, 'I could not'. He said he 
thought he was g·oing not more than fifty-five miles an hour.'' 
That statement was made at the request of Mr. Williams. 
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Q. Did not Mr. Williams tell you, "At the time of the col-
lision all four of my wheels were across or on the north 
side of the road and my car was almost straight east''? 
A. Yes; that is referring to the diagram. 
Q. If you look at your diagram and change the 
page 191 } designation of the cars and put'' A'' on Mr. Still-
man's car and "C'' on Mr. Williams' car, which 
you say would be correct, you do not place Mr. Williams' 
car all four wheels 011 the north side of the road. If you 
change the designation of the automobiles, as you have them 
here, you have Mr. ·wmiams' car going towards Blackstone, 
when, as a matter of fact, it was g·oing towards Petersburg. 
As a matter of fact, "A" which is designated as l\,Ir. Wil-
liams ' car, should be '' C '', is that rig·ht Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You think that is about the position of the cars Y 
A. We drew that four or five times and that is a copy of my 
diagram. 
Q. How long haye you been adjusting for insurance com-
panies Y 
By ].\fr. Bowles: Is that material, your Honor¥ 
By the Court: I don't see the materiality. 
By Mr~ Allen: All right; I strike that. 
Q. Did you not know, as an experienceq. adjuster (I will 
call you that, if I may) that putting the Stillman car within 
30 to 50 feet of the Williams' car wl1en Williams undertook 
'to make the turn would absolutely relieve your company? Is 
not that a facU 
By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor please, I think that is ask-
ing· Mr. Dawson for an answer to a question of law. I submit 
that to the Court. 
page 192 r By the Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Mr. Dawson, did you get any permission from the hos-
pital to see Mr. Williams that morning? 
A. Yes; it was the first time I had been to the new hos-
pital and I asked where these people were and I went up-
stairs. 
Q. I mean did you get any permission from the people at 
the hospital to g·o to that room where these people were over 
there? · 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. When you were taking this statement, did not young· Mr. 
Bruce and young Mr. Williams make objection, stating Mr. 
Williams was not able or in a condition to make a statement? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you not have some difficulty in getting Mr. Wil-
liams to understand the questions and did you not have to 
repeat the questions at times? 
A. No. Young Mr. ·wmiams and young Mr. Bruce were 
very helpful in fixing the diag-ram, &c. 
Q. When Mr. Bruce made some statement there did you not 
get right irritated and say, '' This statement has to be signed 
today''? 
A. No; neither of us got irritated that day. . 
Q. I asked you, did you l)ot make this statement, '' This 
statement has to be signed today"? 
A. I made no such statement. 
page 193 ~ Q. You stated at first tha.t you represented Mr. 
Stillman. I ask you if it is not a fact that the in-
surance is not even carried in Mr. Stillman's name? 
By Mr. Bowles : If your Honor please, I don't think that 
is proper, how insurance is carried, or not. 
By the Court: The objection is overruled. 
By Mr .. Bowles: I note an exception. 
A. The insurance is carried in Mr. Stillman's name. 
Q. It isY . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Berl~ Vending Company took it out, did they noU 
By j\fr. ·Bowles: I object again as to who took out the insur-
ance. 
By the Court: The objection is overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception~ 
Q. Do you know who the insured is, that is what I am 
getting atY 
By Mr. Bowles: I object to that. 
By the ·Court: The objection is. overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception. 
A. Mercer -Stillman is the insured. 
Q. I mean the name of the insured in the policy? 
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By lVIr. Bowles: If your Honor please, it has already been 
testified. that the automobile was registered in the 
page 194 ~ name of Mr. Stillman and it was in Mr. Stillman's 
name. I object to it on that ground. 
By the Court: Objection overruled.· 
By Mr. Bowles: I note an exception. 
A. The policy is written in the name of Mr. Stillman. 
RE.;DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: 
Q. I believe you stated to Mr. Allen that this statement 
was the responses of Mr. Williams to your questions? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Allen has asked you several times as to whether 
the statements were the substance of what Mr. Williams told 
you or the words as he dictated them to you. Where you 
have in the statement the words in quotation marks, where 
he said to you, '' The only conversation I had with the other 
driver was that I stated to him he was running sixty miles 
per hour. He said would you swear to that. I replied, 'I 
couldn't'. He said he thought he was not going more than 
55 miles per hour.''-where you -quote the words they are 
Mr. Williams' words 1 
A. Those are the words Mr. vVilJ.iams used. 
Q. I understand this diagram is not your diagram at all, 
but it is a copy of a diagram drawn by Mr. Williams, with 
the two yoµng men helping him 1 · 
A. That is right. 
pag·e 195 ~ Q. In reference to ".A." and "C ", did Mr. Wil-
liams tell you his car was headed in a northeast 
direction -in making the turn T • 
A.. He did. 
Q. The road in which he was to turn was going in ·a north-
erly direction? 
A.. Yes, north or northeast. 
Q. He was coming from Blackstone, which was to the west, 
and going· to the east f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The one designated "A", which· should be "C ", which 
is Mr. Williams' car, should· be headed northeast, should it 
not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: · 
. Q. Was that diagram drawn at the time the statement was 
taken, in the presence of young Mr. Williams, young Mr. 
Williams, young· Mr. Bruce and yourself? · 
A. You mean this one here? The four of us worked on 
the diagram to try to show the way the road was located, be-
cause I had never been to the location. 
Q. Then, the diagram was there at the time the statement 
was taken, and when Mr. Williams signed the statement, the 
diagram was on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(The witness was excused.) 
By Mr. Bowles: That is the defendant's case, your Honor. 
pag·e 196 ~ REBUTTAL. 
LUTHER COLUMBUS BRUCE, JUNIOR, 
a witness introduced in rebuttal by Counsel for Plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Mr. Bruce, state your full name 1 
A. I~uther Columbus Bruce, Junior. 
Q. Where do you live 1 
A. Winston-Salem, North Carolina. 
Q. Are you the son of the Mr. Bruce, who testified here 
yesterday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe your f atl1er was involved in this accident? 
A. He was. 
Q. How old are you, Mr. Bruce? 
A. Twenty-seven. 
Q. What were you doing at the time this accident hap-
pened, what was your occupation? 
A. I was general manager of the Quality Cleaners Busi-
ness that my father and I operate in Winston-Salem. 
Q. Had you had any pr~vious experience in the study of 
law? 
l 
I 
j 
I 
I 
1\ 
I 
I 
:,I 
J 
I 
i 
/ 
i 
M. Stillman and Berlo'Vending Co. v. C. W. W1lliams 191 
Luther Columbus Bruce, Junior. 
A. I had one year in the study of law in the University of 
North Carolina. . 
page 197 ~ Q. Did you have occasion to come to Richmond 
to see your father and on that trip go into Mr. 
"Williams' room to see him on the next day following this 
collision¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. iState 110w you happened to be in Mr. ·wmiams' room 
and who was there and what took place in connection with 
this statement tl1at Mr. Dawson got Mr. Williams to sign? 
A. On the morning of the Saturday morning of the 15th 
of February I had been in Mr. Williams' room a couple of 
times to see how he was getting on, and I bad been intro-
duced to Mr. Williams' son, who had arrived that morning 
from somewhere in North Carolina. He said he would like 
to go back to North Carolina with me in my car. .At this 
particular time when I saw the gentleman who took Mr. Wil-
lim;ns' statement I went to Iv.[r. Williams' room to see young 
Mr. Williams, Mr. Williams' son, and at that time, as well 
as I remember, Mr. Dawson was in there and I was intro-
duced to him. 
Q. Let us take t1lis statement and let us see about what 
Mr. Williams told Mr. Dawson. The statement says, after 
giving his name and age and residence, "On February 14, 
19'41, about 8 :30 A. M., I was driving my 1939 Buick sedan" , 
-what did l\fr. Williams state to Mr. Dawson about the 
time? 
A. ,v ell, there was some question about the time and Mr. 
Williams said he thought it was somewhere around 8 to 
8:30. 
page 198 ~ Q. 8 to 8 :30? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you state during the entire time of this discussion 
there was much discussion and whether Mr. Williams was 
quite talkative? . 
A. Well, Mr .• Williams was quite talkative. Yes, I would· 
say he was quite talkative every question that was asked 
him. . 
Q. Have you read the statement, or had it read to you, 
since you have been here today? · 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Will you state whether or not the statement contains 
everything l\fr. Williams said T 
A. No, it does not contain everything Mr. WilJiams said. 
Q. Now, the statement goes on to say, "I was going on to-
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wards Petersburg or east on Route 460. The roads were 
wet and it was slightly foggy.'' "'What is your recollection 
about what Mr. Williams said in that connection? 
A. Let us see. Mr. Dawson asked Mr. ·wnliams about the 
condition of the weather; what kind of cla.y it was. :M:r. Wil-
liams made a reply to the effect that it was wet and possibly 
raining slightly, or possibly slightly foggy, and there was 
some little discussion about the weather there. 
Q. It is in evidence here now that the statement as origi-
nally written by Mr. Dawson had the word ''quite" instead 
of ''slightly''. Do you remember anything about that¥ 
A. I remember some discussion later on. after 
page 199 ~ the statement was written, when M:r. Williams 
said the word ''slightly". Mr. Dawson had it 
"densely foggy" and I think he chang·ed it to "slightly 
fog·g·y". 
Q. He stated, ''I did not have on any lights.'' "'What about 
that? 
A. Mr. Dawson asked him a question about the lig·hts and 
Mr. Williams said he did not know whether be had on the 
lights or not. He was not sure. He went on to elaborate on 
the question of whether he had on his lig·hts or not. I don't 
think he was in a condition to ascertain whether he had on 
lig·hts at that time or not. 
Q. What was Mr. ·wmiams' condition g·enerally and in re-
ply to these questions ; was he definite or certain of any 
particular, or was he really conscious? 
A. My impression was he was really only partly eonscious 
and somewhat lrnzy and seemed befuddled; about what he was 
asked. Several questions, simple questions, he had to have 
repeated. 
Q. v~7b.en you first entered his room that morning did he 
recogmze you? 
A .. No; the nrst time I went in Mr. Williams' room he 
seemed to be in a semi-dazed condition. He did not open 
his eyes. He was lring on the bed, with his. eyes closed. I 
returned to his room forty or forty-nve minutes 
page 200 ~ later and l1e greeted me as if I was a stranger. 
Q. How long had you known him before '"the 
wre~? · 
A. vVell, I imagine about two or three months. 
Q. This statement contains another statement purporting 
to have been made bv Mr. "'Williams: "As I neared the in-
tersection I pulled close to the center of the road. I did 
not see any cars coming from any direction.'' I understood 
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Mr. Dawson to say that that was all Mr. Williams said on 
the question of seeing and looking·. Will you tell the Court 
whether that is correct, or not Y 
A. How did he have it? · 
Q. '' I clid not see any cars coming from any direction''? 
A. Of course, Mr. Da.wson was. asking Mr; Williams 
numerous questions, while he was :filling out the statement. 
As well as I remember, Mr. Dawson asked Mr. Williams this 
question and Mr. W"illiams went very much into detail about 
the method he went throug·h of vtewing· different roads. Mr. 
Williams elaborated on the fact that he had been warned or 
Romething beforehand about the cross roads and he went 
into specific. details about how many times he looked in 
each direction and how he cheeked in his mirror to see 
whether anybody coming. He seemed to want to be very 
explicit about the fact that lie looked in each direction. 
Q. The statement says: ''I did not give any arm or hand 
or any signals for a left turn." Will you state 
page 201 ~ whether that is correct, or not 1 
A. Mr. ·wmiams said he did not know whether · 
he held out his hand or. not, but it had been his general rule 
to obey the traffic rules at all times. This is just a g·eneral 
statement of what Mr. "Williams said. He said if he had the 
window down he did hold out his hand, but that there was 
some doubt in his mind whether he held out his hand or 
not; but he thought he did. 
Q. Did you have any opportunity of examining· the automo-
biles, and, if so, when did you-make the examination? 
A. I saw the automobiles after tllis statement was made 
this day I went through Blackstone. 
By Mr. Anderson: If your Honor please, we object to 
the witness' examination of the automobiles_ the day after 
the accident. 
• 
By the Court: 
Q. Had the cars been· removed? 
A. Yes, sir, they had been removed to Blackstone. 
• 
By the Court: It is too remote. 
Q. Was the glass in the left front window, by the driver's 
seat, broken or not f 
A. I don't know whether it was broken. I know I stuck 
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mv hand in the ·window and whether broken or not I don't 
know. Q. The statement says: ''I started to make 
page 202 } my left turn. going not more than 20 to 25 miles 
- per hour.'' Did Mr. Williams make that state-
ment to Mr. Dawsont 
A. Well. now, the question was put .as to how fast Mr. 
Williams was going when he started to make the turn, as 
well as I remember, and then Mr. Williams described his 
approach to the intersection; the fact ·that he slowed down 
to a very slow speed.; I believe he stated almost a walk, while 
he looked in the different directions. I believe he stated 
during that statement twenty to twenty-five miles an hour. 
The way I interpreted it, he meant as he approached t~e in-
tersection in question he was going· twenty to twenty-five 
miles; but he never stated as he made the turn he was go-
ing,· twenty to twenty-five miles an hour. 
Q. "When the left side of my car was heading northeast 
in making the turn and tl1e left side of my car about 4 feet 
north or across the center line, a Ford coming from Peters-
burg· or east to west, or coming from the opposite direction 
I was tr~veling before starting· ·my turn, came into view." 
Did Mr. Williams state that he was about 4 feet north of 
the line when the Ford came into viewt 
A. He said that his left wheel he judged was a bit over the 
white line; I think he said somewhere around 2 to 4 feet. 
Q. The statement continues: ''This car (referring to the 
sentence I have just read) was, about 30 to 50 feet from me." 
Did Mr. Williams use that expression, "30 to 
page 203 } 50 feet", and, if so, in what connection Y 
· A. He was asked how far the car was away 
from him when he first saw it. I don't know whether that is 
the exact words, anyway, he was asked how far the car was 
away from him when he ·first saw it, and l\fr. Williams said 
his first view of the car was when it was abtmt 30 to 40 feet 
from the intersection. Tl1en he went on and added that the 
car was upon him before he realized it, before he had time 
to do anything about it. 
Q. The statement continues: '' At that time I was right 
a.t the turn or intersection. A second later the front of the 
Ford struck the front of mv car." Can you brieflv state 
exactly what Mr. Williams said, or the substance of 'it, in 
that connection? 
A. Leading up. to that question there was quite a discus-
sion; in fact leading up to the answer of each of the ques-
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tions, l\fr. Daws·on would put the question and Mr. Williams 
would go into very elaborate detail to each of them, and 
some questions he. seemed to have difficulty in recalling them, 
as I remember. 
Q. Taking all these questions now together, beginning 
with: ''vVben the left side of mv car wa.s headinQ" northeast 
in making· the turn and the left "·side of my car about 4 feet 
north or across the outer Ian~, a Ford coming from Peters-
- burg or east to west, or coming from the op-
page 204 }- posite direction I was tr.aveling before starting 
my turn, came into view. At that time I was 
right at the turn or intersection. A second later the front 
of the Ford strnek the front of my car." What do you re-
call that Mr. "Williams said in regard to these questions? 
A. I don't recall Mr. ·Williams saying explicitly about a 
second later, but the essence of what he said wa.s he viewed 
that car and had no time to .do anyth.ing before the car was 
upon him, and he stated the care he exercised in approach-
ing that intersection to see whether any cars were coming. 
Then he said, I think, the car was 40 to 50 feet from the 
intersection and then the car was right on him. I don't 
think he specified any time ; I think he said a moment, or 
something like that. 
Q. Now, there is a diag·ram 0~1.- the original statement, at 
the top of page 4 I believe, and Mr. Dawson testified that 
you and young Mr. Williams helped him to draw that dia-
gram, and the diagram shows that Mr. Williams' car is go-
in~· towards Blackstone and Mr. Stillman's car towards Pe-
tersburg. Did vou know in which direction the cars were 
going?'"" · 
A. Oh, yes, I knew very well . 
Q. Were you familiar with the intersection prior to· that 
time! 
.A. Yes, I had been past the intersection numerous times 
before and had occasion to be in tliat particular section and 
had paid particular attention to that intersec-
page 205 ~ tion. I even from memory knew the number of 
Virginia highway coming- in there, 153. 
Q. Did you have any difficulty with Mr. Dawson about that 
intersection and the cars, &c. T How did it come about that 
it was drawn like that, with the cars headed in the opposite 
direction from which they were actually headed? 
A. I don't know how he got mixed up in the direction the 
cars were traveling. I remember he wanted to put Virginia 
higl1way 153 coming into 460 at right angles and I corrected 
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him on that_ and told him it came in at a different angle, and 
he corrected that and put 460 coming into 153, or vice versa, 
in a point. It don't come to a point. On this diagram he has 
a point and the bank has been cut down. 
By l\fr. Bowles: . 
Q. Take the original; were not curves on it Y 
A. He corrected some, but he still does not have it like I 
told him to draw it; because this curve here is very much 
wider than be has put it in this diagram; but a~ to how he 
faced the cars, I don't know, because I certainly had noth-
ing to do with that, and as far as Mr. Williams was con-
cerned, he had nothing to do with the diagram, because I 
don't know whether he ever saw the intersection before. 
Bv Mr. Allen: 
"'Q. Do you· know whether the diagram was on the paper 
like that when Mr. Williams signed it? 
A. Yes, as well as I remember. 
page 206 ~ Q. Did you make any objection in the begin-
ning to Mr. Dawson as to Mi;. Williams signing 
the paper? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you tell Mr. Dawson t , 
.l-L 'When l\Ir. ·w'illiams started to sig·n the paper I objected. 
I said, "Mr. "\Villiains, I don't think you should sign that", 
and when I c).id, Mr. Da:wson whirled on me, with the paper 
in his hand, and said, "He must sign it; it is my report. 
It has to be signed", and he ·seemed very much irritated at 
my interference. I still insisted tha.t -Mr. W'illiams should 
not sign it, because if anything should arise later Mr. Wil-
liams was in no condition to sign any statement. 
_Q. Did Mr. Dawson say anything there about it being- used 
against him later, and, if so, wha.t did Mr. Dawson state? 
A. Mr. Dawson seemed to continue to feel irritated to-
wards me and said, '' This will never be used; it is just some-
thing for my private files.'' 
By l\fr. Bowles : If your Honor please, here is a brand 
new thin!!; that Mr. Williams has not testified about. I move 
that it be stricken. 
By the Court: Objection overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles : I note an exception. 
Q. Now, do you know whether or not anything· was said 
M:. Stillman and Berlo Vending Co. v. C. ,v. Williams 197 
Luther Colurnbus Bruce, Junior. 
there about !fr. Dawson giving Mr. Williams a copy of the 
statement if he signed iU 
page 207 ~ A. Yes, Mr. Dawson stated why he should sign 
the paper and and Mr. Williams said, "If I sign 
the paper will you give me a copy of iU" and Mr. Dawson 
sajd, "I will give you a copy, or send it to you,''.] have for-
gotten which he said, and then Mr. Williams went ahead and 
signed it. 
Q. Did 1\fr. Dawson leave without giving Mr. Williams. a 
copy? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you state how soon Mr. Dawson left after he got 
]\fr. "Williams' sig11a.ture . to this paper? 
A. "\V ell, I don't know the exact minute, but very shortly 
after. As soon as he signed it, he folded up the paper and 
excused himself politely and left the room. 
Q. "r ere you interested in this automobile accident, &c. Y 
.A.. Yes, I was right much interested. 
Q. On aceount of your father 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have no interest now? 
.A. No, sir. 
(.~. Did Mr. Dawson give you any card there that day to 
show who he was representing? 
A.. Yes. .As soon as Mr. Dawson left Mr. Williams' room, 
I followed him out, and my reason was because he told me 
in there he wanted to see my father, and the reason was my 
father was in pretty bad condition that morning. I followed 
him out the room. He still wanted to see my 
page 208 ~ father, and I told him. he could not see him, and 
he said he would see my father at a later date 
and gave me hiR eard, and I put the ca.rd by my father's 
bed. 
Q. This statement says: "At the time of the collision all 
four of my wheels were across or on the north side of the 
road and my car was almost straight east". Did l\fr. Wil-
liams tell Mr. Dawson thaU 
A. How is that? 
Q. This statement says: '' At the time of the c.ollision all 
· four of mv wheels were across or on the north side of the 
road and my car was almost straig·ht east''. Did Mr. Wil-. 
Iiams tell Mr. Dawson that? 
A. I don't think Mr. Williams ever said all four of the 
wheels of his car were across the white line. They were 
talking about the white line, which I believe is in the center 
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of the road. Mr. 'Williams probably said his left wheels were 
across the white line; but he never said all four of his wheels 
were ac.ross the white line.· He did say his car was headed 
almost directly west, or straight up and down the road, at 
t.he time of the impact. 
Q. The statement says: '' The only conversation I had 
with the other driver was that I stated to him he was run-
ning si~ty miles per hour. He said, ·vv ould you swear to 
that. I replied, 'I couldn't'. He said he thought he was not 
going· more than 55 miles per hour." What is 
pa.ge 209 ~ your recollection of that 1 
A. 1'Thcn Mr. Dawson asked llim about the 
speed of the other car, M.r. vVilliams said he had no wa.y of 
telling how fast the other man came into him; but he knew 
it was a tremendous rate of speed. Then Mr. Dawson said, 
''Estimate the speed; was it 25 or 55 an hour, or something 
like that 1'' Then 1\fr. 1'Tilliams said, '' I don't know, but it 
was a tremendous rate of speed; then told about the con-
versation between him and Stillman on the wa.v to the hos-
pital, which ·yon have just read; but never did state the 
speed was 60 miles an hour; he said 60 miles or more. I think 
he said 60~ 70 or 80. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
· Q. lVIr. Bruce, are you and Mr. Williams any kin? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You both have Columbus in your name and I wondered ·y 
A. Yes, it is quite a coincidence. 
Q. Were you present at t4e court on yesterdayY 
A. No, sir. · · 
Q. "When did you arr~ve here? 
A. I arrived in Richmond yesterday afternoon, about 
twenty minutes to 6 o'clock. 
Q. You c.onferrecl with opposing- counsel, of course, in 
preparation for your testimony today? 
page 210 ~ A. Yes, I saw them this morning. 
Q. Diel you not see them last evening Y 
.A.. No, not counsel. 
0. Did vou see Mr. Williams Y 
~- Yes,·sir. · 
Q. Did either of the counsel for l\fr. Williams go over this 
statement, or the contents of the statement, with you 7 
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A. Yes; I read over the statement this morning with Mr . 
.Allen. 
Q. Did you read it over sentence by sentence as you have. 
just testified to the jury? 
.A. Yes, I should say we did. 
Q. A.ccording· to each sentence you were told what Mr. 
Williams said yesterday, were ·you not Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q.- Did Mr. Williams tell you what he said yesterday? 
A. Mr. ·wmiams, on two or three occasions in the discus-
sion, said wl1at he testified. 
Q. ·when you were preparing foi.~ your testimony with 
counsel for Mr. "Williams vou were aware of the differences 
between the contending l)arties here concerning Mr. Wil-
liams' statement on the stand yesterday and his written 
statement which we are now discussingf 
A. Yes, I have always been aware of the differences set 
out in the statement of what l\fr. Williams said 
page 211 ~ that morning a.nd what was said yesterday. 
. Q. How long was Mr. Dawson in Mr. Williams' 
room, or in conversation with him, would you say t 
.A. I don't know; I am not quite sure when Mr. Dawson 
came in the room, exactly what time; but, as well as I remem-
ber, I was· sorry I was present most of the time, because it 
threw me an hour and a half late g·ettin~; back in Winston-
Salem. I imagine Mr. Dawson was in Mr. Williams' room 
an hour or an hour and,fifteen minutes. 
Q. Were the circumstances of the accident and conditions 
of t.he accident discussed in Mr. vVilliams' room at that time? 
A. You mean the actual accident? 
Q. Yes? 
A. Yes. it was discussed pretty thoroughly. 
Q. During pretty much of that time, 
.A. Practically the entire time, I would say. 
Q. So, at the end of the discussion Mr. ·wmiams had got-
ten down to a fairly co~c.ise and accurate aceount of what 
took place that he was willing to sign, had he not Y 
A. Well, the situation had been discussed very thoroughly, 
as I say, but do you want my opinion on the matter Y 
Q. I did not ask for your opinion; I asked for an answer 
to a question f 
A. Yes: he should have reasonablv had a concise idea of 
· what he said. ~ · 
page 212· ~ Q. He did sign this statement, did he not? 
A. Yes, after protest. 
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Q. And the protest was made by you? 
A. Yes, I led the 'protest, I should say. 
Q. And, notwithstanding your advice to him not to sign 
the statement, he did sign that statement as the truth of 
wha.t he, said, did he not? 
A. No; he was not on oath. 
Q. I did not say on oath, but I say he signed it as a true 
statement? 
A. Mr. 'Williams signed the statement, as per the request 
of l\fr. Dawson. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Dawson that it was untrue? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How long was the statement, itself, approximately in 
the writing, would you say? 
A. It is hard to judge. There were several interruptions 
while we discussed · the questions I answered the counsel 
awhile ago. I should imagine the whole thing took forty-
five minutes. 
Q. And each of these initialed things were carefully 
threshed out not only by Mr. "\Villiams, hut by you, who was 
thoroughly familiar with the location, &c.? 
A. Not alwavs before the answer was written. 
Q. YOU discussed it some time before the answer was writ-
ten! 
pag·e 213 ~ A. Sometimes discussed before the answer 
was written; sometimes not before the answer 
was written. 
Q. The changes were made after Mr. 'Williams made the 
corrections ? 
A. Mr. Dawson made some notations on the paper. As to 
whether he made the changes that Mr. Williams requested 
·I don't know. 
Q. Did Mr. "\Villiams read it? 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. Did Mr. Dawson read it to him? 
A. Yes, he read some statement to him. There seems to 
be some question in my mind whether he read the entire 
document, but he did read the statement to Mr. Williams. 
Q. You say you have studied law? 
A. Yes, some law. 
Q. You know the difference between the present recollec-
tion of what took place more than a year a.go and the repeti-
tion of what appeared on a piece of paper taken a year ago1 
A. You ask me if I lmow the difference of what took place 
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and the bringing out of a certain thing that brings to my 
memory certain things. 
Q. Have you any present recollection, independent of this 
paper that you have testified to at the request of Mr. Allen! 
. A. You mean do I remember the things that 
page 214 ~ I have stated here on the stand this morning? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, -sh. 
Q. Do you think you would have remembered them whether 
you had seen them on the copy of the paper or not Y 
A. I always generally remember what I have stated. 
Q. Would you remember those things as a pr~sent recol-
lection without the assistance of this copy of the paper? 
A. If I had not seen this copy of the paper I could prob-
ably have not told you several ,specific things that I have 
told you this morning about it ; for instance, not until I 
saw the copy of the paper this morning had it flashed in 
my mind about the curve in the road at the intersection of 
153 and 460. 
Q. You have made the statement in vour direct examina-
tion that Mr. Dawson firett wrote on this paper that there 
was a dense fog; is that from refreshing your memory, or 
from your present recollection of what took place at the 
time! 
A. Well, let us see, as well as I remember, I think I said 
a few minutes ago that the first time ]\fr. Dawson :finished 
talking with :VIr. Williams about the condition of the weather 
he wrote that it was densely fog:gy. That is my exact recol- · 
lection of what he stated that morning. I think 
page 215 ~ that he put down something about it being densely 
f og·gy and we asked him to make a clmnge in 
that and I thinl~ he made the chang·e, or he made the motion 
of doing so. 
Q. Do you see "densely foggy" written on the copy¥ 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Is it your recollection, without the aid of the paper you 
saw this morning·, that Mr. Dawson wrote that ''densely 
foo·o·v''OJ A~· I ~ould not say he stated ''densely foggy". 
Q. But you did say '~ densely foggy'' this morning? 
A. I have no reason to be sure he put that '' densely foggy'' 
or ''thickly foggy"; but it was my recollection that he put 
down that it was foggier than it really was.; but I do not 
remember during- the discussi.on whether it was "densely 
fogg-y", or ''thickly fogg-y'', or "slightly foggy". 
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Q. Will you look at the statement and see what he actually 
wrote downY 
A. I don't know what this word is. It looks like "great" 
or ''quite''·. 
Q. ·which is rig·ht1 
A. Well, I think the sig1.1 means "quite foggy". 
Q. During your talk with Mr. Williams last evening did he 
tell you that Mr. Dawson first wrote that ''densely foggy" · 
and changed it to "slightly foggy" T 
page 216 ~ A. No, I don't think that was brought up, 
whether or not he first wrote it ''densely foggy'' 
and changed it to "slightly foggy". 
Q. It is a coincidence, then, that Mr. 'Williams said 
''densely'' and you said ''densely'' Y 
A. I imagine you· would call it that. 
Q. There was no concerted agreement about it between the 
two of you¥ 
.l\.. No, we never a.g-reed to use the same word. 
Q. Mr~ Bruce, you'-' say you have a present recollection of 
wl1at' l\!Ir. 'Williams told Mr. Dawson. You do recall, very 
distinctly, that Mr. 'Williams told :M:r. Dawson that he did 
not see this car coming· to him 11ntil it was too late to do 
anything- about it. Is that correct?. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall independently of this paper that Mr. Wil-
liams told Mr. Dawson that that car was 30 to 50 feet away 
from the intersection? 
A. Yes, he used the word's '' 30 to 50 feet from the inter;. 
section''. 
Q. Were you told in your discussion this morning that Mr. 
Dawson had in the statement that Mr. Williams told him 
tbe car was 30 to 50 feet from him when he first saw it, and 
that he intended to say 30 to 50 feet from the intersection 
rather than as on this statement? 
page 217 ~ A. I was told in this conversation this morn-
ing that Mr. Dawson said Mr. Williams told him 
that this car was 30 to 50 feet away from him. 
Q. That is in the statement, is it not? 
A. I believe he stated that he testified that yesterday. 
Q. He stated when he first say the car it was 30 to.50 feet 
awav from him? 
A: Yes, that.is what he told me this morning. 
Q. And he did· not t_ell }'OU this morning that the car was 
aetually 30 to 50 feet away from the intersection when he 
first saw it? 
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.A. No, he did not. 
Q. Now, you commented on the fact that Mr. Williams 
seemed hazy and befuddled about what he was a.sked. ·Is it 
not rather true that hew.as hazy or befuddled about what had · 
oceurredY 
.A. Do vou mean that it is not true that Mr. Williams was 
not befuddled or hazy about what occurred the day before 1 
Q. Yes, that is righU 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You also threw in the fact that Mr. Williams when you 
first went into this room had his eyes closed and lying there 
and you made very little noise and he did not arous~. Do 
you mean. to inf er from that that there was anything wrong 
with Mr. Williams, or that he was just asleep 
page 218 ~ and you just did not wake him up Y 
· .A. The :first time I don't know whether he was 
asleep or not; but he did not show that he Imew that I was 
in the room. 
Q. You don't mean by that to infer that he wa.s not prop-
erly capable of discussing· the matter with Mr. Dawson, do 
vou? 
.. .A. No, sir. 
Q. You said Mr. Dawson was asking questions and Mr. 
Williams was giving answers. That statement purports to 
carry the substance of what Mr. Williams said, does it not! 
.A .• That is what it purports to do. 
Q. Was there any obligation on the part of Mr. Williams 
to answer those questions Y 
.A .• Mr. Williams gave every indication of not wanting to 
answer any questions that morning; but Mr. Dawson seemed 
very insistent about having the questions answered that 
morning, and Mr. Williams, being· a very patient man, an-
swered the questions. 
Q. And, notwithstanding he did not want to answer the 
questions, he elaborated on the different questions; is that 
true? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He talked a great deal about every question discussed? 
A. He talked a; great deal, and I remember he stopped sev-
eral times to take a drink of water · and make himself com-
fortable. He was very obviously in pain. 
page 219 ~ Q. You stated that Mr. Williams elaborated on 
the fact that he had been warned beforehand 
about this intersection, did he say who warned him? 
A. Yes, I think Mr. Williams brought out the· fact that 
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some question had been discussed between him and my father 
about the posts and Mr. Dawson seemed to think it was ir-
relevant. 
Q. He told Mr. Dawson that your father had told him 
when he approa.ched that interseetion that that was a da.n-
g·crous intersection? 
A. I think he told Mr. Dawson that some discussion had 
been made quite a distance from the intersection about those 
posts at the intersection, which we do not have in North 
Carolina. Anyway, my father and Mr. Williams had evi:. 
dently discussed, from what Mr. Williams told :M:r. Dawson 
that morning, the fac.t that these stakes were out in the 
middle of the road at the intersection. 
Q. On the morning· following· this accident, do I under-
stand you to say that Mr. Williams told Mr. Dawson that 
your fa.tber and he had discussed the fact of these stakes 
being in the intersection? 
A. Yes, that is my recollection. 
Q. Do you recall whether he told ·Mr. Dawson that your 
fa the11 had warned him that morning· that this was one of the 
most dangerous intersections he knew off 
page 220 ~ A. Yes; I don't remember the exact words, but 
I think some conversation occurred oetween Mr. 
·wmiams and Mr. Dawson about the stakes. ' 
Q. You did the chief assistance in drawing· this di~o-ram, 
did vou not? 
A: I guess you would call me chief assistant. I had more 
to say about the way the roads came in there than anyone 
else. 
Q. Are you responsible for putting the wrong letters on 
the different cars? 
A. No, I am not. The first time I knew about this was 
this morning. 
Q. It is very obviously a mistake? 
A. Yes, a very obvious mistake. 
Q. It slipped by you? 
A. No, I was standing· about ten feet from Mr. Williams 
and from Mr. Dawson when he drew that diagTam and I wa.s 
looking over his shoulder from an oblique uosition. This 
morning was the first time I saw that copy~; I caught the 
error then. 
Q. Did you point that error out to counsel? 
A. No, counsel had already dis~overed it. 
Q. You made the statement a moment ag-o that this diag·ram 
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is not as you instructed him to draw it. How did you in-
struct him to draw it f 
page 221 ~ A. I don't know whether I used the word "in-
structed", but the diagram is not as expert as 
I would like to have made it that morning. 
Q. It is not exactly drawn to scale, is iU 
. A. No, but you would want to get it accurate, I assume. 
Q. You have no personal knowledge of this accident, have 
vouY 
.. A. Only the point that I went by the scene of the accident 
the day following the accident, and the cars had been re-
moved. 
Q . .So, you had no personal lmowledg·e of whether the cars 
were indicated in the position as thev occurred at the wreck¥ 
A. No, sir. " · 
Q. So, Mr. Williams was the only one that had accurate 
lmowledge of the position of the cars at the time this dia-
g·ram was gotten up? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\fr. ·wmiams drew the diagram, did he noU 
A.· No, sir. 
Q. Mr. ·wmiams knew a diagram was on the statement, did 
he not? 
A. I don't know whether he ever saw the diagram; I don't 
know; I think he did. 
Q. You made the statement that you objected 
page 222 ~ to Mr. ,¥illiams signing the statement; that you 
saw no sense in bis signing it. What did you 
mean bv that? 
A. I .. thought if Mr. Williams signed tl1at paper tl1at he 
was probably signing something he did not know what he was 
sig·ning in the paper, and it seemed entirely unnecessary 
at the time for him to sig·n it, and being vitally interested 
in my father lying aeross the hall, I did not want :Mr. Wil-
liams to sign a vital paper that might have some bearing on 
the subject later. 
Q. There was no way Mr. Dawson could compel Mr .. Wil-
liams to sign the paper, was theret 
~- "N"o, eir. . 
Q. He asked him to sign it! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He did sign it, 
A. Yes, in response to that request, he signed it. 
Q. Mr. Bruce, your father was a passenger in :Mr. Wil-
liams' car, was he not? 
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A. Yes.· In addition to that, I wanted to do everything I 
-could for Mr. Williams. 
Q. In addition to that you did not think he should sign 
the paper without advice of counsel Y 
A. That was my idea, and certainly that soon after the 
accident, that quick, in view of all the circumstances sur-
rounding· the accident. 
page 223 ~ Q. You knew perfectly well what Mr. Williams 
·signed in that statement would have a bearing on 
your father, did you not? 
A. No, I did not until considerably later; but I knew he 
would be confronted with it later. 
Q. In respect to your bias in the matter, you were anxious 
to have that statement made as favorable to vour father's 
position as possible, were you not? · 
A. Yes, I was vitally interested in my father's position in 
the matter. 
Q. Is that why you wa11-ted the changes made? 
A. No; we wanted the document as nearly as possible to 
present what Mr. "'illiams told Mr. Dawson that morning. 
Q. As far as you know, that is true, is it noU 
A. No, I think not. 
Q. Mr. Williums signed it, did he not, as true? 
A. I don't know whether he signed it as true, or not; he 
signed it to get rid of Mr. Dawson. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Allen: . 
Q. Did you see either of counsel for 1Mr. ·Williams in this 
case prior to this morning in reference to this case? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you seen the statement-I am speaking of the 
original statement now, in Mr. Dawson's hand-
page 224 ~ writing-between the date it was taken at the 
hospital and the date it was shown to you on the 
typewritten statement this morning? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you seen a typewritten copy of the statement be-
tween the date Mr. Dawson took the original at the hospital 
and the date of seeing counsel this morning? 
A. I glanced at that document-let us see, it must have 
been the morning that :Mr. Williams left Winston-Salem on 
his way up here, Monday morning. He .said, ''I have a copy 
of the statement that Dawson took at the hospital that morn-
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ing-. Would you lik~ to see itf'.' I glanced over it and made 
the remark-
By Mr. Bowles (interposing·) : I object. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
A. (continued): I glanced over it and handed it ba.ek. to 
Mr. Williams. 
Q. Did you make any study that morning· of the different 
details of the conversation, as you remember it f . 
A. No; I only had the paper in my hands a minute, as I 
remember it. 
Q. The first discussion you had with counsel about this· 
paper was this morning·! 
A. Yes, sir. 1 
Q. Before the paper was handed to you and before you 
read it, yourself, were you asked to make a gen-
page 225 ~ eral statement of what the conversation was as 
you recalled it? 
A. Yes, as I recall it, you asked me to make a general 
statement of what transpired in the room that morning a.s 
I. recalled it, and I went into a specific statement of all I 
recalled of what went on in the room; about what): said to 
Mr. Williams and what Mr. ,villiams said to· Mr. Dawson 
· and what was said bv Mr. Dawson. 
Q. Then, the paper· was gone over in some detail¥ 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Was the statement any different in detail from what 
you stated in deta.il before the statement was read to you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Bowles asked you with reference to the condition 
of Mr. Williams, I believe, at the end of the discussion at 
the hospital that day. I will ask you to state, as briefly 
as vou can, as to whether at the end of the discussion that 
had gone 011 for forty-five minutes or .more he was as alert 
as when it started, or was he tir~d? 
A. You mean his general condition? 
Q. Yes, whether he was as alert or tired? 
A. It had a verv definite action on him. I know he was 
extremely nervous, witl1 indication of being tired and in 
pain. As I stated awhile ago, he drank water two or three 
times during the conversation and taking of the statement. 
I "don't think Mr. Williams was alert. He never 
page 226 ~ gave me. the impression that he was entirely alert 
during the entire conversation, and some of his 
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statements were rambling and not alert during the whole 
conversation. 
Q. I will ask you if you have any interest in this ease at 
this time? 
Bv l\!Ir. Anderson: You asked him that on his direct ex-
amination. 
Bv the Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Allen: All right; I withdraw that. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINA.TION. 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
~Q. :M:r. Bruce, you have just told how you made a state-
ment to Mr. Allen about what occurred ut the hospital before 
l\Ir. Allen showed you this written statement, or copy of 
it. I believe you bad previously told us that you had previ-
ously gone over ,·vith Mr. vVilliams what occurred Y 
A. No, I did not go over it; I talked to him. 
Q. And you talked with him about some differences in the 
statement? 
A. No, I don't tllink we mentioned the statement. The 
only thing I think, I am not sure, is the reason the statement 
had been quoted-Mr. Williams told me when I arrived yes-
terday that the statement had been presented and they would 
probablv ask me about the statement. 
- . ., Q. You knew tl1e defendant had attempted to 
page 227 ~ contradict Mr. Williams a.bout his written state-
ment, did you not T 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. You discussed that with Mr. ·wmiams last nighU 
A. No, I only discussed with him :fifteen or twenty minutes 
and when I came back he was asleep. 
Q. Fifteen or twenty minutes¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long were you with counsel this morning? 
A. A little less than an hour. 
Q. Almost as long as it took to get the statement, was it 
not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, you and counsel conferred about this statement the 
greater part of an hour, did you not? . 
... ~ .. We did not confer about the statement the entire time 
I was with counsel. 
M. Stilhnan and Berlo Vending Co. v. C. W. Williams 209 
C. W. Williams. 
Q. You did go over with counsel the entire statement this 
morning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And rehearsed your testimony? 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. I believe you said the taking of this statement on Feb-
A. Yes, that is true. 
-ruary 15th made you an hour and a half late in getting home? 
Q. You were in a. hurry, then Y . 
.A.. Yes ; I had some business in Winston-Salem 
page 228 ~ to attend to and I had planned to leave the hos-
pital within :fifteen minutes after lVIr. Dawson 
came in. 
Q. So, you were in a hurry to· get the statement finished 
so you could leave? 
.A.. Yes, I think I had sub-consciously left the statement to 
Mr. Dawson. 
' (The witness stood aside.) 
By Mr . .Allen:· If your Honor please, I wish to recall Mr. 
Williams for one question. 
By the Court: Come around, J\fr. Williams. 
page 229 ~ C. vV. vVILLIAMS, 
the plaintiff, being recalled in rebuttal by coun-
sel for Plaintiff, testified as follows: · 
DIR,ECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. .Allen: 
Q. Mr. Williams, I will not go over what you have already 
testified to, but I do want to ask you one question: it has been 
testified here that your son was in the room at the hospital 
at the time this statement was taken by Mr. Dawson Y 
.A.. He was. 
Q. I will ask you as to whether afj;er the statement was 
put in evidence yesterday yon mad~ an effort to get in touch 
with your son to come here and testify and what your success 
has been in that respect, 
.A.. As soon as I could get to a telephone I checked every 
place in Charlotte and checked in every hotel in Fayetteville, 
where he is handling a case. 
Q. In other words, you made every effort to get in touch 
with him? 
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A. Every effort possible. 
Q. Did you put in a call for· him to call you this morning Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I notice there is a memorandum here that there is a 
call for you at the hotel? 
page 230 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Allen: Your Honor, may he go to the 'phone and 
get in touch with the hotel in reg·ard to that message? 
By the :Court: Yes. 
(Mr. Williams goes to telephone and returns in a few min-
utes.) 
By Mr. Allen: 
Q. Mr. Williams, I believe you just went to answer a long 
distance telephone call. State whether you have been able 
to get in touch with your son¥ 
A .. The telephone people notified me I could get him at 1 
to 1 :30 at· Fayetteville, 'North Carolina, two hundred miles 
from. here. · · 
By l\fr. Bowles: Do you want to get him here to testify, 
Mr. Allen? 
By Mr. Allen: We certainly would like to have him, but 
I would not ask the Court to delay the trial to get this man, 
even if we could get him in several hours. 
By Mr. Bowles: In connection with that I think Mr. Allen 
will agree that the statement was sent to him at his request 
some weeks ago. . 
By the Court : That is all in the evidence. 
By Mr. Allen: Yes, but we h~d no idea he would put Mr. 
Dawson on the witness stand. 
By the Court: As I understand, you rest, Mr. 
page 231 ~ Allen Y . 
By Mr. Allen: Yes, sir. 
By l\fr. Bowles: I have two motions to make your Honor. 
I wish to renew the motion I made at. the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's testimony for the reason stated. Your Honor is 
acquainted with the basis of my motion. 
Bv the Court: The motion is overruled. By Mr. Bowles: Exception is noted. I wish to make a 
motion for the Oourt to ·withdraw a juror and declare a mis-
trial, for the admission of testimony which we conceive to be 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
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By the Court: Do you wish to argue the motion in the 
presence of the jury! 
By Mr. Bowles: !No, not in the presence of the jury. 
By the Court: The jury will retire. 
Jury out. 
By Mr. Bowles: I don't think, your Honor, that on the 
first motion I can do more than elaborate the points I have 
made, and if the ·court's mind is made up on that I don't 
want to take up the Court's time in going over that motion. 
I am very sincere ou those points. · 
By the Court: I have followed this testimony very closely 
· and I don't think I cau change my mind. 
pag·e 232 r By Mr. Bowles: .As to the motion for a .mis-
trial, your Honor, this is the view I wish to pre-
sent to you. As I understand the authority for permitting 
a responsive answer to disclose the propositio1i. of insurance 
in the backgTound is on the occasion of when it. is necessary 
for the jury to have a fair understanding of· the testimony 
before it of any indication of bias, or a slant, so that the jury 
can properly evaluate the weight of the testimony. ,Now, in 
this case the introduction of the testimony concerning the in-
surance and the length to which these questions have gone 
does not furnish the jury in any sense, I submit, with any 
additional help on that point, and the oniy basis on which 
it can come in is that it discloses the relation of Mr. Dawson 
when he went there. I can see no possible augmentation of 
the bias, whether Mr. Dawson went there representing· Mr. 
Stillman on a direct contract between him and Mr. Stillman, 
or whether he went there as a result ·of an agreement between 
Mr. Stillman and the insurance company; the bias is the 
same, if any, and that is the chief basis on which it occurs to 
me that I am justified in objecting to the introduction of the 
insurance question. On top of testimony already 
page 233 r presented, it can only be for the pu_:rpose of plain~ 
tiff's counsel to let the jury know that there is 
insurance. Furthermore, if your Honor please, if your Honor 
can recall the manner in which l\fr. Allen brought out the 
question of insurance it showed the jury that there was in-
surance before I had any opportunity to object to it. The 
question was: '' As a matter of fact, when you went there 
to get this statement you were in the employ of the insur-
ance company carrying the public liability and property dam-
age insurance on the car which Stillman was driving at the 
time of the wreck¥" I tried to object to that and your Honor 
ruled that I could not object until the question was finished. 
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By the Court: We have been over that and the jury was 
sent out and you were given an opportunity to present the 
law in regard to it. I asked both you and Mr. Allen if you 
had said all you wanted and I indicated what my ruling would 
be. You told me you had said all you wanted to say. I did 
not send the jury out again, because you did not request it. 
By Mr. Bowles: I don't think I was addressing myself to 
that particular question. The reasons I changed the position 
which I previously stated to the court, when I determined 
not to put Mr. Dawson on the stand, in the light of what 
- your ruling· would be, were these : Mr. Allen 
page 234 ~ asked Stillman three questions : Mr. Allen asked 
Mr. Stillman on the witness stand did he go· to 
the hospital with Mr. Dawson. He said no. He then asked 
him did he send Mr. Dawson there. Mr. Stillman said no. 
Mr .. Allen then asked him did he know he was g·oing· and Mr. 
Stillman said no. 
By the Court: Do you recall that that testimony was given 
in reply to a question as to whom he repiesented and he said 
he was Mr. Stillman's attorney? 
By Mr. Bowles: There was a statement yesterday that he 
was Mr. Stillman's attorney and it was then brought out 
that he went there at Mr. Stillman's request. The difference 
lies in the employment, whether throug·h ,Stilhnan 's insur-
ance company or direct. When those questions were asked 
l\fr. Stillman I realized then that they were in effect telling 
the jury that this was an insurance case. I conceived then 
that the jury knew the interest of an insurance company, and 
I considered what I thought was proper to do from then on, 
namely, that putting l\fr. Dawson on and running the risk 
of that being confirmed was no more dangerous to the de-
fendant's case than had alreadv been suffered. Under those 
circumstances I submit to the Court that they questioned Mr. 
Dawson on the witness stand and showed the jury that he 
was there actually on Mr. Stillman's behalf as a 
page 235 ~ lawyer for him; that he further stated that he 
was then acting with all that probable bias for 
him, and the jury knew that they were listening to a witness 
who had a direct interest, and whether that request came 
from Mr. Stillman f9r him to g·o there, ·or whether Mr. Still-
man's request came from the insurance company to have a 
man g·o there and interview Mr. Williams does not point to 
nor is it relevant to the question of bias, which had already 
been covered and established. 
That is the basis for my request for a mistrial and I wish 
to state that the question was asked before I had an oppor-
tunity to object, because the Court stopped me, and that, 
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moreover, is what I consider is very prejudicial error which 
these defendants have suffered. 
By the Court: The motion is overruled. 
By Mr. Bowles : Exception is made for the reasons stated. 
Note: At this point the jury was brought in and the Court 
excused them until 2 o'clock P. M., May 14, 1942. 
page 236 ~ INSTRUCTION NO. 1,- OFFERED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF, BUT REFUSED 
BY THE OOURT. 
The Court instructs the jury that" it was the duty of the 
defendant, Stillman, in using the highway upon the occasion 
in question-
( 1) To drive his automobile, upon approaching said inter-
section, a.t a careful speed, having due reg·ard to the traffic, 
surface and width of the highway, and of any other condi-
tions then existing, and to :ha.ve said automobile under rea-
sonably proper control in approaching· and entering· said in-
tersection, and to keep a reasonable lookout for traffic on the 
highway ahead; and 
(2) If the plaintiff, Williams, entered said intersection 
prior to the entry therein of the said def end ant, and that the 
plaintiff was in the act of turning therein to the left when 
the said defendant. entered said intersection, then it was the 
duty of the defendant, Stillman, to yield the right of way to 
the plaintiff, and allow him to complete his left turn into 
Route No. 153. · 
(3) And if the jury believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant failed to perform any, or either of the foregoing du-
ties, and that such failure was the proximate ca.use of the 
collision, resulting in injury to the plaintiff, and the· plaintiff 
· was without negligence on his part contributing 
page 237 ~ to his injury, the jury will find for the plaintiff, 
and in estimating the damages sustained by him, 
they should take into account the bodily injuries sustained 
by the plaintiff, the effect thereof upon his ability to do such 
work as he had been accustomed to do, the mental suffering, 
the pain undergone, and the effect on the health and nervous 
system of the plaintiff, according to its degree and its prob-
able duration, together with such doctors' bills as the plain-
tiff has proven he incurred, endeavoring· to get healed and 
cured of his injuries, and the damages to the plaintiff's au-
tomobile, and fix his damages at such just and reasonable 
amount as you ma.y. believe from the evidence in this case will 
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be sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for injuries and the 
damages to his automobile, the total sum awarded not ex-
ceeding·, however, the amount sued for. 
(4) On the subject of the duty of Williams, the court in-:-
structs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that 
Williams, in approaching and entering· said intersection, was 
in such a position that a reasonably prudent man, in the 
exercise of ordinary care and vigilance, would under all the 
circumstances of the ca~e, have had reaf;;onable grounds for 
believing that his making· a left turn in saicl intersection 
might affect the operatjon of another vehicle on the highway, 
then it was the duty of Williams to give the signal required 
for a left turn, otherwise he was under no duty 
page 238 ~ to do so. In the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, the plaintiff would be presumed to have 
exercised due and proper· care at the time he was injured, 
and in so far as the defendant relies upon the non-exercise 
of such care, that is, upon the contributory neglig·ence of the 
plaintiff, the burden is upon the defendant to prove such 
contributory neg·ligence by a preponderance of the evidence, 
unless it appears from the plaintiff's own evidence, or may 
be fairly inferr~d from all the facts proven in the case. 
(5) The court further instructs the jury that to constitute 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, there 
must have been a want of ordinary care on_ his part and a 
proper connection between such want of care and his injury. 
page 239 ~ INSTRiUOTIONS A, B, C, D, E, F, G AND H 
OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT.S, BUT 
REFUSED BY THE COURT. 
Instruction No. A. 
The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the 
plain ti ff "'\Villiams before undertaking- to make a left turn 
from Route 460 to first see that such movement could be made 
in safety, and if the operation of an~r other vehicle mig·ht 
be affected by making· such left turn. to g·ive a signal by ex-
tending· the arm in a horizontal position straight from and 
level with the shoulder to the left side continuouslv for a 
distance of at least fifty feet (50 ft.) before altering the 
c011rse of his vehicle. 
The observance of the foregoing- dutv was itself a continu-
ing duty on the part, of the plaintiff. If you believe from the 
evidence tha.t the plaintiff failed to observe the foreg;oing 
dutv and that such failure on his nart efflcientlv contributed 
in any substantial degree to ca.use the collision, then the plain-
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tiff cannot recover and you must find your verdict for the de-
fendants, Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Company. 
If you also believe that the plaintiff's failure to observe 
this duty was the sole cause of .the collision, then the de-
. f endant Mercer Stillman is entitled to recover on his cross-
claim against the plaintiff Williams, and you must 
page 240 r find your verdict in favor of the defendant Still-
man, against the plaintiff Williams, on his cross-
claim. · 
lnstritction No. Q. 
The court instructs the jury that at the time of the col-
lision involved in this case, the Motor Vehicle Code of Vir-
g-inia provided that a driver having once given a signal in-
dicating his intention to make a left turn must continue the 
course thus indicated unless he alters the original signal and 
takes care that the drivers of other vehicles have seen and are . 
aware of the change. · 
Instruction No. C. 
The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the 
plaintiff Williams in attempting to make a left turn at the 
intersection of Routes 460 and 153 to pass beyond and to the 
rig·ht of the center of such intersection before turning· to the 
left side of the highway. The court further tells you that 
the .center of an intersection within the meaning of this re-
quirement is the meeting point of the center lines. of the in-
. tersecting highways whether the center is· marked or not. 
. The observance of the foregoing duty was itself 
page 241 ~ a continuing duty on the part of the plaintiff. If 
you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff 
failed to observe this duty and that such failure on his part. 
efficiently contributed in any substantial degree to cause the 
collision, then the plaintiff cannot recover and you must find 
your verdict for the defendants, Mercer Stillman and Berlo 
Vending Company. 
If you also believe that the plaintiff's failure to observe 
this duty was the sole cause of the collision, then the defend-
ant Mercer Stillman is entitled to recover on his cross-claim 
against the plaintiff Williams, and you must find your ver-
dict in favor of the defendant Stillman against the plaintiff 
Williams ori his cross-claim. 
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Instruction, No. D. 
The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the 
plaintiff Williams: 
1. To exercise .reasonable care in the operation of his au-
tomobile; 
2. To keep and maintain a proper lookout; 
3. To have his automobile under proper control; 
4. ·To drive his automobile on the right half of the high-
. way and to pass vehicles proceeding in the opposite direc-
tion on the right, giving any such vehicle as nearly 
page 242 ~ as possible one-half of the main traveled portion 
of the highway. 
The court tells you that the observance of each of the fore-
going duties was a continuing duty on the part of the plain-
tiff. 
If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff failed 
to observe any one ·or more of these duties and that such fail-
ure on Iris part efficiently contributed in any substantial 
degree to cause the collision, then you must find your verdict 
for the defendant Stillman. 
If you also believe that the plaintiff's failure to observe 
any of these duties was the sole cause of the collision, then 
the defendant Mercer StHlman is entitled to recover on his 
cross-claim against the plaintiff ,.\Tilliams, and you must find 
your verdict for the defendant Stillman on his cross-claim 
against the plaintiff Williams. 
Instruction No. E. 
The court instructs the jury that if you believe from all 
the evidence that the plaintiff ·wmiams attempted to make 
a left turn from Route 460 when the Stillman car was so 
near in its approach that a reasonably prudent man, acting 
with ordinary care for his own safety and for the safety of 
others, would not have made the left turn when he 
page 243 ~ did because of the approach of the Stillman car, 
and that by making such left turn under those 
·circumstances the plaintiff Williams either caused or effi-
ciently contributed in any substantial degree to cause th~ 
collision, then the plaintiff Williams cannot recover, and you 
must find your verdict for the def enda.nts. 
If you believe froni the evidence that such action on the 
part of the plaintiff was the sole cause of the collision, then 
the defendant Stillman is entitled to recover on his cross-
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claim against the plaintiff and you must find your verdict 
for the defendant Stillman on his cross-claim against the 
plaintiff. Williams. 
lnst·ruction No. F. 
The court instructs the jury that eyen if you believe from 
the evidence that the def end.ants were guilty of negligence 
in the operation of their automobile, yet if you also believe 
that the plaintiff was guilty of any negligence that efficiently 
contributed in any substantial degree to cause the collision, 
you must, nevertheless, still find your verdict for the def end-
ants. 
pag·e 244 }- Instruction No. G. 
. . ' :i I 
The court instructs the jury that if you :find for the defend-
ant Stillman on his cross-claim against the plaintiff Wil-
liams, you inust assess his damages at the stipulated sum of 
-Four Hundred Seventy-three Dollars and Fifty-three Cents 
($473.53) and find your :verdict accordingly. 
Instritction No. H. 
The court instructs the j~ry that the burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff throughout the trial of this case to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants were 
guilty of neg·lig·ence proximately causing the plaintiff's dam-
ag·e and injuries. If you believe from the evidence that it 
is just as probable that the defendants were not negligent as 
that they were neglig·ent, or that the evidence with respect 
thereto is evenly balanced, then the plaintiff has not borne 
the burden of proof and you cannot find a verdict for the 
plaintiff. A verdict cannot be based in whole or in part on 
conjecture, surmise or sympathy, but rp.ust be based solely ori. 
the greater weig·ht of the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
page 245 ~ COURT '.S INSTRUCTION HIVEN IiN LIEU 
OF INSTRiUCTIONS OFFERED BY PLAIN-
TIFF AND DEFENDANTS. 
(1) The Court instructs the jury that they are hearing to-
gether two cases growing out of the same circumstances. In 
one of them, the plaintiff, C. W. Williams, is asserting a claim 
against Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending- Company. In 
the other (the cross-claim), Mercer Stillman is asserting a 
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claim against C. W. Williams for the damages to his auto-
mobile. · 
(2) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in each case 
to establish his claim against the other by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
(3) In order that either party may recover against the 
other, he must show negligence on the part of that other which 
was a proximate cause of his injuries. In each of these cases, 
the defendant relies as a defense upon the contributory neg-
ligence of the other. 'The party relying upon contributory 
negligence, as a defense to a claim asserted against him, must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the other party 
was guilty of neg·ligence which efficiently contributed to 
bring about his injuries, unless such contributory neglige.uce 
appears from such other party's evidence, or may be fairly 
inferred from all the circumstances proven in the 
page 246 r case. 
( 4) Preponderance of the evidence does not 
necessarily mean the greater number of witnesses. It means 
the greater number of witnesses to whose testimony the jury 
lend credence. It is that degree qf proof which induces be-
lief but not certainty. 
( 5) The respective claims asserted in this suit are based 
. upon neligence. Negligence is the failure to act under given 
circumstances in such a manner as an ordinary prudent per-
son would act under the same or similar circumstances. The 
violation of a statute or a duty imposed by law upon a party 
is negligence as a matter of law, but in order to make such 
violator liable in damages, the violation must have been a 
proximate cause of the injuries complained of. 
( 6) AU drivers of motor vehicles upon the highways are 
required by statute law to drive the same at a careful speed 
not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper having 
due regard to the traffic, surf ace and width of the highway, 
and of any other conditions then existing-. They shall not 
drive at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely 
to endanger life, limb or property of any person. 
(7) The driver of a vehicle a.pproacl:ring but not having 
entered a.n intersection s];iall yield the right .of way to a ve-
hicle within such intersection and turning therein to the left 
across the line of travel of such first mentioned vehicle; pro-
vided that whenever the operation of any other 
page 247 ~ vehicle may be affected by such movement, the 
driver of the vehicle already in the intersection 
and turning left shall first use ordinary care to see that such 
movement can be made in safety, and shall give a plainly 
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visible signal of intention to turn left as required in Section 
2154(122). 
(8) The signal last above referred to shall be by extending 
the left arm in a horizontal position, straight from and level 
with the shoulder and shall be given continuously for a dis-
tance of at least fifty feet before turning or· partly turning 
or materially altering the course of the vehicle. 
( 9) Drivers having once given a signal must continue the 
course thus indicated, unless they alter the original signal 
and take care that drivers of other vehicles have seen and are 
aware of the change. 
(10) Should a party, having indicated by proper signal an 
intention to turn, then, without his fault, be placed in a po-
sition of danger by negligence of the other party, then in 
order to extricate himself from such danger, he may alter 
his course and otherwise act as a reasonable prudent man 
might act under the same or similar circumstances without 
being in violation of this law. 
(11) It is not negligence to fail to give a signal when to 
do so would be ineffectual to give notice to the other party. 
(12) Drivers of :vehicles when turning to the 
page 248 ~ left shall pass beyond the center of th~ intersec-
tion and as closely as practicable to the right of 
the center of such intersection before turning such vehicle to 
the left. The center of the intersection shall mean the meet-
ing points of th~ center lines of the highways intersecting 
one another. · 
(13) The court further intructs the jury .that they are the 
sole judges of the facts in this case, and it is for them to 
determine from the evidence before them which witnesses are 
more worthy of belief and more accurate and to give credit 
accordingly. 
(14) If the jury believe that both parties to the accident 
being investigated were g·uilty of negligence which proxi-
mately caused or efficiently contributed to the accident, then 
neither party should recover anything of the other. 
(15) If the jury believe that one party was guilty of neg-
ligence and the other was free of negligence _that efficiently 
contributed to bring about his injuries, the jury should find 
its verdict in favor of such party free of negligence and es-
timate his damages at such sum as will fairly compensate him 
for his injuries shown by the evidence. 
{16) If the jury believe from the evidence that it is just as 
probable that a party 1vas negligent as that he was not, or 
that the evidence with respect thereto is evenly balanced, then 
the party asserting a claim for such negligence has not borne 
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. the burden of proof, and you cannot find aver-
page 249· ~ diet against such party. 
(17) Should you find a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, C. W. Williams, then in estimating his damages, you 
may take into account the bodily injuries sustained by him, 
their effect upon his ability to do such work as he has been 
accustomed to do, the mental suffering and physical pain suf-
fered by him, the effect upon his health and nervous system, 
according to its degree and probable duration, and such doc-
tors' bills as the plaintiff has necessarily incurred endeavor-
ing· to be cured, together with the damages to his automo-
bile. . 
(18) Should you find your verdict for Mercer Stillman, 
you should fix his damages at the sum of $473.53 which the 
parties have stipulated to be the extent of the damages suf-
fered by him. 
(19) The court further instructs the jury that should they 
:find a. verdict in favor of C. W. Williams against Mercer 
Stillman, their verdict should also be ag·ainst the Berlo Vend-
ing Company, because it has been admitted by the parties 
that :Mercer Stillman, at the time of the accident, was acting 
as the agent of the Berlo Vending Company. 
(20) A verdict cannot be based in whole or in part upon 
conjecture, surmise or sympathy but must be based solely 
on the evidence in the case and the instructions of the Court. 
page 250 ~ By the Court: I will hear the objections to the 
plaintiff's instructions, then hear Mr. Allen's re-
ply, and then any objections to the defendant's instructions. 
DEFENDANT'S OB.JE.CTIO.NS TO INSTRUCTIONS 
TENDERED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
By Mr. Bowles : I don't think that number paragraph 2 
is a correct statement of the law. It is not sufficient~ He 
must give a signal and must see that such movement is plainly 
visible and that the left turn can be ma.de in safety. That 
is the right of way section, but is dependent on right many 
things, as to whether he shall have the right of way or not. 
He is only entitled to the right of way if he gives the signal 
and shall first see that the movement can be made in safety. 
The Code provides that "Every driver who intends to turn 
from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be 
made in safety, and whenever the operation of any such ve-
hicle may be affected by such . movement the driver of the 
vehicle already in the· intersection shall give a sig-nal, by 
extending· his left arm from and beyond the left side, plainly 
, I 
I 
I 
I 
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visible to the driver of such other vehicle, and such signal 
shall be given continually for a distance of at least fifty feet 
before beginning the turn, or might alter the 
page 251 ~ course of the vehicle." So, that is a provision 
attached to the Code section. 
The defendant further, in that connection, excepts to that 
parag-raph in this case, because the plaintiff has not said he 
gave a hand signal. Mr. Allen said in his opening statement 
the plaintiff, himself, would not do so, but that Mr. Bruce 
would go on the stand and that he would supply that defi-
ciency. Mr. Bruce, on the contrary, did not say that he gave 
a hand signal. All the evidence is to the contrary in the 
previous statement of the plaintiff. It is true that this is one 
instruction, but that is one phase of it. 
By the Court: You make no objection to paragraph 1, do 
youf 
By Mr. Bowles: I think that is a correct statement of the 
law. I mean it is a correct general statement of the law;. but 
the Court should have sustained the motion to strike. 
As to paragraph 3, I don't know whether it is material in 
an instruction of that character, but the word ''efficient'' 
should be put in there in front of "contributing''. 
By the Court: There may be slight things that are con-
tributory, but not enoug·h for the law to take notice of. I 
kind of like that word "efficiently contributing". 
·By Mr. Bowles: Down further in that para-
page 252 ~ graph 3, I suppose the language, '' * * * accord-
ing· to its degree and its probable duration'', ·is 
intended to be a means to argue some phase thereof. I don't 
~e!ieve there is any evidence sustaining a claim of permanent 
lilJUry. 
By the Court: That don't indicate that there is. _It merely 
allows him to argue the evidence. I don't have any right to 
presume that he is ~oin~· beyond the evidence. 
By Mr. Bowles: The language above that is: '' * * * the 
effect thereof upon his ability to do such work as he had been 
accustomed to do"., ! think the general language would 
carry it beyond the present; but it is not as bad as I expected 
it to be. 
Now, the last two paragraphs are incorrect statements of 
the law. They confuse and are arg'Umentative and I don't 
understand what the purport of them is. I think 1\f r. Allen 
is certainly entitled to have for his· client the proposition that 
contributory negligence is subject to proof; but I don't think 
that ought to be tacked on to a proposition that the Court 
tells the jury in the instruction that they presume him to be 
free of contributory neg·ligence. 
' 222 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
By the Court: Usually it is covered by an instruction 
where the burden of proof lies. The Court of Appeals has 
said that the words '' burden of proof'' is sufficient and to 
leave out the "presumption". I don't like the 
page 253 ~ word "presumption" in instructions and I don't 
use it where I can help it. In some cases you 
have to have it. 
By Ivir. Bowles: The first part of paragraph 4, in reg·ard 
to the requirement of giving· signals and exercising the spe-
cific acts that constitute reasonable care provided for a per-
son making a reasonable turn, the :Court would be stating 
in this instructions that if a reasonably prudent person would 
not have thoug·ht it necessary to do it, he would not have to 
give a signal. I don't think th~t is true. The law says you 
must give a signal, whether a reasonably prudent person 
would have thought it necessary or not. 
Bv the Court: Is not that stated there? 
By Ivir. Bowles: It says: "On the subject of the duty of 
Williams, the court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that Williams, in approaching and entering· said 
intersection, was in such a position that a reasonably pru-
dent man, in the exercise of ordinary care .and vigilance, 
would, under all the circumstances of the case, have had rea-
sonable grounds for believing that his making a left turn in 
said intersection might affect the operation of another ve-
hicle on the highway, then it was the duty ·of Williams to 
give the signal required for a left turn, otherwise he was 
'· under no duty to do so.'' * * * '' I don't think 
page 254 ~ the statute makes that the criterion there as to 
what the man would have thoug·ht. The effect of 
the statute is if another vehicle is coming he had to give a 
signal; not the question of whether a man's duty in his own 
mind when another car is coming made it necessary to give 
the signal. The statute says : '' ~ ~ * whenever the operation 
of any other vehicle may be a.ff ected by such m<>vement, the 
driver of the vehicle shall give a sig'llal." What I am trying 
to say, your Honor, is I think that is an attempt to reduce 
the duty on Williams to a lower degree than the statute re-
quires. 
By the Court : Not whether a reasonable man thought so, 
but whether it would be effectual to do so. 
By Mr. Bowles: In the last paragTaph of the instruction 
it says : '' * • * there must have been a want of ordinary 
care on his part and a proper connection between such want 
of care and his injury." I think that is very indefinite and 
vague. 
• 
• 
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By l\fr. Allen: That ought to be "causal connection". I 
think ''proper'' is a stenographer's error there. 
By Mr. Bowles: I don't think "causal connection" is suf-
ficient. If there was any negligence in causing this thing, 
then it was his contributory neg·ligence and that is a repeti-
tion of what has already been said up her'e. 
By the Court: I will hear you, Mr. Allen. 
page 255 }- By Mr . .Allen: ·Section 2 sa.ys : '' If the plain-
tiff, Williams, entered said intersection, prior to 
the entry therein of the said defendant, and that the plaintiff 
was in the act of turning therein to the left when the said 
defendant entered said intersection, then it was the duty of 
the defendant, Stillman, to yield the right of way to the plain-
tiff, and allow him to complete his left turn into Route No. 
153." . 
There is a proviso there, but that provision has to be read 
in connection with the construction that the Court of .Appeals 
placed upon that section which contains the proviso. (Quotes 
llf orris v. Dane, 161 Va. 545.) I am trying to follow that in 
the principle I have laid down here. 
By Mr. Bowles: Do I understand that you contend tha.t 
there was no duty on the part of l\fr. Williams to give a sig-
nal¥ 
By l\fr. Allen: No, I don't contend that. 
By the Court: As J understand, he must give the signal, 
unless giving it would be a vain thing. If nobody was where 
it could be seen, I1e might be excused. The signal must be 
given where it is effective; but where no effect it is vain. 
That is a question for the jury. 
page 256 ~ PLAINTIFJP'S OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUC-
TIONS TEND.ERED BY THE 
DEFEND.ANTS. 
By Mr . .A.Hen: The :first two paragraphs in Instruction A 
are apparently all rig·ht, from a cursory reading. The last 
paragraph is not supported by any evidence in the case. It 
is based upon the assumption that Stillman was not guilty 
of any negligence. The only evidence in the case as to how 
he was driving· was Williams said he was driving at a ter-
. rifle rate of speed, sixty to ninety miles per hour ; the lowest, 
I believe, sixty, and that he was approaching an intersection 
and he did not apply his brake or slow up at·the intersection, 
but just entered at full speed, and has no recollection of see-
ing the other automobile. So, I don't think any instruction 
is proper based on the assumption that he was not g'Uilty of 
any negligence. 
Now, as to Instruction B. That instruction is not ap-
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plicable to the facts. Either the man made no change at all 
to go into the other road, or made emergency changes or 
changes not contemplated by the statute. 
Instruction :C. Ther~ is no evidence that he did not pass 
beyond it. All in the car, Williams and Bruce 
page 257 ~ both stated that they ,vent beyond the center sig-n 
· before they undertook to turn and he got only a 
few feet before the other fellow came into view. The last 
paragraph of that is based upon the assumption that there 
was no neg·ligence on the part of Stillman and is not ap-
plicable. 
Instruction D. Sections 1, 2 and 3 are all right. Section 
4: "To drive his automobile on the right half of the high-
way and to pass vehicles proceeding in the opposite direction 
on the right, * * * "-is not applicable to this case, because 
there is no evidence that this ma;n ever intended to pass 
the man, and proceed in the opposite direction. All the evi-
dence is that he intended to make a left turn, and it was his 
duty to pull to the center of the road and keep a lookout, as 
he was doing· then. The last paragraph of that instruction is 
subject to the same objection, that Stillman was g-uilty of no 
negligence. · 
Bv Mr. Bowles : The reason for putting section No. 4 in 
Insfrnction D was this : if the jury concluded that Williams 
intended to turn to the left, but did not do it, but tried to 
cut back and pass and abandoned his intention to turn left, 
then it was his duty to pass the driver g·oing in the op-
posite direction on the right side of the road. 
page 258 ~ In other words, whichever theory he adopted in 
the case, he must do that according to the law. 
If he was trying to pass the other vehicle on the right-hand 
side, then he must do that in accordance with the provisions 
of the law. If he intended to turn to the left, then he must 
do that in accordance with the law. I arp not cedain in my 
own mind which one of these things the plaintiff is relying 
upon, whether he intended to abandon his turn to the left, or 
to change it and get out on the side. If a man is approaching 
an intersection and sees a vehicle approaching him, he is 
naturally entitled to assume that that vehicle will go on and 
pass him, unless he sees a signal and that the moving· car 
is not going to pass. That is the statute and is sensible 
and reasonable. Not until he actually turns can a person 
coming to a vehicle have knowledge tl1at he is going to turn. 
If he don't give a signal, then it is his duty to pass the other 
car in accordance with No. 4. · 
By Mr. Allen: The first paragraph of l)ef endant 's Instruc-
tion E is apparently all right. The last paragraph of In-
• 
• 
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struction E is objected to, because it is based upon the as-
sumption that Stillman was not guilty of any negligence and 
there is no evidence to support any such instruction. 
Instruction F, I guess, is all right. 
page 25~ ~ Instruction G. G is predicated upon the assump-
. tion t~at Stillman is not guilty of any negligence, 
and there 1s no evidence to support any such assumption. 
Instruction H. I don't think there is any evidence to sup;. 
port any instruction based on the theory of negligence being 
evenly balanced. 
By the Court: All right, gentlemen. I will go over these 
instructions and may work out one instruction in the form 
of a charge, including all the points vou have asked for. I 
will try to do that. ., 
By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor does that, you will give us 
an opportunity to object to it. . 
May 14, 1942, · 
2 o'clock P. M .. 
At this point the Court and counsel convened in the Court's 
chambers. 
By the Court: Gentlemen, I have considered your instruc-
tions and I :find I will have to make a great many changes to 
meet my ideas, and I found it easier to draft another one. 
( Copies of the Court's instruction were sub-
page 260} mitted to counsel.) . 
By 'l\fr. Allen: With respect to the instructiqn 
prepared by the Court, I will say that it is a very fair state-
ment and is an accurate statement of the law, in my opinion, 
with' the possible exception of paragraph numbered in paren-
thesis 11, and I will not object to that paragraph if Mr. Bowles 
does not. If he objects to it, then I should like to point out 
wherein I am afraid that it is not an accurate statement of the 
law as applicable to this case, otherwise, in my opinion, it is 
correct. 
By the Court: I thought it '""ould be better to leave that 
out. If you want it out and Mr. Bowles wants it out, I will 
certainly strike it out. 
By Mr. Allen: I believe l would like to put in the1~e in its 
place what I consider an accurate statement. If Mr. Bowles 
agrees to it, I am willing for it to remain. 
By Mr. Bowles: Counsel for Defendants regrets that he 
cannot be quite as effusive in his praise of the Court's in-
struction as Counsel for the Plaintiff. We agree that it shows 
a very careful and earnest effort on the part of tlrn Court 
to state the law of the case; but, from the standpoint of the 
defendant, we must object and except to the giving- of any in-
' 
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struction for the plaintiff, for the reasons hereto-
page 261 r fore stated in the motion to strike. 
Counsel must also except to the refusal of the 
Court to g·ive the instructions tendered on behalf of the de-
fendant, numbered A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H, in the form in 
which tendered. 
Counsel has no objection to numbered paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 
of the Court-'s charge. 
Counsel for the Defendants disagrees with the Court's view 
stated in paragTaph No. 4: "It means the greater number 
of witnesses to whose testimony the jury lends credence. 
One witness upon whom the jury thoroughly relies may fur-
nish the preponderance of the evidence.'' Counsel feels that 
this paragraph may be confusing and misleading to the jury, 
because the statement, in ronnsel 's opinion, is too brief as 
to that phase of the instruction. 
Counsel does not disagree that paragraphs Nos. 5 and 6 
are a correct statement of the law, bnt as to the matters cov-
ered therein the Court is requested to state it to the jury in 
the form in which it was presented on behalf of these defend-
ants. 
As to paragraph No. 7, Counsel for the Defendants ex-
pressly objects to the giving of this paragraph of the instruc-
tion: 
First, on the ground that there is no evidence to support a 
right of way on behalf of the plaintiff; 
page 262 r Secondly, that the conditions and provisos pro-
vided by the statute are incorrectly stated, even 
if the right of way were g-iven to the plaintiff, and, without 
waiving these objections, the Court is requested to ameild it 
so it will read: '' provided, whenever the operation of any 
vehicle may be affected by such movement, the driver of the 
vehicle making such left turn shall l1ave first seen that such 
movement could be made in safety, and shall have first given 
plainly a visible sig11al of his intention to turn left, by ex-
tending- the left arm,'' &c., as set forth in numbered para-
graph 8. 
With. respect, further, to that numbered paragraph counsel 
urges upon the Court the fact that the failure to give any 
signal and the failure to make the left turn in accordance 
with the provigions of the law is, in itself, a violation of the 
statute, and, in itself, a proximate cause of the collision, and 
may be a basis for the defendants' rig·ht to a verdict, and, like-
wise, if the sole cause, a basis for their right to a recovery. 
The defendants' view as expressed in Instruction A is not 
presented to the jury as a ground for the defendants' re-
covery; but is only presented to the jury as a proviso and 
, 
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condition on which the' right of way improperly accorded the 
plaintiff can be had. 
With respect to paragraph No. 10, Counsel for the Def encl-
ants objects to that paragraph on the ground that 
page 263 ~ there is no evidence to support the instruction. 
It is in effect a last clear chance instruction. It is 
contrary to the evidence in the· case and is a prejudicial and 
irrelevant statement by the Court, excusing the actions ad-
mitted to have been made by the plaintiff. There is no evi-
dence that the defendant placed this plaintiff, ,vithout his 
fault, in a position of danger. There is no· evidence that, with-
·out negligence on his part, he was attempting to extricate him-
self from such clanger, and we submit, further, that the para-
graph is improper on even the testimony of the plaintiff that 
he did not see the automobile until within 30 to 50 feet of the 
intersection and after he had commenced his turn, in the light 
of the other evidence showing, in accordance with his claim, 
that the visibility was perfect and that the view was up to 
400vards. 
As to paragraph No. 11, Counsel for the Defendants objects 
on the gTouncl that there is no evidence that the signal was 
given and consequently it is error for the Court to excuse this 
failure in advance. 
· As to paragraph 12, Counsel objects to the language of this 
instruction because no driver was driving to the left except 
the plaintiff, Williams. 
Instr:uction No. C offered by the clef enclants places this duty 
upon Williams. The instruction drawn by the Court gives it 
as a general proposition of law applicable to all 
page 264 ~ drivers; w1rnreas, the defendants believe they are 
entitled to have the Court tell the jury specifically 
in this case that Mr. ,vmiams waR under that duty, without 
reference to any possibility of the defendants being under 
that duty. 
With respect to paragraph No. 15, it appears that the Court 
is attempting to state. a general propm;ition that if one party 
is guilty of negligenee and the other is free of efficient con-
tributQry neglig·ence sur.h pnrty free of negli~ence is entitled 
to recover; b11t the instruction iR so worded that it apnlies 
only to the nlnintiff, since it refers to injury rather than dam-
age. The def endanh~ not having- :filed any claim for injuries, 
thP instrnr>tion i~ misleading to the jury. 
Those. if your Honor please, are the obiections which conn-
sP.l for defendants are able to pP.rceive in this short length 
of timP to the instrurtion nrepa:recl hy the Court. 
Bv Mr. Allen: Yonr Honor, sinee Mr. Bowles objecfa to 
No. 11. I think I Rhoulcl call to your attention what I consider 
is ·a proper statement there. As stated yesterday, paragraph 
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No .. 3 of Instruction No. i offered by the plaintiff is what I 
think the law is on that subject. · 
By the Court: I don't think that is the law. I think the 
jury has to decide that. 
page 265 r By Mr. Allen: I object to No. 11 because I 
think that should be covered by language as fol-
lows: 
'"'If the jury believe from the evidence that Williams in ap-
proaching and entering said intersection was in such a posi-
tion that a reasonably prudent man, in the exercise of ordinary 
care and vigilance, would, under all the 6ircumstances of the 
case, have had reasonable grounds for apprehending that his 
making a left turn at said intersection might affect the oper-
ation of another vehicle on the highway, then it was the duty 
of Williams to give the arm signal required for a left turn; 
otherwise, he was under no duty to do so." 
By the Court: I will limit counsel to thirty minutes a side. 
By Mr. Bowles: If your Honor please, I hate to make a 
point .of the limitation of time for argument in a matter of 
this character; but your Honor is well a.ware of all the rami-
fications this case has gone into, in view of the questions of 
insurance and that statement and .several other matters, to-
gether with the fact that the case has been tried for two days, 
there are two counsel for the defendants and two defendants, 
and we earnestly and seriously believe that thirty minutes is 
too short a time for counsel to present our argument, and we 
earnestly ask you to give us forty-five minutes, and 
page 266 r wish to except to your refusal to do so. 
·Note: At this point the Court and counsel went into the 
courtroom and the jury was brought in and took their seats in 
the jury box. 
By Counsel for Defendants: If your Honor please, here a.re 
· the pictures which I think we spoke of yesterday and I for-
got to put them in yesterday. On the back of them is written 
the direction in which they were taken. By stipulation of 
counsel these pictures are introduced and filed as ''Defend-
ants' Exhibits Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14". 
By the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, you may consider 
those pictures as exhibits with the evidence. 
Note: The Court at this point read to the jury the instruc-
tion prepared by the Court. 
By the Court: Gentlemen of· the jury, I have used the 
word ''injury'' in this instruction and '' <Iamage '' in another 
place in the instruction. I do not draw any distinction qe-
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tween the two. You can consider ''damage'' as ''injury''. 
The two terms I have used interchangeably. 
Note: At this point ·argument was had by counsel, in ac-
cordance with the limitation of thirty minutes per 
page 267 ~ side, as prescribed by the Court. 
The argument for the plaintiff was opened by Mr.· George 
E. Allen, Jr., and thereupon Mr. Anderson and Mr. Bowles 
successively addressed the jury, in accordance with the limita-· 
tion imposed of thirty minutes, and during the course of the 
argument of Mr. George Ji]. Allen, Sr., the following occurred: 
" * * * What have we left. They bring.here a statement 
signed in the hospital by Mr. Williams, under the circum-
stances detailed here, and I submit to you gentlemen of the 
jury that the very :first statements that Mr. Dawson made when 
he entered that hospital were misrepresentations. And they 
come here and tell you that Mr. Dawson was an attorney at 
law, representing Mr. Stillman, and that Mr. Dawson went 
there as a representative and attorney for M:r. Stillman. It 
turns out that he came from Pennsylvania about three years 
ago, and all he has clone is to pay a fee for about three years 
to the Integrated Bar, and has not bought -a license for the 
City of Richmond or the State of Virginia, and he claims, 
therefore, he is entitled to represent Mr. Stillman 
page 268 ~ as a lawyer. His name is not on any of these 
papers. Aecording to his statement, his part as 
a lawyer is· giving incorrect statements-
By Mr. Bowles (interposing): My understanding of the 
evidence is that Mr. Dawson is qualified as a lawyer, and he 
does what it subsequently appears he does as a lawyer for 
an insurance carrier. We objected to the bringing out of the 
question of insurance, and if there was bias, it was 'brought 
out that he was attorney for Mr. Stillman. The evidence 
shows he gave Mr. Bruce a c~rd showing he was a representa-
tive of the insurance company, but he states that he did not 
know at the time that his insurance company was carrying 
the ri~k on the Stillman. car. 
By the Court: I overrule the objection. 
By Mr. Bowles: Exception is noted to the Court's ruling. 
By Mr. Allen (c.ontinuin~): I submit to you gentlemen o~ 
the :iury that he testified to and represented to you that 
he was an attorney at law, representing Mr. Stillman, and 
yon saw he did not have any right to practice law:, and he ad-
mitted it on the witness stand, and when first questioned he 
said he did not know he was representing the insurance com-
pany, and when he went out there and wanted to go into Mr. 
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. Bruce's room, and young Mr. Bruce would not let 
page 269 ~ him go in, he then handed Mr. Bruce a card show-
ing he represented the insurance company. * • * '' 
Note: At the close of th~ argument, the jury retired to the 
juryroom to considet:·6ftheitvetflic-t;1and'later returned with 
their verdict as follows: 
; "We, the ju_ry,.,on the .issues joineq., .find for the plaintiff 
a-gain~t Mercer Stillman and ,Berlo Vending . Company. and 
:;issess his damag~s at $3,000.00.'' 
N o{e : . :The. jm·y · w~s then excused. 
By Mr. Bow~es: If your Honor please, on behalf of both 
4efeilclants, with.,:r~spe~t: t<:>,both the notice of motion for judg-
:jnent and the cross claim, we move the Court to set aside the 
verdict and enter up ju~lgment for the defendants on the 
notice of motion for judgri1~nt, and, in the alternative, to grant 
the defendants a new trial, and, in any event, to grant a new 
trial 'on the cross claim, on the ground that the verdict is 
epntrary to the law and the evidence and without evidence 
to· ,support it, and because of errors e6mmitted during the 
c'ourse of the trial. . . 
· . Bv the· Court: I will hear argument of counsel on this 
motion at a later date. 
page 270 ~ I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
. · Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do here-
by·certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the reeord 
ip. the above entitled case wherein C. ,v. Williams 'is plaintiff 
arid Mercer Stillman and Berlo Vending Company, a Dela-
ware Corporation, defendants, with the exception of the origi-
nal exhibits filed in evidence and that the attorney of rec.ord 
:ror the plaintiff had 'clilc notice of the intention of the de-
fendants to apply for such transcript and that a suspending 
bond conditioned as prescribed in Section 6351 of the Code of 
Virginia has been executed on behalf of the ·defendants in 
the penalty of $3,000.00 with surety approved· by the Clerk 
of this Court. 
Witness my hand this 24th day of September, 1942. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for Record, $60.00 .. 
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